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Preface
Risk analysis should form the foundation on which food safety policy is based in the European Union
(White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 final). The EU should base its food policy on the articulation
of three primary components of risk analysis: risk assessment (scientific advice and information analysis) risk
management (policy-making, regulation and control) and risk communication. Risk assessment should pro-
vide scientific advice to underpin the Commission’s proposals on measures and policies that may affect the
health and safety of the citizens or impact on the environment (Communication on the precautionary princi-
ple, COM(2000)1final). However, in the decision making process in the EU, other legitimate factors can also
be taken into account. The definition of the scope of such legitimate factors has been debated and studied at
the international level particularly in Codex Alimentarius. Examples of such other legitimate factors include
environmental considerations, animal welfare, sustainable agriculture, precaution, consumers’ expectations
regarding product quality, the provision of information and definitions of the essential characteristics of prod-
ucts and their process and production methods. The role of scientific evidence and expertise and these ‘other
legitimate factors’ in science-based risk policy-making has been the focus for considerable analysis and re-
search for over twenty years. One key focus of those debates has been concerned with whether those ‘other
legitimate factors’ should be taken into account ‘down-stream’ i.e. only after scientific risk assessments have
taken place, or ‘up-stream’ too, i.e. in advance of the conduct of risk assessments.
This project was designed as a follow-up of a previous ESTO study (Science in trade disputes related
to potential risks: comparative case studies, IPTS, October 2004 EUR 21301 EN) that provided detailed em-
pirical evidence (from three disputes and six institutional settings) showing that scientific risk assessments
are routinely, and perhaps invariably, conditioned by sets of prior up-stream ‘framing assumptions’ that de-
termine, for example:
• which kinds of effects are deemed to be within the scope of the assessment and which are outside it, 
• which kinds of evidence are included and which discounted, 
• how the selected evidence is to be interpreted, and 
• how much of different kinds of evidence may be necessary or sufficient to sustain different types of
judgements.
That ESTO study also concluded, not just that such up-stream framing assumptions are present and ac-
tive, even if they are not always explicitly acknowledged, but more importantly that they are key to under-
standing many of the most intractable disputes between the EU and its trading partners in the WTO, and that
they are also pivotal to similar disputes within the EU. 
In this context, the General Principles Committee of the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission
has articulated a new concept, namely what it terms ‘risk assessment policy’ to refer closely to what was
explicated above, and in the mentioned ESTO report, in terms of ‘upstream framing assumptions’.
Even though no statutory jurisdiction has yet explicitly articulated the concept of a ‘risk assessment
policy’ as Codex has, several have outlined, or have bodies that have recommended elements of a risk as-
sessment policy. There are several more-or-less fully articulated elements of what Codex refers to as ‘risk as-
sessment policy’, and the study presented herewith was designed to provide a comparative map and analysis
of those innovations and initiatives.
At a plenary meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission in Rome in July 2007 the assembled
Member States adopted a policy statement to the effect that risk managers, in all national competent author-
ities, would provide their national risk assessment bodies with risk assessment policy guidance. That deci-
sion makes this report particularly timely.
Germany, the UK, the USA, Japan and Argentina are the 5 national jurisdictions chosen for analysis.
The WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission is the pivotal organization setting baseline standards for
internationally traded food and agricultural commodities, and as the source of the concept of ‘risk assess-
ment policy’, was a pivotal focus of study and analysis although it is not a legal jurisdiction. 
Within the EU, Germany and the UK provide a relevant contrast. In Germany, an institutional division
has been created by the establishment of two separate organisations responsible for science-based risk as-
sessments (Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung) on the one hand and risk management policy-making (Bun-
desamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit) on the other, although with little explicit attention
to what Codex calls ‘risk assessment policy’. In the UK, on the other hand, both risk assessment and risk
management functions are located within the Food Standards Agency (FSA). The FSA has not explicitly ac-
knowledged the concept of a ‘risk assessment policy’, but it has articulated something analogous in its
Guidelines for Scientific Advisory Committees.
The USA has been chosen because of the importance of risk assessment policy differences between the
EU and the USA, including those that were highlighted in the above-mentioned ESTO study on Science
and Trade Disputes.
Argentina has been selected partly because Argentinean officials served as co-chairs (with Canada) of
a working group of the Codex Committee on General Principles that drafted the working principles for risk
analysis, which reported to the full Codex Committee on General Principles in April 2005. The Argentineans
therefore represent the developing country that was more actively engaged in discussions of the interpreta-
tion and operationalisation of the concept of risk assessment policy than any other.
Japan is included partly because it represents a major OECD non-European country with which to con-
trast the risk assessment policies in the EU and USA; partly because it has recently established a new Food
Safety Commission that ostensibly resembles the UK’s Food Standards Agency, but which in practice is in-
terpreting its role and remit rather differently. 
The data for this study were mostly gathered during 2005 and 2006, although subsequent develop-
ments are referred to, but in less detail.
The study, coordinated by JRC, was led by Prof Erik Millstone (SPRU – Science and Technology Policy,
University of Sussex) in collaboration with Dr Patrick van Zwanenberg (FLACSO, Argentina). Dr Les Levi-
dow (Centre for Technology Strategy, Open University) was in charge of the research and interviews in USA
and UK, Dr Armin Spök (IFZ - Inter-University Research Centre for Technology, Work and Culture) in Ger-
many, Prof Hideyuki Hirakawa (Faculty for Study of Contemporary Society, Kyoto Women’s University) and
Makiko Matsuo (University of Tokyo, Japan) were responsible for the case studies in Japan. Dr van Zwanen-
berg was in charge of the study in Argentina and Erik Millstone was responsible for the study of Codex and
corresponding global institutions. 
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This study examined how risk assessment
policies are in practice being decided and opera-
tionalised in different jurisdictions. Our starting as-
sumption was that, where public policy-making
institutions formally take responsibility for risk ap-
praisal and decision-making, some risk assessment
policy assumptions arise, even if they are not ex-
plicitly acknowledged or labelled in those terms.
We found that the choice was not between having
a risk assessment policy and not having one, but
between being explicit and transparent about RAP
judgements, or being implicit and opaque.
The topic – ‘risk assessment policy’
This project has examined food safety risk as-
sessment policy-making at the global level (in the
Codex Alimentarius Commission and its joint
FAO/WHO expert advisory committees) in the
USA, the UK, Germany, Japan and Argentina, in
relation to chemical risks and to risks from GM
foods and crops.1
Aims and objectives
The aim of this project has been to enrich our
understanding of the interactions between scientific
and policy considerations in food safety policy-
making, and of the policy implications of those in-
teractions. The objective has been to provide
detailed comparative characterisations of the ways
in which scientific and policy considerations have
interacted over several important food safety policy
issues in the USA, the UK, Germany, Japan and Ar-
gentina and in the corresponding global institutions. 
Context
The concept of a ‘risk assessment policy’ first
emerged in the 1983 US National Research Coun-
cil’s (NRC) report entitled Risk Assessment in the
Federal Government, which has come to be
known as the ‘Red Book’ because it was bound in
a red cover. 
The US NRC interpreted the concept of ‘risk as-
sessment policy’ as referring to policy judgments
that arise during risk assessments and confront risk
assessors, beyond purely scientific issues. The Red
Book used the expression to refer to non-scientific
assumptions made by risk assessors during the
course of their assessments. The authors of the Red
Book understood those risk assessment policy issues
as ones for which, in principle, risk managers and
risk assessors could take joint responsibility and
which could be embodied in agreed guidelines.
Debates about risk assessment policy type
judgments have evolved significantly since then.
The public policy literature increasingly recognises
that scientific assessments are conditioned by var-
ious kinds of prior non-scientific ‘framing assump-
tions’. A recent and important example is the
Codex Alimentarius Commission that since the late
1990s has been using the expression ‘risk assess-
ment policy’ to refer to risk management consider-
ations that frame risk assessments, and thus for
which risk managers could and should take ex-
plicit responsibility.2
Codex has stipulated that:
• Determination of risk assessment policy
should be included as a specific component
of risk management.
• Risk assessment policy should be estab-
lished by risk managers in advance of risk
assessment, in consultation with risk asses-
sors and all other interested parties. This
procedure aims at ensuring that the risk as-
sessment is systematic, complete, unbiased
and transparent.3
Executive Summary
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1 In this report we refer to these as ‘institutional settings’ and confine the use of the term ‘jurisdictions’ to national states that make and en-
force laws.
2 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 14th Edition, 2004, Appendix IV. Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Applica-
tion in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, paras 13-15, pp. 103-104
3 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 14th Edition, 2004, Appendix IV, Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Applica-
tion in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, paras 13-14, p. 103
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Codex also characterises risk assessment pol-
icy as “Documented [policy] guidelines on the
choice of options and associated judgements for
their application at appropriate points in the risk
assessment such that the scientific integrity of the
process is maintained.”4
The approach
In this study, we understand the expression
‘risk assessment policy’ (or RAP) to refer to all
those assumptions that frame and guide the con-
duct and content of risk assessments. We do not
assume that all such judgements can necessarily
be formulated as explicit policies. Nor do we as-
sume that these are matters that should be decided
either by scientists or by policy-makers on their
own. We approached this study with open minds
on both the question of how realistic it is to expect
that any and all risk assessment policy-like judge-
ments could be formulated as explicit policies and
on the question of how realistic it is to expect pol-
icy-makers exhaustively to address any and all po-
tentially relevant risk assessment policy issues in
advance of scientific assessments commencing.
Our findings indicate that some RAP issues that
have remained implicit can and should be made
explicit and decided in advance of commencing
scientific risk assessments; and also that the impor-
tance of those RAP issues is insufficiently recog-
nised.
The findings - three types of RAPs
Our research has shown that risk assessment
policy can be understood as comprising at least
three main types of considerations, namely proce-
dural, substantive and interpretative issues. Those
types of risk assessment policy issues invariably
condition the ways in which risk assessments are
framed, conducted and reported. They are, more-
over, inter-dependent.
Procedural risk assessment policies are con-
cerned with the responsibilities of risk assessors
and the processes by which risk assessments are
conducted. Substantive risk assessment policy is-
sues are concerned with delineating which poten-
tial changes and effects are included within the
scope of risk assessments and which are outside
their scope. Interpretative risk assessment policy
issues are concerned with the ways in which data
are interpreted. Data and documents do not inter-
pret themselves; interpretation often involves
judgements and assumptions.
The importance of RAPs
Risk assessment policy issues are important
for several reasons. Often, when different risk as-
sessors, especially in different institutional settings
or national jurisdictions, reach different conclu-
sions in their risk assessments, they do so because
they are adopting distinct risk assessment policies
rather than because some committees provide
more or less scientific answers than others. They
are, therefore, often not providing conflicting an-
swers to common and agreed sets of questions
concerning shared and agreed bodies of evidence.
Often they are answering different questions be-
cause they make different risk assessment policy
assumptions and are considering different sets of
data. Even when the sets of questions and sets of
data coincide, different risk assessment policy as-
sumptions may entail that they interpret those data
in different ways. Making a wider range of risk as-
sessment policy issues explicit, and deciding them
in transparent ways, can provide resources with
which disputes can appropriately be addressed,
both within and across jurisdictions.
Dynamics of change
For a variety of historical reasons, there have
been pressures not only at Codex and the joint
FAO/WHO expert committees, but also in the
USA, in the UK, Germany and Japan to address
risk assessment policy issues more explicitly and
more accountably than hitherto. Similar pressures
are less conspicuous in Argentina.
Procedural, substantial and interpretative risk
assessment judgements are ubiquitous, in the
sense that they arise in relation to any and all risk
assessments in all the institutional contexts under
review; and indeed in relation to all institutional
contexts.
The extent to which those risk assessment poli-
cies are explicit and acknowledged varies consider-
5 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 14th Edition, 2004, Appendix IV. Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Applica-
tion in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, paras 13-15, pp. 103-104
ably. In none of the institutional settings are they en-
tirely implicit, and in none are they entirely explicit.
Over time, they have become increasingly explicit,
and this trend may well continue and spread. 
Partially complying with guidelines?
This study has examined the extent to which
RAP decision-making has conformed to the ex-
plicit guidelines provided by Codex and by na-
tional jurisdictions. The Codex Procedural Manual
stipulates that: “…risk assessment policy should be
included as a specific component of risk manage-
ment. Risk assessment policy should be estab-
lished by risk managers in advance of risk
assessment, in consultation with risk assessors and
all other interested parties.”5 That stipulation is not
being met by Codex Committees and their joint
FAO/WHO risk assessment advisory bodies. The
stipulation in the Codex Procedural Manual is not
being fully met in any of the five national jurisdic-
tions under review either, but in every jurisdiction
it is being partly met. There may, however, be other
ways in which RAP issues can be set in publicly
accountable ways, as this study illustrates.
Some risk assessment policy issues have been
explicitly addressed at Codex and the joint
FAO/WHO expert committees, in the USA, the
UK, Germany, Japan and Argentina. Only rarely,
however, are they fully acknowledged, and de-
cided by risk managers in consultation with all rel-
evant stakeholders in advance of the conduct of
risk assessments. Only sometimes are they ad-
dressed in transparent or accountable ways.
The findings of this study indicate that, when
it comes to setting and legitimating risk assessment
policies, neither Codex or the joint FAO/WHO
committees nor any of the five national jurisdic-
tions is dealing with the set of risk issues we have
examined in ways that are mutually consistent
within particular institutional settings. All have at
least some RAP guidelines, but none has compre-
hensive explicit guidelines covering procedural,
substantive and interpretative issues. 
In the USA, RAP guidance is relatively com-
prehensive in relation to toxicological (especially
carcinogenic) risks from chemicals in the food sup-
ply, but not in relation to GM foods or crops. In
the UK, Germany and Japan on the other hand,
some types of RAP guidance are far more compre-
hensive and explicit in relation to GM foods and
crops than in respect of food chemical risks.
To the extent that explicit RAP guidelines have
been provided, none is being fully implemented or
complied with, although in the USA the compli-
ance of food toxicology risk assessors is more com-
prehensive than that found in the other institutional
settings.
In each of the institutional settings, and on all
of the risk issues (that they deal with), at least some
aspects of the three main types of risk assessment
policy issues have been explicitly addressed and
decided. Frequently, however, risk assessors have
decided such issues rather than risk managers. Os-
tensibly, scientific bodies are therefore taking pol-
icy decisions that scientific considerations alone
cannot be sufficient to decide. Some risk assess-
ment policy issues remain unacknowledged and
unaccountable, with policy judgements portrayed
as if they were scientific.
In Germany, the UK and Argentina numerous
substantial risk assessment policy issues concern-
ing both routine and non-threshold food chemical
risk issues have been decided by scientists working
as risk assessors, rather than by risk managers.
The context and ways in which GM foods and
crops policies have been decided since the mid-
1990s were radically different from those in which
the regulatory regimes covering food additives and
pesticide were developed in the 1950s and 1960s.
Explicit public disputes about the breadth or nar-
rowness of the scope of risk assessments of GM
crops and foods have raged, especially in Europe
and Japan, and those debates have had a profound
impact on the substance and procedures of GM
policy-making.
The scope of GM crop risk assessments has
explicitly been widened in response to public con-
troversies. While, initially, risk assessments focused
only on direct and short-term effects, in the late
1990s in the EU and Japan their scope was broad-
ened to include long-term and indirect effects, and
in this decade to include a concern for effects, for
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example, on non-target organisms, and in Japan to
include effects on soil micro-organisms. Although
changes have occurred to the scope of GM risk as-
sessment policy in Argentina too, it has not been
possible to document those changes because of a
chronic lack of transparency.
In the USA the contrast across sectors is quite
different. The policy dimensions of toxicological,
and especially carcinogenicity, assessments are ex-
plicitly acknowledged and addressed. By contrast,
GM foods have generally required no regulatory
approval or risk assessment; while that policy is
portrayed as based only on sound science. 
In the EU, the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) has issued some RAP guidance, for example
in relation to GM foods and crops. Our findings,
however, indicate divergent judgements by EFSA
and some national expert committees, eg by those
in the UK and Germany, and by different risk as-
sessment bodies in both those countries.
Setting RAPs 
There are already opportunities for some ex-
plicit public debates concerning the scope of risk
assessments, which in this study is referred to as
‘substantive’ risk assessment policy-making. While
some maintain that scientists should be left to de-
cide the agenda for scientific deliberations, others
argue that there may and should be more opportu-
nities for a broad range of stakeholder groups to
contribute to articulating the questions that the sci-
entists are requested to address. That task has often
previously been referred to as ‘risk identification’
or ‘hazard identification’, which sets the agenda
for the subsequent deliberations of risk assessors.
Within the policy literature, there are disputes be-
tween those who assert that ‘risk identification’ is
a scientific task and others who argue that it is a
risk management responsibility. Our findings sug-
gest that it is a discussion to which risk assessors,
risk managers, other stakeholders and individual
citizens can helpfully contribute. Similar argu-
ments apply to procedural and interpretative RAP
issues too.
Transparency and accountability
Over recent years, policy-makers have reiter-
ated commitments to making food-safety policy-
making more open, transparent and accountable.
This trend has been especially evident in European
contexts such as in the UK and Germany, and in
Japan. The USA has operated with a Freedom of
Information Act since the 1970s, as well as other
institutional features that drive disclosure. One
consequence of the sustained trend towards
greater transparency and accountability has been
that risk assessment policy issues of the type that
remained implicit for many years in many institu-
tional settings, are now increasingly seen for what
they are.
Many aspects of the current arrangements for
the organisation of risk assessments, and the inter-
actions between risk managers and risk assessors,
are confronted by challenges to their legitimacy.
Some challenges arise because key risk assessment
policy issues emerge at the intersection or bound-
ary between nominally separate and independent
institutions. Procedural transparency and opportu-
nities for comparing judgements of risk assessors
and risk managers, within Europe and between Eu-
rope and other international trading partners, also
generate pressure on regulatory regimes to deal ex-
plicitly with all three types of RAPs.
Making risk assessment policy decisions ex-
plicit might be seen, by some risk managers, as an
unwelcome extra burden, and by some risk asses-
sors as an unwelcome intrusion into matters over
which traditionally they were able to exercise au-
tonomy and discretion. However, if risk managers
took greater explicit responsibility for risk assess-
ment policy-making they could more readily jus-
tify and sustain regulatory decisions and policy
differences. They could participate in a collective
exercise of comparing the risk assessment policies
of different jurisdictions, thus clarifying the basis
for their differences and possibly even overcoming
them. Policy-making processes, and the decisions
that they reach, might also achieve greater scien-
tific and democratic legitimacy.
The ways in which risk appraisal and deci-
sion-making are decided might become more ac-
countable if risk assessment policy issues were
explicitly acknowledged to be, and treated as, pol-
icy judgements that should be decided by demo-
cratically accountable risk managers, rather than
by risk assessors, and in ways that would involve a
broad range of stakeholders.
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List of abbreviations
ACNFP The UK Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes
ACRE The UK Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment
ADI Acceptable Daily Intake
AFC Panel on food additives, flavourings, processing aids and materials in contact with food of
the European Food Safety Authority
AFFRC The Japanese Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council
APA The US Administrative Procedures At
BBA The German Centre for Agriculture and Forestry
BfR The German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment
BGA The German Federal Health Office (Bundesgesundheitsamt)
BgVV The German Federal Institute for Consumer Health Protection and Veterinary Medicine
BMD benchmark dose 
BMDL benchmark dose lower confidence limit
BMELV The German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection formerly the
BMVEL
BMVEL The German Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food, and Agriculture, now the
BMELV, established 2001
BMG The German Federal Ministry of Health formerly BMGS
BMR benchmark response
BSE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (also known as Mad Cow Disease)
BVL The German Federal Agency for Consumer Protection and Food Safety
CAC Codex Alimentarius Commission
CAAEB The Japanese Committee for the Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity
CCFAC Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants
CCRVDF Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods
CCPR Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues
CoC The UK Committee on Carcinogenicity
Codex Codex Alimentarius Commission
CoM The UK Committee on Mutagenicity
CONABIA The Argentine advisory committee for environmental releases of GM plants
CoT The UK Committee on Toxicity
DEFRA The UK Department for Food Environment and Rural Affairs
DQA The US Data Quality Act
EC European Community
ECGMF The Japanese Expert Committee for GM Foods
EFSA European Food Safety Authority
EPA US Environmental Protection Agency
ESTO European Science and Technology Observatory
EU European Union
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FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FSA the UK Food Standards Agency
FSC The Japanese Food Safety Commission, established 2003
FSCAB The Japanese Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau of the MAFF
GM genetically modified
IPTS Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
IRGC The International Risk Governance Council
JCCU The Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union
JECFA Joint (WHO-FAO) Expert Committee on Food Additives
JMPR Joint (WHO-FAO) Meeting on Pesticides Residues
MAFF The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MAFF The UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, abolished in 2001 and replaced by
DEFRA
MHLW The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
MoE Margin of Exposure
MOE the Japanese Ministry of Environment
MRL Maximum Residue Level
NEL no effect level
NOEL no observed effect level
NOAEL no observed adverse effect level
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHPNDF The Japanese Office of Health Policy on Newly Developed Foods
OMB US Office of Management and Budget
OST UK Office of Science and Technology
pH indicator of acidity and alkalinity
RAP risk assessment policy
RKI Robert Koch Institute, in Germany 
UBA The German Federal Environmental Agency
UK United Kingdom on Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
WHO World Health Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation
ZKBS The German Central Commission for Biological Safety at the BVL
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A recently completed comparative study for
ESTO of food safety policy-making in Austria,
France, the UK, the USA and the European Com-
mission provided detailed empirical evidence
showing that scientific risk assessments are rou-
tinely conditioned by sets of prior non-scientific
‘framing assumptions’ that depend on the particu-
lar social and economic context in which those
deliberations take place and decisions are made.6
One of the most explicit official acknowledg-
ments of the role of non-scientific framing assump-
tions in risk assessment science emerged in the
final years of the 20th century and the early years of
this decade in the deliberations of the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission (or Codex (or CAC) for
short). Codex is a body that sets baseline food
safety standards for internationally traded food and
agricultural products. It is jointly convened by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO);
its members are the individual national states that
belong to the UN and WHO, as well as regional
jurisdictions such as the EC/EU. Codex discharges
its responsibility for risk management by setting
those standards in the light of advice from joint
FAO/WHO expert committees that are expected to
provide scientific assessments of risks. 
In 2004, Codex’s Procedural Manual was re-
vised and supplemented with explicit statements
to the effect that in advance of scientific commit-
tees conducting risk assessments, they should be
provided with guidance on what Codex calls ‘risk
assessment policy’.
The concept of a ‘risk assessment policy’ first
emerged in the 1983 US National Research Coun-
cil’s report entitled Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government, which has come to be known as the
Red Book because it was bound in a red-coloured
cover. In that document, the concept is introduced
in the following context: 
The nature of risk assessment
Regulatory actions are based on two distinct
elements, risk assessment…and risk manage-
ment. Risk assessment is the use of the factual
base to define the health effects of exposure of
individuals or populations to hazardous mate-
rials… Risk management is the process of
weighing policy alternatives and selecting the
most appropriate regulatory action, integrat-
ing the results of risk assessment…with social,
economic, and political concerns to reach a
decision.
Codex now defines risk assessment policy as
“Documented guidelines on the choice of options
and associated judgements for their application at
appropriate points in the risk assessment such that
the scientific integrity of the process is main-
tained.”7
The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s Proce-
dural Manual refers to Risk Assessment Policy in
the following terms:
• Determination of risk assessment policy
should be included as a specific component
of risk management.
• Risk assessment policy should be estab-
lished by risk managers in advance of risk
assessment, in consultation with risk asses-
sors and all other interested parties. This
procedure aims at ensuring that the risk as-
sessment is systematic, complete, unbiased
and transparent.
• The mandate given by risk managers to risk
assessors should be as clear as possible.8
(emphasis added)
Codex acknowledges therefore that risk as-
sessments do not occur in a policy vacuum but in
the context of prior risk assessment policy (or RAP)
judgements. Codex indicated explicitly that re-
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tions/publication.cfm?pub=1203
7 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 14th Edition, 2004, p. 46
8 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 14th Edition, 2004, Appendix IV. Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Applica-
tion in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, paras 13-15, pp. 103-104
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sponsibility for deciding risk assessment policy
should lie with risk managers (i.e. those responsi-
ble for policy-making) and not with risk assessors.
Codex also indicates that risk assessment policies
should be made by risk managers in consultation
with all other interested parties, as well as with risk
assessors, and through a transparent process. 
Even though Codex is now more explicit about
the character and importance of risk assessment
policies than any previous policy-making body, we
propose to use the expression in a slightly wider and
less dogmatic way than Codex has adopted. This is
for two reasons. Firstly, in this study, we understand
the expression ‘risk assessment policy’ to refer to all
those assumptions that frame and guide the conduct
and content of scientific assessments. Some of those
assumptions might derive from explicit or even im-
plicit policies, but they may also derive from legal
statutes or institutional structures which are not
often thought of as ‘policies’. Some framing assump-
tions may be far more ad hoc than the notion of pol-
icy implies. The important point is that we do not
wish from the outset to exclude particular kinds of
assumptions and judgements when it is unclear, a
priori, whether they are or could be formulated as
explicit policies. Thus, for the purposes of this study
we do not assume that all of the judgements that
frame and guide the conduct and content of scien-
tific assessments can necessarily be formulated as
explicit policies and we approached this study with
open minds on the questions of how realistic it is to
expect that any and all risk assessment policy-like
judgements could be formulated as explicit policies. 
Secondly, the Codex Procedural Manual im-
plies that risk assessment policies always can and
should be articulated in advance of the conduct of
risk assessments. We assume that while there may
be considerable scope for the explicit articulation
of risk assessment policies in advance of risk assess-
ments commencing, we also assume that some risk
assessment policy issues may arise during the
course of risk assessment deliberation, and there-
fore that it may be unrealistic and unduly restrictive
to suppose that they can be exhaustively specified
by risk managers before risk assessment delibera-
tions begin. We assume that risk assessors may en-
counter open-ended dilemmas in the scientific
characterisation of risks, and that some RAP issues
may emerge in the course of their deliberation. Our
approach assumes that those issues might appropri-
ately be referred to risk managers for their guidance,
without supposing that all necessary guidance can
be finalised before risk assessments begin.
1.1. Research questions
The central questions upon which this re-
search project has focused are: 
What are the various types of risk assessment
policies?
Can particular risk assessment policies be re-
liably identified, and can explicit and implicit poli-
cies be reliably differentiated and characterised?
Which risk assessment policies are being
made explicit, and which remain implicit?
How are risk assessment policies being de-
cided in practice, and how does this compare to
Codex and national guidance?
How do risk assessment policies compare
within and across jurisdictions and institutional
settings?
One objective of this project is to identify the
extent to which, and the ways in which, the guid-
ance on risk assessment policy from Codex is
being operationalised within the Codex/joint
FAO/WHO system, and within several of its Mem-
ber States, and to clarify whether those policies are
converging or diverging. 
1.2. Rationale for the project
In international trade disputes such as those
concerning beef hormones and GM crops, risk as-
sessors in different jurisdictions and institutional
settings sometimes reached conflicting conclu-
sions not because they were providing competing
interpretations of shared and agreed bodies of ev-
idence, but because they were answering different
questions. Since risk assessment policy judgements
are pivotal to the framing and selection of those
questions, risk assessment policies should be a
crucial, but hitherto neglected, focus of inquiry.9
An understanding of risk assessment policy-mak-
ing can therefore contribute firstly to the task of ex-
plaining why particular regulatory regimes have
been established and why specific risk control
measures are being taken, secondly to explain
how and why disputes have arisen, and thirdly to
explore the conditions under which they might ei-
ther escalate or be resolved. To the extent that risk
assessment policies in different jurisdictions might
converge, there might be fewer occasions for dis-
putes to occur, or where they did occur, they might
be addressed more appropriately and effectively. 
Achieving clarity on issues of risk assessment
policy might be important not only for international
discussions about regulations, standards and food
safety policies but also for enhancing the trans-
parency of policy-making procedures and decisions
in the domestic debates within national jurisdictions.
At the European level, where the European Food
Safety Authority is expected to liaise with, and coor-
dinate, the views of 25 national competent authori-
ties, clarity and consensus about risk assessment
policy-making may be especially important.
1.3. Historical context
‘Risk assessment policy’ in the 1983
Red Book
The concept of a ‘risk assessment policy’ was
first articulated in the 1983 Red Book.10 In a sec-
tion entitled ‘The Nature of Risk Assessment’ the
NRC said: 
Risk assessments contain some or all of the
following four steps:
• Hazard identification…
• Dose-response assessment...
• Exposure assessment...
• Risk characterization...
In each step, a number of decision points…
occur where risk to human health can only be
inferred from the available evidence. Both sci-
entific judgments and policy choices may be
involved in selecting from among possible in-
ferential bridges…we have used the term risk
assessment policy to differentiate those judg-
ments and choices from the broader social
and economic policy issues that are inherent
in risk management decisions.11
The NRC implied that ‘both scientific judg-
ments and policy choices’ are involved in all
stages of risk assessment, but that in practice scien-
tific risk assessors have often taken responsibility
for making those choices, although in principle
some choices could be the joint responsibility of
risk assessors and risk managers. The contempo-
rary Codex usage of the expression is rather differ-
ent; Codex uses the phrase to refer to prior policy
choices that inform the conduct of risk assessments
for which risk managers can and should take ex-
plicit and prior responsibility.
Following the upheavals in food safety policy
making in European Member States in the aftermath
of the UK BSE crisis of March 1996, and analogous
crises in other Member States once BSE was con-
firmed in their cattle herds, an entire wave of new in-
stitutions was created. Policy-makers frequently
insisted that the principles guiding their reforms in-
cluded commitments to ‘independence’, ‘openness’,
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’. Similar changes
also occurred in Japan, following the discovery of
BSE in Japanese herds. Giving greater independence
to risk assessors, and enhancing the openness with
which risk assessments are conducted, and with
which risk assessors and risk managers communi-
cate with each other, has created conditions under
which issues of risk assessment policy have come in-
creasingly to be explicitly addressed, even though
the term ‘risk assessment policy’ has only very rarely
been applied to them. Against that background, this
study focuses on how, in relation to food safety, RAP
issues are being decided, and on comparing those
decision-making processes with the template set out
in the Codex Procedural Manual and in national
guidance documents.
1.4. Analytical context
Prior to the BSE crises, and other food safety
crises of the last ten years, the ways in which food
safety policy-making, and the contributions of sci-
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entific knowledge and expertise, were portrayed
corresponded to two main models: a technocratic
and a decisionist model. 
A technocratic model
A technocratic model assumes that policy de-
cisions about technological risks, such as those
concerning food safety, can and should be based
solely on scientific considerations. One indication
of a technocratic approach is the claim that partic-
ular policies have been based on and only on
‘sound science’. The key characteristics of the
technocratic model are that it assumes, in effect,
that science operates in complete independence
of social, political, cultural and economic condi-
tions, and that science provides not just a neces-
sary, but a sufficient, basis for policy
decision-making. The technocratic model is repre-
sented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The technocratic model: policy
based on sound science.
Previous research showed that the techno-
cratic model does not, however, provide sufficient
resources with which to understand international,
intra-European or even domestic disputes over is-
sues such as BSE, beef hormones, rBST and GM
foods.12 Policy differences are not simply a conse-
quence of some jurisdictions accepting ‘sound sci-
ence’, while all others that disagree rely on
‘unsound science’. Different risk assessment bod-
ies provide competing representations of possible
risks not simply because they are providing com-
peting answers to an agreed set of questions, but
often because the questions they are addressing
and answering differ significantly. They may be
equally scientific, but different. 
The technocratic model is not only empiri-
cally unsupported, it is also unable to explain how
policy can be decided in conditions of acknowl-
edged scientific uncertainty, which cannot
uniquely indicate any particular scientific, let
alone policy, conclusion. The prevalence of uncer-
tainties is increasingly hard not to acknowledge,
especially when different jurisdictions are in dis-
pute, and their disputes revolve around competing
scientific conclusions.13
The ‘decisionist’ model
In response to the inadequacies of techno-
cratic narratives, and the increasingly conspicuous
uncertainties complicating understandings of the
risks of e.g. BSE and GM foods and crops, an in-
creasingly large portion of European jurisdictions,
public policy-makers and their expert advisors
now represent the processes in which they partic-
ipate in terms of what is often called a ‘decisionist’
model, illustrated graphically in Figure 2. This cor-
responds closely to what in the USA is known as
the ‘Red Book’ model.14 Decisionism assumes that
risk policy is, and should be, the product of a two-
stage process, the first of which is purely scientific,
often called ‘risk assessment’. On this account, the
scientific risk assessment is subsequently supple-
mented by economic, social and political consid-
erations, which also contribute to policy decisions
in a process called ‘risk management’. On this
model, a risk assessment should not only be prior
to, but entirely independent of, any and all risk
management considerations and judgements. The
‘decisionist’ point of view is found very widely in
most of the jurisdictions we examined, and repre-
sents the prevailing contemporary orthodoxy in the
USA, in Germany and Japan, as well as at the Eu-
ropean Commission and at the FAO, WHO and
Codex. Orthodoxy in those contexts often involves
both the invocation of decisionist rhetorical dis-
course and the ostensible organisation of institu-
tional responsibilities.
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13 See e.g. European Commission, TRANSPARENCY IN RISK ASSESSMENT CARRIED OUT BY EFSA: GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON PRO-
CEDURAL ASPECTS, The EFSA Journal (2006) 353, 1 – 16, April 2006
14 US NRC (1983) Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, National Research Council, Washington DC
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Figure 2:The decisionist (Red Book) model: science first, policy-making second
R
is
k-
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s:
19
Policy MakingScience
Scientific considerations Technical, economic and social information
Policy outcome and regulations
On this model, science influences policy-
making, but policy-making does not influence sci-
entific risk assessments. The decisionist model
provides more resources with which to understand
the occurrence and persistence of both domestic
and international trade disputes than the techno-
cratic model, since it can account for the fact that
different groups and jurisdictions may deem differ-
ent levels of risk to be acceptable; but it is not suf-
ficiently rich fully to comprehend the nature and
complexities of these disputes. Just as with the
technocratic model, it remains difficult from the
perspective of the decisionist model to explain
why different groups of expert advisors provide in-
compatible risk assessments, without assuming
that some or all of the competing assessments are
‘unsound’ or politically biased.
The decisionist model is nonetheless a com-
monplace orthodoxy in official documentation
and rhetoric, both at the national and the interna-
tional levels. For example, a recently issued draft
joint report from the UN FAO and WHO outlining
a Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice
on Food Safety and Nutrition (to Codex and mem-
ber countries) presupposes a decisionist ap-
proach.15 It asserts, for example, that the proposed
framework is “…based on the functional separa-
tion between risk assessment and risk management
in order to ensure scientific integrity and inde-
pendence, avoid confusion over the respective
roles of risk assessors and risk managers, and re-
duce potential conflicts of interest.16 The whole-
hearted endorsement of a decisionist orthodoxy on
the part of FAO and WHO might seem hard to rec-
oncile with the risk assessment policy provisions
of the Codex Procedural Manual, but that indicates
a tension between the greater willingness of the
risk management body to acknowledge and take
some responsibility for risk assessment policy-
making compared to the reluctance of the ‘risk as-
sessors’ to acknowledge that their risk assessments
are framed by policy judgements. 
The trend for governments to establish ‘inde-
pendent’ agencies with responsibility for food
safety policy-making has been evident in the USA,
the UK, Germany, France, throughout the EU, and
at the European Commission with the establish-
ment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
as well in other countries such as Japan. In the EU,
Regulation 178/2002, ‘laying down the general
principles and requirements of food law, establish-
ing the European Food Safety Authority and laying
down procedures in matters of food safety’ for-
mally set the decisionist model on a statutory basis
for the EFSA.17 The creation of such agencies has
often been legitimated in terms of the separation
of risk assessment from risk management, although
that terminology was not invoked in the UK when
the Food Standards Agency was established. 
15 UN FAO & WHO, FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition (to Codex and member coun-
tries) - Final Draft for Public Comments, Rome/Geneva 2006, available 27 February 2007 from 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/index_en.stm as ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/framework_en.pdf
16 op cit para 2.2 page 3 
17 REGULATION (EC) No 178/2002 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 28 January 2002 laying down the gen-
eral principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of
food safety, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 31/1-24, 1 Feb 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_031/l_03120020201en00010024.pdf
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For the reasons set out above, we broadly
share the view that underpins the introduction by
Codex of the concept of risk assessment policy
namely that scientific assessments of risk are
framed in some important ways by their social and
policy contexts. From this perspective, it is mis-
leading to represent policy-making as divided into
a purely scientific up-stream risk assessment phase
followed by a down-stream risk management
phase. Rather scientific risk assessments are
framed by legal requirements, institutional struc-
tures, and by other social, economic and political
judgements. Those up-stream judgements directly
concern or indirectly influence, for example, the
objectives of policy, the responsibilities of risk as-
sessors, the effects that are deemed to be ‘risks’ or
‘adverse effects’, the evidence that is to be counted
as relevant, and the ways in which data are to be
interpreted and presented. They consequently con-
tribute to setting the agenda for scientists to delib-
erate and this explains in large part how different
scientists can reach differing, but not necessarily
any more or less scientific, risk assessments. 
We shall adopt the vocabulary used by Codex
in referring to those kinds of judgements as ‘risk
assessment policy’. Moreover, we assume that the
relationships between risk assessment policy and
risk assessment and risk management can more
appropriately be portrayed in the model given in
Figure 3, representing what here is called the
‘transparent’ model. This model is not used or re-
ferred to by Codex, but it provides a fuller repre-
sentation of the interactions of science and
policy-making than either of the two previous
models, and if our analysis is correct it accommo-
dates, in ways that other models do not, the mean-
ing and significance of the introduction by Codex
of the concept of ‘risk assessment policy’. 
1.
 In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
20
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
Policy Making Policy MakingScience
Socio-economic and
political
considerations
Technical, economic 
and social 
considerations
Policy outcome, 
regulations
and communication
Scientific
considerations
Figure 3: The transparent model: scientific risk assessment framed by risk assessment policy
The distinctive feature of this ‘transparent’
model is that it not only assumes that policy de-
cisions involve social, economic and political
judgements in the context of downstream trade-
offs, but it also sees scientists as operating within
specific social, political, cultural and economic
contexts that can affect the agendas, contents and
conclusions of their risk assessments. The model
does not assume that the incorporation of social,
economic and political considerations into risk
assessments renders them ‘un-scientific’. It as-
sumes that risk appraisal is typically a hybrid en-
terprise and therefore indicates the possibility of,
and scope for, addressing such considerations
more explicitly and opening them to evaluation
and negotiation.
The transparent model does not entail that pol-
itics illegitimately meddles with science, but indi-
cates rather that non-scientific considerations play
a distinctive up-stream role in setting the framing
assumptions that shape the ways in which risk as-
sessments are constructed and conducted. It im-
plies that, rather than leaving those assumptions
implicit and leaving risk assessors to take responsi-
bility for non-scientific judgements, risk managers
may, and perhaps should, take responsibility for at
least some of the risk assessment policy judgements
that circumscribe the scope, or at least the mini-
mum scope, of the risk assessors’ deliberations. In
the terminology used by Codex, risk managers
could provide their risk assessors with explicit up-
stream risk assessment policy (or RAP) guidance. 
Although in this study we adopt the vocabu-
lary used by Codex in referring to the kinds of
judgements that frame scientific assessments as
‘risk assessment policy’ we do not want to imply
that the division of regulatory decision-making into
three discreet stages: risk assessment policy, risk
assessment and risk management, as in the trans-
parent model, is the only or best way in which reg-
ulatory decision-making should be thought about
and organised. Although the majority of the insti-
tutions and jurisdictions in this study, including
Codex, use the terms risk assessment and risk man-
agement, not all do. Moreover, those that do share
the terminology often mean slightly different things
by the terms. Thus, in adopting the useful term ‘risk
assessment policy’ to mean the assumptions and
judgements that shape the conduct and content of
scientific assessments, we do not assume that the
process of scientific appraisal must be called a risk
assessment or that such assessments should be
purely scientific and separated from risk manage-
ment decisions.
1.5. Policy literature – acknowledg-
ing ‘risk assessment policy’
judgements
There have been some attempts, other than in
the 1983 Red Book and the Codex Procedural
Manual, to address risk assessment policy issues
within the public policy literature, although the
terminology varies. The following four examples
do not attempt to provide an exhaustive catalogue
of those developments, but highlight some of the
main contributions, at least in the English-language
literature.
1) US Presidential/Congressional Commis-
sion on Risk Assessment and Risk Manage-
ment
In 1997 the issue of the policy-framing of risk
assessments was addressed in the report from
the US Presidential/Congressional Commission
on Risk Assessment and Risk Management.18
That document discussed some of the ways in
which non-scientific considerations frame ad-
vice from expert scientific committees in terms
of their contributions to what it there variously
called ‘problem formulation’19 ‘problem char-
acterization’20 and ‘problem identification’.21
2) The FOSIE project
In 2003 results emerged from an EU-funded re-
search project called Food Safety in Europe:
Risk Assessment of Chemicals in the Food and
Diet (or FOSIE).22 It was managed and led by
senior staff at the International Life Sciences In-
stitute (ILSI).23 The approach adopted in the
FOSIE report includes the concept of ‘problem
formulation’, the meaning of which is close to
that in the US Presidential/Congressional Com-
mission on Risk Assessment and Risk Manage-
ment
In relation to ‘problem formulation’, the au-
thors state: 
Problem formulation is the initial step in the
whole risk assessment process….The out-
come of problem formulation is an analysis
plan with detailed questions for the risk as-
sessor, on which the risk characterisation
process has to focus. Ideally, problem formu-
lation should be considered as an iterative
process involving dialogue with all stake-
holders, i.e. risk assessors, risk managers,
manufacturers or producers, consumers, and
it can develop as the risk assessment
evolves… The process can be initiated by an
individual outside the scientific and risk as-
sessment community bringing a problem to
R
is
k-
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s:
21
18 US Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Final Report Volumes 1 and 2, 1997
19 op cit Vol. 1 p. 59
20 op cit Vol. 2 p. 127
21 op cit Vol. 2 p. 58
22 A G Renwick et al, ‘Risk characterisation of chemicals in food and diet’, Food and Chemical Toxicology, Vol 41, 2003, pp. 1211-1271
23 ILSI describes itself as: “…a nonprofit, worldwide foundation that seeks to improve the well-being of the general public through the ad-
vancement of science. Its goal is to further the understanding of scientific issues relating to nutrition, food safety, toxicology, risk assess-
ment, and the environment by bringing together scientists from academia, government, and industry.” (http://www.ilsi.org/AboutILSI/ 9
November 2005) Other describe it less charitably. (S Boseley, ‘Sugar industry threatens to scupper WHO’, The Guardian, Monday April
21, 2003)
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public attention… The first step to problem
formulation is a planning dialogue that clar-
ifies the management goals, the purposes and
scope of the assessment… all stakeholders
(from the initial producer/grower to the final
consumer) bring valuable and often different
perspectives to assessment planning… Prob-
lem formulation should be as explicit as pos-
sible and should generally include
considerations of relevance (including socie-
tal values)… The process should undergo rig-
orous review by risk managers, scientific
peers, and other stakeholder to ensure that
all concerns have been addressed…”24 (em-
phases added) 
That account of ‘problem formulation’ is sub-
stantially equivalent to our interpretation of the
Codex use of the expression ‘risk assessment
policy’.
3) Renn et al in the Framework 6 Safe Foods
project
In the context of the European Commission
supported Integrated Project entitled Safe
Foods25, Renn et al draw heavily on the Codex
General Principles, and argued that: 
There should be a functional separation of
risk assessment and risk management, in
order to ensure the scientific integrity of the
risk assessment, to avoid confusion over the
functions to be performed by risk assessors
and risk managers and to reduce any conflict
of interest. However it is recognized that risk
analysis is an iterative process, and interac-
tion between risk managers and risk asses-
sors is essential for practical application.
Determination of risk assessment policy
should be included as a specific component
of risk management. 
Risk assessment policy should be established
by risk managers in advance of risk assess-
ment, in consultation with risk assessors and
all other interested parties. The procedure
aims at ensuring that the risk assessment is
systematic, complete, unbiased and transpar-
ent. The scope and purpose of the particular
risk assessment being carried out should be
clearly stated and in accordance with risk as-
sessment policy. The output form and possi-
ble alternative outputs of the risk assessment
should be defined.26 (emphases added) 
That articulation of the Codex approach in the
context of a science-led, but joint natural and
social science, research project suggests that a
consensus has developed between natural and
social scientists working at the frontier of food
safety research and food safety policy research,
that the concept of ‘risk assessment policy’ is
important and relevant to both sets of perspec-
tives.
4) The International Risk Governance Council
A report recently emerged from the Interna-
tional Risk Governance Council, which is a
body drawn from both industrial and academic
groups.27 The IRGC document said:
Risk analysis
The process of decision-making on risks has
been termed risk analysis. The Scientific
Steering Committee of the European Com-
mission has been defining a framework for
risk analysis…risk analysis comprises risk as-
sessment, management, monitoring and re-
view of decisions…
The risk analysis process in this framework is
iterative: it is continuously reviewed and
adapted if needed, based on monitoring/sur-
veillance of implemented measures and on
new emerging information…The process can
be conceived of as a winding stair, where
each round leads to a higher level of under-
standing of the risks and the benefits, the
views of the stakeholders and thereby the
management options.
In addition, the Scientific Steering Commit-
tee identified other values, which currently
are not incorporated in the formal risk assess-
ment process, but which should be taken into
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25 see http://www.safefoods.nl/default.aspx
26 M Dreyer & O Renn, SAFE FOODS WP5 - Recent activities and current status, SafeFoods Project, Athens, October 2005
27 The IRGC is a public-private partnership, based in Geneva, Switzerland, with funding sources including the governments of Switzerland,
USA, the European Commission, People’s Republic of China, the Zurich-based technical university ETH and the reinsurance company
SwissRe.
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
account, such as: (i) animal welfare, (ii) sus-
tainability, (iii) human Quality of Life param-
eters, (iv) risk perception, (v) ethics, and (vi)
social and economical benefits. The Scien-
tific Steering Committee has proposed a gen-
eral schedule for risk analysis, which takes
account of the assessment of these Quality of
Life parameters….the Quality-of-Life param-
eters that need to be assessed…include ad-
verse effects in humans, nutritional efficacy
in humans, health protective/promotional ef-
fects in humans, environmental impact, eco-
logical impact (farming, fishery, industry),
occupational health issues in farming and in-
dustry, associated animal welfare issues, con-
nected local and global sustainability issues,
economical impact assessment, ethical issues
and consumer perception issues.28
IRGC explicitly refers to the ‘identification of
concerns’ and ‘formulation of risk management
questions’ […of risk assessors], as well as: ‘Es-
tablishment of risk assessment policies for con-
duct of the risk assessments’. The IRGC portrays
RAP issues as including the ‘formulation of risk
management questions’ and ‘identification of a
food safety problem’ and ‘establishment of risk
assessment policies for conduct of the risk as-
sessments’. The first and second of those ex-
pressions correspond to what we term
substantive RAP, while the third corresponds to
what we term procedural and interpretative
RAP. This also provided evidence of a growing
recognition of the existence and importance of
risk assessment policy-making, although the
IRGC refers to RAP issues only in generic terms,
rather than in terms that are concrete and spe-
cific.
1.6. Risk assessment policy and
Codex Member States
The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s policy-
making system is, to a first approximation, com-
prised of the sum of the individual jurisdictions
represented and participating at Codex meetings.
That might be thought to imply that the explicit ob-
ligation on risk managers to provide risk assess-
ment policy guidance to risk assessors had not
only been accepted by Codex, but also that it had
been fully and formally accepted and endorsed by
all Codex Member States, i.e. the membership of
the WHO and the UN-FAO. The position is slightly
complicated, however, and in flux.
At a meeting of the Codex General Principles
Committee held in Paris in April 2005, Member
States failed to agree a text that would have stipu-
lated that each of them should also be subject to
the same injunctions as all Codex risk manage-
ment bodies.29 Subsequently, however, a meeting
of a Working Group of the Codex Committee on
General Principles, on Working Principles for Food
Safety, which met in Brussels in September 2006,
unanimously agreed a draft document setting out
Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Food
Safety for Application for Governments.30 That
text included references to ‘risk assessment policy’,
using very similar wording to that in the Codex
Procedural Manual, namely: 
- Determination of risk assessment policy
should be included as a specific component
of risk management. Risk assessment policy
should be established by risk managers in
advance of risk assessment, in consultation
with risk assessors and all other interested
parties. This procedure aims at ensuring that
the risk assessment is systematic, complete,
unbiased and transparent. The mandate
given by risk managers to risk assessors
should be as clear as possible. Where neces-
sary, risk managers should ask risk assessors
to evaluate the potential changes in risk re-
sulting from different risk management op-
tions.31
At a plenary meeting of the Codex Alimenta-
rius Commission in Rome in July 2007, the assem-
bled Member States adopted a policy statement to
the effect that risk managers in all national compe-
tent authorities would provide their national risk
assessment bodies with risk assessment policy
guidance.32 In the context of that decision, it is par-
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29 Report of the Twenty-Second Session of the Codex Committee on General Principles, to Codex Rome July 2005, ALINORM 05/28/33a
30 Report of the Working Group on Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Food Safety, Brussels, 26-28 September 2006
31 Op cit Appendix III, pp 26-27
32 see http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/archives.jsp?lang=en
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ticularly important to understand and compare the
ways in which risk assessment policies have been
articulated, interpreted and implemented within
global institutions and across national jurisdic-
tions. Once national jurisdictions start to imple-
ment the recent agreement, and compare and
contrast their individual risk assessment policies,
this may cause Codex risk management bodies to
reflect on their own policies, and to explore the
extent to which the separate approaches of Codex
member states can be reconciled at the global
level. 
Our starting assumption was that, where pub-
lic policy-making institutions formally take respon-
sibility for risk appraisal and decision-making,
some risk assessment policy assumptions arise,
even if they are not explicitly acknowledged or la-
belled in those terms. We found that the choice
was not between having a risk assessment policy
and not having one, but between being explicit
and transparent about RAP judgements, or being
implicit and opaque.
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2.1. General Approach
The approach adopted in this research was as
follows. Firstly, a review of the rather limited general
literature on risk assessment policy was conducted
and secondly documents published by the respec-
tive risk managers and risk assessors, with responsi-
bility for each of the case studies and each of the
six institutional settings, and some contributions
from the wider policy community, were gathered
and scrutinised for explicit statements of risk assess-
ment policy, and for comments that indirectly imply
assumptions about risk assessment policies.33 From
that analysis, a set of interim hypotheses was devel-
oped concerning what the official risk assessment
policies might be, and where and how they may
have been decided. Those interim hypotheses were
then triangulated against information obtained
through a set of semi-structured interviews with key
participants, including those identified as ‘risk as-
sessors’ and ‘risk managers’, in each of the relevant
institutional settings. On the basis of those findings,
individual reports were written on each of the insti-
tutional settings. The aim was to document the loca-
tion and substance of risk assessment policy-making
in relation to the case studies. In the concluding
stage, a comparative analysis was developed ex-
ploring the implications of the extent of divergence
and convergence in risk assessment policies that the
case studies revealed.
In analysing risk assessment policies in and
across six different institutional settings we have
had to be careful to ensure that those analyses and
comparisons were meaningful given a rather di-
verse range of institutions, legal traditions and
practices. As several academic studies of compar-
ative regulation have indicated, the ways in which
risk appraisal and decision-making are organised
and practiced in different jurisdictions vary, some-
times quite markedly, because those practices are
shaped in important ways by the laws, institutional
and administrative cultures specific to each juris-
diction.34 That variance extends to the ways in
which the scientific aspects of policy decision-
making are organised, practiced and portrayed.
For example, the distinction between ‘risk assess-
ment’ and ‘risk management’ originated and took
on a particular meaning in the USA. Other juris-
dictions have shared the terminology, but the
meaning of the distinction cannot be presumed to
be identical. Furthermore, not all jurisdictions
make the same distinction between risk assess-
ment and risk management. To take another exam-
ple, the notion of what constitutes an accountable
process of risk decision-making will be under-
stood in different ways across jurisdictions, given
different legal, political and regulatory cultures,
even though many of the core aspects of what
contributes to and detracts from accountable deci-
sion-making will be shared. Thus, despite such
variations, meaningful comparative analyses can
be made but care is required in interpreting differ-
ences and imposing concepts that are not neces-
sarily universally shared.
Our findings indicate that risk assessment pol-
icy can be understood as comprising at least three
main types of considerations, namely substantive,
interpretative and procedural issues. Substantive
risk assessment policy issues are concerned with
delineating which kinds of potential changes, ef-
fects and evidence are included within risk assess-
ments and which are outside their scope.
Interpretative risk assessment policy issues are
concerned with the ways in which data are inter-
preted. This includes issues such as the inference
principles used to extrapolate carcinogenic risks
from test animals to human populations, and the
relative importance of seeking to identify and take
account of possible false negatives and false posi-
tives. Procedural risk assessment policies are con-
cerned with the responsibilities of risk assessors
and the processes by which risk assessments are
conducted. They cover all institutional issues, such
as those concerning the recruitment and inde-
2. Materials and methods
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
33 Not all cases were, or could be, covered in all six settings. For example, the joint FAO/WHO expert committees have not conducted risk
assessments of GM foods or crops.
34 S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: science and democracy in Europe and the United States, Princeton University Press, 2005
pendence of experts, the extent of openness and
transparency and the ways in which the responsi-
bilities of scientists and policy-makers are coupled
together. Our analytical discussion of the case
studies and institutional settings is organised in
terms of those three types of RAPs.
2.2. Case Studies
Four case studies were chosen. The first two
concern different aspects of GM crop safety: agro-
environmental risks and human food-borne risks.
Both aspects of GM crop safety constitute rich cases
for identifying, and appreciating the importance of
risk assessment policies because in all jurisdictions
the chosen approaches to assessing the safety of GM
crops and GM foods are in a state of flux. The re-
maining two case studies concern two aspects of
public health risks from food chemicals: food chem-
ical risks where toxicological dose thresholds are
known or assumed to exist and chemical risks for
which no dose threshold is presumed. Compared to
GM crop safety, there is much less debate and dis-
pute over the regulation of chemicals in the food
supply. Nevertheless, similar types of risk assessment
policy issues arise and these have been pertinent to
regulatory decision making for many decades. 
The four case studies were selected because
they illustrate well the kinds of food safety topics,
and the range of substantive, interpretative and
procedural risk assessment policy issues that indi-
vidual jurisdictions and multilateral organisations
such as Codex have to cope with. The intention of
this report is not to provide a detailed or definitive
analysis of risk assessment policy for each case, or
to compare each case across different jurisdictions.
Rather it is to illustrate the variety of ways, and
some of the general differences, in how several ju-
risdictions have handled risk assessment policy is-
sues in the area of food safety.
2.3. Institutional settings
Each case study will be examined across
some, but not all, of the six institutional settings
(the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its joint
FAO/WHO expert committees, the UK, Germany,
the USA, Japan and Argentina). This is partly be-
cause not all of the jurisdictions have developed
distinct policy regimes in relation to each case
study. For example, Codex has no role in relation
to the agro-environmental aspects of GM crops
whilst the USA has effectively deregulated GM
foods. Another rationale for limiting the number of
case study/institutional setting combinations is that
the principle purpose of our analysis is not to pro-
vide an exhaustive account of actual practices or
an analysis of any single jurisdiction. Rather it is
to provide an illustration of the variety of different
ways in which different jurisdictions are thus far
managing risk assessment policy-type issues
As we outline below, the six institutional settings
manage the business of risk appraisal in quite differ-
ent ways, partly reflecting each jurisdiction’s political
and administrative culture, although there are many
similarities too. In several of the settings those prac-
tices are undergoing considerable change. These dif-
ferences, similarities and changes are especially
important for procedural risk assessment policies.
In three of those institutional settings, namely
the UK, Germany and Japan, food safety policy-
making institutions have recently been restructured
and reformed, largely as a consequence of BSE
and in some cases other food policy crises. In the
UK and Japan this has involved the separation, at
least partially, of food safety responsibilities from
agriculture and food industry sponsorship, as well
as the creation of new institutions with responsibil-
ities for food safety. In Germany, by contrast, those
distinct responsibilities were combined so that
agriculture, food safety and consumer protection
policy, previously separate, are now in a single
ministry. Germany and Japan also responded to the
ways in which the BSE saga unfolded domestically
by attempting institutionally to separate the func-
tions of risk assessment from risk management. The
UK, on the other hand, combines risk assessment
and risk management within a single institution
(the Food Standards Agency or FSA), although par-
tially independent expert committees provide a
substantial part of the scientific assessment.
In the remaining settings, namely the USA, Ar-
gentina and at Codex and the joint FAO/WHO
committees, the structure and mandate of food
safety policy-making institutions has continued un-
changed for several decades. Those jurisdictions
have not, however, faced the same kinds of crises
over BSE and/or agricultural biotechnology that oc-
curred in Europe and Japan. At the international
level Codex/FAO/WHO has long had separate in-
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stitutions for risk assessment and risk management
policy-making whilst in the USA and Argentina
those functions have long been combined within,
or overseen by, single agencies or departments. 
Argentina is the only institutional setting in
which no distinction is made between risk assess-
ment and risk management. Instead, there exists the
kind of technocratic regime, common until relatively
recently in many other jurisdictions, in which all of
risk appraisal and policy decision-making is repre-
sented as (and organised as if it were) entirely tech-
nical in nature. The remaining five institutional
settings all invoke a general distinction between risk
assessment and risk management, although this is
sometimes articulated abstractly rather than organ-
ised in practice. Although the language of risk as-
sessment and risk management is widespread, no
two jurisdictions are interpreting and operationalis-
ing the contrast in the same way. 
The next sub-section provides a brief compar-
ative summary of the institutional settings and their
roles in relation to the assessment and manage-
ment of risk. Some generalised similarities and dif-
ferences are highlighted. Those differences reflect
different political and administrative cultures and
traditions, as well as varying responses to the
threats and challenges posed by contemporary
food policy regulation.
Codex
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (or
Codex for short) was established in the 1950s, as a
joint initiative of the UN Food and Agriculture Or-
ganisation (founded in 1945) and the World Health
Organisation (founded in 1948).35 Until the estab-
lishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in
1994, Codex standards had no statutory force under
any legislation, national or international. One of the
elements of the treaty under which the WTO was
created is the agreement on Sanitary and Phytosan-
itary Standards (or SPS agreement).36 Under its pro-
vision, Codex standards are defined as providing a
minimum benchmark of food safety for internation-
ally traded foodstuffs. Any WTO Member State can
lawfully exclude products that fail to comply with
Codex standards, but Member States can only law-
fully exclude products that comply with Codex
standards if their regulatory measures are based
upon a scientific risk assessment.37
Codex is organised into Committees, which
are known in Codex terminology as ‘Subsidiary
Bodies’; and the three upon which this study con-
centrates are the Codex Committee on Food Addi-
tives and Contaminants (CCFAC), the Codex
Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in
Foods (CCRVDF) – both of which receive risk as-
sessment advice from JECFA (Joint (WHO-FAO) Ex-
pert Committee on Food Additives – and the
Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) –
that receives advice from JMPR (the Joint Meeting
on Pesticides Residues). 
Codex has responsibility for risk management
and standard setting for food additives and con-
taminants but a far more limited role in respect of
GM food safety and no role at all in relation to
agro-environmental aspects of GM crops. On GM
foods, Codex has only set out some general prin-
ciples and guidelines for risk assessment but has
not become involved in assessing specific food-
stuffs. Since the environmental impact of GM
plants will vary as a function of the different
ecosystems into which they might be introduced,
it would be unrealistic to imagine a centralised
global body, such as Codex, providing generally
applicable assessments of the agro-environmental
risks posed by cultivating particular GM varieties.
Within the Codex system, risk assessment and
risk management functions are ostensibly located
in separate institutions and treated as distinct activ-
ities. Codex’s key policy responsibilities in respect
of standard setting for food additives and pesti-
cides, lie, respectively, with the Codex Committee
on Food Additives and Contaminants (CCFAC) and
the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues
(CCPR), which consists of representatives from
member governments plus observers, who are
largely from industrial firms and trade associations. 
Risk assessments, and recommended stan-
dards for pesticides residues in traded food com-
modities are provided by the FAO/WHO’s Joint
Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR). The
FAO/WHO’s Joint Expert Committee on Food Ad-
R
is
k-
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s:
27
35 See History of Codex at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/008/y7867e/y7867e00.htm
36 Available at: http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm
37 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 5.1
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ditives (JECFA) provides risk assessments of food
additives and contaminants, primarily in terms of
quantitative estimates of ‘acceptable daily intakes’
or ADIs. Standards for levels of use of additives in
particular categories of food products are set by
CCFAC, rather than by JECFA. JECFA and JMPR are
expert scientific advisory committees comprising
scientists drawn from professional scientists work-
ing in public and private institutions. JECFA and
JMPR are institutionally separate from Codex, even
though providing advice to Codex has become
their main function. They have their own secretari-
ats, provided jointly by the WHO and FAO, rather
than by Codex or its Committees.
UK
Food safety policy-making in the UK had tra-
ditionally been the responsibility of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), which was
also responsible for sponsoring the food and farm-
ing industries. In 2000, in the wake of the BSE de-
bacle, the UK Government separated food safety
responsibilities from agricultural and industrial
sponsorship by creating the Food Standards
Agency (FSA). This was followed in 2001 by the
abolition of MAFF and its replacement with the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Af-
fairs (DEFRA).
De facto responsibility for both the risk assess-
ment and risk management components of food
safety policy-making in the UK (including GM food
and food chemicals) now rest with the Board of the
FSA, although de jure Department of Health minis-
ters can over-ride the ‘advice’ of the FSA. Environ-
mental releases of GM crops had been the
responsibility of the Department of the Environ-
ment’s Biotechnology Unit. Since 2001 those re-
sponsibilities have passed to DEFRA.
Although risk assessment and management
functions are combined within the FSA (for GM
food and food chemicals) and DEFRA (for GM
plants), expert advisory committees, often com-
prising mostly non-governmental employees, play
significant roles conducting, what are in effect, risk
assessments, although they are rarely so labelled.
FSA, DEFRA and other Ministerial departments
nevertheless provide secretariats to those commit-
tees and technical support including providing ini-
tial assessments of the assembled evidence.
The principal committees for our case studies
are the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and
Processes (ACNFP) in relation to GM foods, the Ad-
visory Committee on Releases to the Environment
(ACRE) for GM plants, and in relation to food addi-
tives the Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in
Food, Consumer Products and the Environment (CoT
– and its sub-committees - the Committee on Car-
cinogenicity (CoC) and the Committee on Muta-
genicity (CoM). ACNFP and ACRE consist of
members drawn from universities and public sector
research organisations whilst the CoT, CoC and CoM
also have members drawn from the private sector.
The expert committees sometimes represent
what they provide as ‘risk assessments’. It is much
rarer, however, for officials engaged in scientific
aspects of appraisal to characterise their activities
as ‘risk assessment’. Rather, much of what takes
place within the Food Standards Agency is a hy-
brid scientific/policy activity with no clear demar-
cation between scientific and policy aspects of the
FSA’s responsibilities.
UK legislation and regulation (and for Ger-
many too) in relation to both food chemicals and
GM crops and foods, is subordinate to EU legisla-
tion and regulations. However, national govern-
ments within the EU retain reserve powers that
allow them to ban or restrict products that are al-
ready approved at an EU-wide level, but only
under certain conditions. Consequently UK and
other European national regulatory systems of reg-
ulation have not entirely been displaced by Euro-
pean level decision-making.
Germany 
Germany also restructured its food safety pol-
icy-making system in the wake of the BSE saga.
Rather than separating agriculture and food safety
responsibilities, however, as in the UK, those re-
sponsibilities were combined under the German
reforms. In January 2001, agriculture, food safety
and consumer protection policy, previously: sepa-
rate, were combined in one powerful ministry the
Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food,
and Agriculture (BMVEL).38
2.
 M
at
er
ia
ls
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
ds
28
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
38 Recently renamed as Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV).
When the new BMVEL was created, the Fed-
eral Institute for Consumer Health Protection and
Veterinary Medicine (BgVV), which had previously
been responsible for the assessment and manage-
ment of most categories of food and consumer
products, was added to the portfolio of BMVEL and
then subsequently split into two new institutions:
the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) and
the Federal Agency for Consumer Protection and
Food Safety (BVL). This change was represented as
institutionally separating risk assessment (in BfR)
from risk management (by BVL).39
The situation is, however, more complex for
GMOs where not just the BfR performs risk assess-
ments but so do at least four additional institutions:
the Federal Biological Research Centre for Agricul-
ture and Forestry (BBA), the Federal Agency for Na-
ture Conservation (BfN), the Robert Koch Institute
(RKI) and the Central Commission for Biological
Safety (ZKBS) at BVL. There is also some inconsis-
tency between the planned institutional demarca-
tion and what happens in practice. In some policy
fields, such as for GM crops and foods, the separa-
tion between risk assessment and risk management
was only partially implemented. RKI and BfN are
not subordinate to the BMVEL/BMELV and were
therefore not included in the institutional reforms.
They remain hybrid institutions, with both risk as-
sessment and management responsibilities. As the
nominal risk manager, the BVL not only has its own
scientific advisory committee, the ZKBS, but also set
up its own in-house risk assessment expertise,
which was deemed essential for risk managers.40
Risk assessment conclusions on GMOs delivered by
the BfR, BBA, RKI, BfN and the ZKBS are then con-
sidered in relation to BVL’s own risk assessment
judgements. The procedures and conclusions of
BVL risk assessments, however, remain opaque,
even to other risk assessment institutions.
Japan 
As in Germany and the UK, Japan has sought
to reform food safety policy-making as a conse-
quence of BSE and other food safety crises. In July
2003 the new Japanese Food Safety Commission
(FSC) was established in order to institutionally
separate risk assessment (in the FSC) from risk
management, which is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)
and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
eries (MAFF). 
For GM foods, risk assessments are conducted
by the Expert Committee for GM Foods (ECGMF)
of the FSC, while risk management is carried out
by the Office of Health Policy on Newly Devel-
oped Foods (OHPNDF) of the Pharmaceutical and
Food Safety Bureau (PHSB) of the MHLW. 
For GM crops, risk assessments are the re-
sponsibility of the Committee for the Assessment
of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity (CAAEB) whose
secretariat is the Biotechnology Safety Division of
the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research
Council (AFFRC) of the MAFF and the Wildlife Di-
vision of the Nature Conservation Bureau (NCB) of
Ministry of Environment (MOE). The committee
was newly established in 2004 as functionally and
organizationally separated from risk management
body, namely the Food Safety and Consumer Af-
fairs Bureau (FSCAB) of the MAFF.
USA
Food safety policy-making in the USA is prima-
rily the responsibility of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) whose structure and mandate have
remained largely unchanged. The FDA’s Center for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition is responsible for
policy on food additives and contaminants. The
FDA is also responsible for GM food regulation but
in practice has declined formally to regulate those
products. GM crops are the responsibility of the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA) whilst the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency regulates all plant pes-
ticides (which include Bt toxins). In practice, the
USDA has deregulated GM crops and therefore
only the EPA has active regulatory oversight for GM
plants, or rather those that have pesticidal proper-
ties.
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39 Eventually, three areas - animal medicines, animal diseases and plant protection products - were exempted from the separation of risk
assessment and risk management: according to some interviewees there was strong political resistance in each case to the separation of
risk assessment and risk management. In the former case BMG, the competent authority for animal medicines, insisted on having only
one contact instead of two if risk assessment and risk management would be separated. In the second case, geographical reasons also
probably apply – as Bundesforschungsanstalt für Viruskrankheiten der Tiere is located on an island which is considered a safe place to
deal with animal diseases.
40 Despite its role as the risk manager, senior managers portray the BVL as a scientific institution.
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The EPA and FDA are responsible for both risk
assessment and risk management Those two func-
tions are nevertheless treated separately; within
each Agency there are two categories of staff, des-
ignated as either risk assessors or risk managers.
Both Agencies have external advisory committees,
comprised of scientists drawn from public sector
research organisations and universities (the Scien-
tific Advisory Panel in the case of the EPA’s Office
of Pesticide Programs and the Food Advisory Com-
mittee for the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition). The role of those committees is
not to produce risk assessments but rather to peer
review, and comment on, risk assessments that
have been produced by Agency staff.
Argentina
Argentina is the world’s second largest pro-
ducer of GM crops and so far the technology has
not attracted the sorts of controversies that have
beset European countries. Consequently, the regu-
latory regimes have not been forced to try and ac-
commodate domestic tensions either over GMOs,
or food safety policy more generally and, like the
USA, Argentina has not been under pressure to re-
form food safety policy-making. The Argentinean
risk regulatory regimes are also less well resourced
than the equivalent regimes in wealthier OECD
countries.
Policy responsibility for GM plant and food
regulation falls to single agencies within the Secre-
tariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and
Food. These are the National Advisory Commission
on Agricultural Biotechnology, for GM plants, and
the National Agrifood Health and Quality Service
for GM foods. In both cases the Secretary of Agri-
culture is formally responsible for taking regula-
tory decisions although in practice the agencies
provide prescriptive advice that is almost always
followed. Food additive regulation is the responsi-
bility of the National Food Institute in the Ministry
of Health and Environment. 
In the case of both GM crops and GM foods,
expert committees are responsible both for con-
ducting assessments of risk and making risk man-
agement judgements. That distinction between risk
assessment and risk management, or between sci-
entific and policy aspects of risk decision-making
is, not generally used in the Argentinean regime,
which instead portrays the entire risk appraisal and
decision-making process as a purely technical
one. There is, in fact, no discreet set of activities
that the Argentinean regulatory system represents
as risk management. Rather what other jurisdic-
tions take to be risk management activities are ei-
ther ignored in official discourse, or seen as a
technical matter (such as the conditions attached
to approval) or are not conceptually distinguished
from risk assessment (such as issues of risk accept-
ability). Unlike the USA and UK, the expert com-
mittees comprise not only experts from universities
and other public sector research organisations but
also government officials and individuals from the
principal industrial trade associations. For food ad-
ditives, Argentina does not routinely undertake risk
assessments, relying largely on the standards pro-
vided by Codex and other regulatory authorities in
OECD countries.
In the following discussion of our empirical
findings, the sequence in which the various insti-
tutional settings are discussed varies. The specific
order in which they are reviewed in relation to par-
ticular topics has been chosen to reflect either the
dominance of particular approaches or the recent
introduction of interesting innovations. The order is
intended to be analytically informative rather than
mechanically repetitive. 
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What kinds of risk assessment policies
have been articulated and how have
they been established?
The analysis presented in this section begins
by describing which kinds of formal risk assess-
ment policies have been established in the six in-
stitutional settings (in relation to the four case
studies) and the ways in which those policies have
been established. Those policies are rarely referred
to as a ‘risk assessment policy’ but they are never-
theless explicitly recognised as policy guidance to
risk assessors. In some cases the policies that have
been explicit have been procedural while others
have been substantive and/or interpretative. Pro-
cedural risk assessment policies generally cover an
entire jurisdiction, or an area of broad policy, and
as such tend to derive from relatively high-level
policy officers and must subsequently be inter-
preted by risk managers and/or risk assessors in
specific policy domains. Substantive/interpretative
risk assessment policies, on the other hand tend,
by their nature, to be applicable only within spe-
cific policy domains only and as such usually orig-
inate with either the risk assessors and/or risk
managers within the relevant area of policy. 
That discussion will then be followed in Sec-
tion 4 by a more detailed scrutiny of the contents of
the policies themselves, beginning with various pro-
cedural aspects of risk assessment policy and then
in Section 5 various substantive and interpretative
aspects. The discussion in Section 6 then focuses on
the extent to which we can identify implicit risk as-
sessment policies in the six institutional settings.
Section 7 provides an account of how some policy
practices compare with the policy ambitions set out
by Codex and the five jurisdictions. Section 8 pro-
vides a brief summary and conclusion.
Codex
While national food safety crises have pro-
voked considerable institutional changes, such as
those in the USA in the 1970s and in Europe in the
late 1990s and in the early years of the first decade
of the 21st century, Codex institutions have re-
mained remarkably unperturbed. Ironically, that
structural inertia at Codex has been combined
with conceptual innovations. It is Codex, rather
than any of the national jurisdictions, that explic-
itly recognised that risk assessments are routinely
framed by prior upstream judgments and Codex
explicitly committed its risk management decision-
makers to providing ‘risk assessment policy’ guid-
ance to risk assessors in the joint FAO/WHO
expert advisory committees; even though those
FAO/WHO committees have rarely acknowledged
that they need, or should be guided by, risk assess-
ment policy framing guidance from Codex sub-
sidiary bodies.41
The phrase ‘risk assessment policy’ appears to
have been introduced, accepted and adopted in
response to calls from Member States and the
Codex subsidiary bodies (comprised of representa-
tives of Member States) to make its procedures and
those of its expert advisory committees more trans-
parent. Some Member States assumed that risk as-
sessment policy guidance would be primarily or
even entirely procedural, while others, including
the USA, understood that some substantive guid-
ance might also be essential.
The inclusion in the Codex Procedural Man-
ual of an explicit formalised obligation from Codex
to its ‘subsidiary bodies’ such as CCFAC, CCPR
and CCRVDF potentially transforms the relation-
ships between risk assessors and risk managers. If
risk managers are obliged to provide a risk assess-
ment policy framework to risk assessors, then the
latter are under an obligation to conduct their de-
liberations in accordance with that guidance.
Technocratic and decisionist portrayals of the re-
lationship between science and policy loose their
plausibility, and a fresh approach to representing
risk assessment and risk management is required
and new forms of accountability may be required. 
3. EXPLICIT Formal risk assessment policies 
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In the early years of this decade, the CCFAC,
CCPR and CCRVDF developed a varied set of RAP
proposals, intended to operationalise the provi-
sions of the Codex Procedural Manual, that JECFA
and JMPR then rejected; and rejected quite
abruptly. Over a period of five years, lengthy, com-
plex and discreet negotiations resulted in a series
of agreed compromises between those three
Codex Committees on the one hand and JECFA
and JMPR on the other.
The initial proposals
A draft risk assessment policy was first pro-
duced by CCRVDF for JECFA in July 2001 although
the document was referred to as ‘risk analysis prin-
ciples and methodologies’.42 The following month
a draft Risk Assessment Policy Statement for the In-
teraction Between CCFAC and JECFA was circu-
lated for discussion.43 In December 2001 the
CCPR published a document, which like the
CCRVDF, referred to draft risk analysis principles
rather than risk assessment policy.
All three drafts contained some procedural
guidance, while the CCRVDF document also pro-
vided some substantive and interpretative guid-
ance. The procedural guidance referred primarily
to requirements that the committees should be in-
dependent, that uncertainties and assumptions be
made explicit, and included a requirement from
CCPR to JMPR stipulating that the risk assessors
should provide risk managers with scientific com-
ments on a range of pre-defined risk management
options.
The CCRVDF’s substantive and interpretative
guidance included indications about what was to
count as a benchmark of acceptable risk, about the
kinds of metabolic changes, following use of vet-
erinary drugs, that should or should not be the
focus of JECFA’s attention, as well as guidance con-
cerning the use a safety factor of 100 to calculate
ADIs from NOELS (or ‘no observed effect levels’)
in animal studies. CCRVDF indicated that it took
the view that deciding the value of different safety
factors was a task to which risk managers should
contribute, although the 2001 document observed
that: “It is odd that CCRVDF has never addressed
this important matter and issued the necessary
guidance to JECFA.”44 CCRVDF also portrayed risk
assessment, which is JECFA’s explicitly responsibil-
ity, as a four-step science-based process (compris-
ing hazard identification, hazard characterization,
exposure assessment and risk characterization).45
By 2005 the CCFAC document had been dis-
cussed, modified, agreed by JECFA and by the full
Codex Commission, and incorporated into the
Codex Procedural Manual. There it is listed as ‘risk
analysis principles’, despite the Procedural Man-
ual stipulating that what the risk managers should
set is a ‘risk assessment policy’, and despite the first
draft being known as a ‘risk assessment policy’.
CCFAC and JECFA agreed on referring to ‘risk
analysis principles’ apparently because neither
JECFA nor most members of CCFAC chose to ac-
knowledge that these were issues of ‘policy’, since
that would entail that they could legitimately be
politically contested. The CCPR document is due
to be forwarded for adoption to the Codex Com-
mission in 2007. The CCRVDF document, on the
other hand, the most detailed of the three and the
only one to include explicit substantive and inter-
pretative guidance, was discussed by JECFA in Feb-
ruary 2004; but when JECFA did so, the draft was
comprehensively rejected.
JECFA rejects the CCRVDF proposals
JECFA’s rejection of the CCRVDF draft propos-
als stated: 
Although the Committee recognised the value
of a risk assessment policy, it was concerned
that the current draft document to CCRVDF
was not adequate due to serious flaws in struc-
ture and content. 
…the Committee agreed that Annex I of the
above mentioned draft discussion paper in its
current form requires substantial revision,
which should consider the following issues:
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42 Discussion Paper on Risk Analysis Principles and Methodologies in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods,
CX/RVDF 01/9 July 2001
43 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Request for Comment on the Proposed Risk Assessment Policy Statement for the Interaction Between
CCFAC and JECFA, CL 2002?_-FAC_2002; NB this document is not available on the WorldWideWeb, and cannot be located on the
CODEX Website.
44 Discussion Paper on Risk Analysis Principles and Methodologies in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods,
CX/RVDF 01/9 July 2001, p 10 para 53
45 op. cit. para 11
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• A risk assessment policy should provide a
general policy framework for the work of risk
assessors and not describe the details of the
four steps of the risk assessment process.
• The roles and responsibilities of risk assessors
and risk managers need to be clearly defined,
recognizing the independence and trans-
parency of the risk assessment process.
• The development of risk assessment guide-
lines is an inherent part of the corresponding
scientific work which needs to be accom-
plished by risk assessors.
• The Expert Committee is an independent sci-
entific body that provides advice not only to
Codex but also directly to FAO and WHO
and to member countries. The risk assess-
ment policy needs to recognize these related
but independent roles of the Committee.
• The Committee noted that similar activities
are on-going in other Codex Committees
(e.g. CCFAC, CCFH, CCPR) and therefore
strongly recommends that every effort should
be made to harmonise these activities.
The Committee recommended that a risk as-
sessment policy (principles and processes)
should include at least the following elements:
• Objectives of a risk assessment
• Responsibilities of risk manager and risk as-
sessor in the process of problem formulation
• Need and mechanisms for effective dialogue
between risk manager and risk assessor
• Core principles to conduct a risk assessment
(e.g. scientific soundness, transparency, etc)
• Inputs to the risk assessment (e.g. sources of
data, confidentiality etc)
• Outputs of the risk assessment (form and de-
tail, including request for different risk man-
agement options and their consequences)
• Level of protection to be provided by the risk
assessment. 
The Committee welcomed the opportunity to
comment on the current document; the Joint
Secretariat is asked to continue the discussion
with CCRVDF and to consider the possibility of
consulting members of JECFA before the next
meeting of the Committee in a written proce-
dure. A close co-ordination with other ongoing
activities is also desirable.46 (emphases added)
JECFA’s February 2004 response to CCRVDF
was remarkably undiplomatic in its choice of
words. It not only rejected the specific suggestions
from CCRVDF, it implicitly repudiated the provi-
sions and premises of the Codex Procedural Man-
ual. JECFA explicitly rejected both the form and the
content of the guidance that CCRVDF had pro-
vided. JECFA did not contest the suggestion that
risk assessment consisted of four steps, but insisted
that it was for JECFA to decide how those steps
were conducted. JECFA insisted, in effect, that it
was not for CCRVDF, or any other Codex Commit-
tees for that matter, to tell JECFA how it should
conduct a risk assessment. JECFA was, in effect,
claiming that it was for risk assessors and not risk
managers to decide JECFA’s rules and standards of
procedure and interpretation.
JECFA’s response to CCRVDF was noteworthy
in several respects. Firstly, while CCRVDF had re-
ferred to the role of ‘other legitimate factors’, to in-
form the risk assessment policy that it was
articulating,47 JECFA never referred to those factors,
as if they were entirely tangential to JECFA’s delib-
erations and CCRVDF’s proposals. Secondly, the
Codex Procedural Manual does not say that risk
assessors can veto the policy guidance provided
by risk managers, such as CCRVDF. JECFA’s re-
sponse reads like an attempted veto. Thirdly, the
wording of the JECFA response is curiously long-
term for a body that has no sustained membership.
As Crossley explained (in his report to FAO &
WHO entitled Review of the working procedures
of the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticides
Residues) the JMPR is an ad hoc body that exists
for only two weeks of the year (and the same can
be said for JECFA too).48 Since that JECFA meeting
had rejected the guidance provided by CCRVDF, it
is unclear why the CCRVDF risk managers did not
subsequently request JECFA’s FAO/WHO Secre-
tariat only to select for JECFA membership those
who would accept the risk assessment policy guid-
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46 JECFA 62nd Meeting February 2004, Summary report at: http://www.who.int/ipcs/food/jecfa/summaries/en/Summary62.pdf
47 Discussion Paper on Risk Analysis Principles and Methodologies in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods,
CX/RVDF 01/9 July 2001, para 56
48 S J Crossley, Review of the working procedures of the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticides Residues (JMPR), WHO & FAO, Rome Feb-
ruary 2002, page 5
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ance that CCRVDF had provided. CCRVDF did not
however pursue that option.
Subsequently a less than transparent process
of negotiations took place and the positions of
both CCRVDF and JECFA shifted noticeably. At a
meeting in May 2006, CCRVDF agreed a text that
represented a compromise between the two initial
positions, but a relatively dilute compromise that
omits any reference to issues that have been and
remain contentious.49 Issues omitted from the
eventually agreed text include for example discus-
sion of which metabolic changes should (and
should not) be the focus of JECFA’s attention, the
use of data from laboratory animals as a basis for
extrapolations to humans, or circumstances when
evidence of adverse effects in laboratory animals
may be discounted. JECFA also said nothing about
how it would or should respond to uncertainty.
Although the CCRVDF document, like the
one produced by CCFAC, provides what it terms
‘risk analysis principles’ rather than ‘risk assess-
ment policy’, it does refer to risk assessment policy
in the context of the discussion of Risk Analysis
Principles, and it does so when setting out the risk
management responsibilities of CCRVDF. The first
element of risk management is referred to as ‘pre-
liminary risk management activities’.50 Preliminary
risk management activities are then portrayed as
firstly including: ‘establishment of risk assessment
policy for the conduct of risk assessments.’51
The next paragraph states: “The responsibili-
ties of CCRVDF and JECFA and their interactions
along with core principles and expectations of
JECFA evaluations are provided in Risk Assessment
Policy for the Setting of MRLs in Food, established
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.”52 (em-
phasis added) In other words, CCRVDF and JECFA
have agreed that there can and should be a ‘risk
assessment policy’, but only in respect of JECFA’s
responsibility for proposing MRLs; not otherwise. 
When MRLs are set, they make specific ref-
erence to recommended maximum levels of par-
ticular compounds in specific categories of
foods. That contrasts with ADIs, which refer
solely to the compounds, and not to the food-
stuffs that may contain the residues. Setting MRLs
therefore involves making judgements about how
permitted residues can be apportioned across
different categories of foodstuffs, in ways that
should ensure that ADIs are not, or only rarely,
exceeded Setting, or proposing, MRLs can there-
fore depend on industrial considerations that
need not arise in relation to ADIs. It is therefore
understandable that JECFA and CCRVDF might
acknowledge risk assessment policy assumptions
are involved in setting MRLs, even if they do not
acknowledge any involvement of such issues in
setting ADIs.
The CCRVDF document also says: “After ap-
proval by the [CAC] of the priority list of veterinary
drugs as new work, the CCRVDF forwards it to the
JECFA with the qualitative preliminary risk profile
as well as specific guidance on the CCRVDF risk
assessment request.”53 (emphasis added) The char-
acteristics of that ‘specific guidance…on the risk
assessment request’ remain unclear, but one plau-
sible interpretation is that rather than providing
general risk assessment policy guidance to JECFA,
CCRVDF envisages providing a multiplicity of in-
dividual risk assessment policies in connection
with particular requests and compounds. 
CCRVDF indicated procedurally that, when re-
porting the results of its deliberations JECFA should
provide reports that “…clearly indicate the choices
made during the risk assessment with respect to sci-
entific uncertainties and the level of confidence in
the studies provided.”54 Moreover CCRVDF indi-
cates that: “JECFA should, if necessary, propose dif-
ferent risk management options…[and]…should
present, in its report, different risk management op-
tions for CCRVDF to consider. The reporting format
should clearly distinguish between the risk assess-
ment and the evaluation of the risk management op-
tions.”55
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49 ALINORM 06/29/31, Report of the Sixteenth Session Of The Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods, Cancun, Mex-
ico, May 2006, to the CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, Twenty-ninth Session, July 2006, Appendix VIII
50 ALINORM 06/29/31, Appendix VIII, page 89, para 8
51 op cit p. 90 Section 3.1 para 10
52 op. cit. p. 90 para 11
53 op cit p 91 para 19
54 op cit p. 91 para 20
55 op cit p. 91 para 23, cf p 94 para 2(c)
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To summarise, despite the explicit require-
ment from Codex to CCFAC, CCRVDF and CCPR
to provide JECFA and JMPR with RAP guidance,
that requirement is not being fully met. That failure
has come about in part because of a refusal on the
part of JECFA and JMPR to accept the RAP guid-
ance initially developed for them. Instead the risk
management committees have drafted, and in the
case of CCFAC finalised, a text called ‘Principles of
Risk Analysis’ that constitute an attempted retreat
to a Red Book decisionist division of labour, with
no recognition that scientific representations of risk
depend on prior non-scientific assumptions about
what states of affairs or changes are to be counted
as risks, and which others are to be discounted. In-
stead they attempt simply to portray JECFA and
JMPR as conducting purely scientific risk assess-
ments without relying on any non-scientific as-
sumptions or considerations (eg ‘other legitimate
factors’), with Codex committees as acting on in-
formation from JECFA and JMPR but with no recip-
rocal input or guidance. The CCFAC, CCPR and
CCRVDF texts do however invoke the concept of
independence of risk assessors, but without ex-
plaining of whom or what they should be inde-
pendent; they also acknowledge some
uncertainties and assumptions. Such guidance as is
provided is primarily procedural; substantive risk
assessment policies remain implicit. When dis-
cussing debates about the relationship between
science and policy-making on GM crops and
foods in the USA, Jasanoff said that some were try-
ing: “…to return to an imagined prelapsarian
state…by rebuilding the walls between science
and politics…”56 That description could apply
equally well to the compromise agreed between
CCFAC and JECFA. 
In the autumn of 2006 an FAO/WHO draft re-
port was circulated to Codex Member States that
was entitled FAO/WHO Framework for the Provi-
sion of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutri-
tion (to Codex and member countries) - Final Draft
for Public Comments. The text included a proposal
for “…the provision of explicit documentation of
all procedures, policies and practices.”57 (empha-
sis added) That wording was included in the defin-
itive version that was published in 2007.58 If the
procedures of all WHO/FAO food safety and nutri-
tion scientific advisory committees were to be ex-
plicitly documented, that would substantially
contribute to making some procedural aspects of
risk assessment policy-making more transparent
and potentially accountable. The foreword to that
document claims that the report “…describes the
principles, practices and procedures currently ap-
plied by FAO and WHO for the provision of sci-
entific advice…”59 but since for example JECFA
and JMPR reports do not “…include explicit recog-
nition of any uncertainty either in the current state
of knowledge or in the adequacy of the available
data”60 the Framework for the Provision of Scien-
tific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition seem in
places to be more aspirational than reportage (as is
evident from the discussion of JECFA’s assessment
of neotame reviewed in Section 6 of this docu-
ment, starting on page 73). 
The FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision
of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition
that was published by WHO and FAO in 2007 rep-
resents a significant change from the status quo
ante because it includes in an Annex a more com-
prehensive list of documents that provide JECFA
and JMPR (as well as the Joint FAO/WHO Expert
Meeting on Microbiological Risk Assessment and
the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Pesticide
Specifications) with procedural risk assessment
policy guidance than had ever previously been
published.61 The question of the extent to which
those documents report traditional practices or
represent aspirational benchmarks yet to be
achieved is beyond the scope of this study but rep-
resents an occasion for subsequent research. 
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56 S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature - Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p.
233
57 UN FAO & WHO, FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition (to Codex and member coun-
tries) - Final Draft for Public Comments, Rome/Geneva 2006, p. 9, available 27 February 2007 from 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/index_en.stm as ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/framework_en.pdf
58 FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition, WHO/FAO, 2007, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/Proscad_Framework_Final_E.pdf
59 Op cit p. vi
60 Op cit p. 4 para 2.1
61 Op cit Annex B pp 28-39
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USA 
In the USA a variety of explicit risk assessment
policies, both procedural and substantive, have
been established by regulatory agencies and Con-
gress. Even where specific risk assessment policy
guidance does not exist, there are several legal
statutes, some long-standing, that guide and re-
strict the procedures with which US risk assessors
can frame their assessments and gather, select and
interpret data. At least some of the key assumptions
that frame and underpin risk assessments become
explicit in US institutions and procedures, partly
as a consequence of the requirements of US
statutes but also attempts on the part of regulatory
agencies to avoid or anticipate legal challenges. 
For example, the US Administrative Proce-
dures Act 1946 imposes constraints on agencies’
regulatory discretion by stipulating mandatory
consultation procedures. Regulatory agencies must
give advance notice of proposed rules as well as
opportunities for comments by interested parties.
This requirement has generated adjudicatory pro-
cedures with broad scope for participation, often
testing evidence in adversarial hearings.62
More recently, in 2001, the US Congress
passed The Data Quality Act (or DQA), albeit with-
out discussion or debate.63 Weiss described the
DQA as the ‘nemesis of regulation’, while Graham
(who was then the head of the OMB Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs) portrayed it as a
means of ensuring that the federal government
sticks to ‘sound science’.64 The DQA obliges the
Director of the OMB and other federal agencies to:
“…provide policy and procedural guidance to Fed-
eral agencies for ensuring and maximising the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of informa-
tion…” Irrespective of the contest over the political
significance of the DQA, it is evident that the DQA
imposes procedural obligations on US government
regulatory agencies such as the FDA and EPA to
provide some interpretative RAP guidance to their
risk assessors. 
Regulatory decisions are also routinely sub-
ject to judicial review, and the courts may over-
turn decisions deemed ‘arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law’. Moreover, under a ‘formal adju-
dication’ procedure, the courts may overturn any
decision not supported by ‘substantial evidence’.
In making such a judgement, courts may review
any of the evidence cited, by drawing on expert
witnesses.65 This threat of litigation has provided a
strong incentive for agencies to adopt consultative
procedures, as well as to formalise and routinise
risk assessment methods that can be defended in
adversarial judicial contexts.
Under those conditions, risk assessment guid-
ance has emphasised and made explicit the role
of assumptions, including inherent extra-scientific
and/or non-scientific judgements. According to the
US National Research Council’s 1983 Red Book ‘a
single risk-assessment method may not be suffi-
cient’ because there may not be only one right way
of assessing risks, and so the choice of appropriate
assumptions requires interactions between risk as-
sessors and risk managers.66 According to subse-
quent guidance from the US National Research
Council in 1997, risk assessors should evaluate the
weight of evidence that supports different assump-
tions or conclusions.67 In effect, legislation such as
the APA and DQA set procedural risk assessment
policy, which in turn generates pressures for some
substantive risk assessment issues to be made more
explicit that was previously, or would otherwise
be, the case; ongoing debates about those issues
are thereby engendered.68 Most regulatory rule-
making processes are regulated by specific statutes
that in part provide some substantive RAP guid-
ance on which risks are to be controlled. Since the
3.
 E
X
PL
IC
IT
 F
or
m
al
 r
is
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s 
36
62 Brickman R, Jasanoff S, Ilgen T, Controlling chemicals: the politics of regulation in Europe and the US, Cornell University Press, 1985, p.
88
63 Data Quality Act, Section 515 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub.L. 106-554; available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ554.106
64 R Weiss, ‘Data Quality Law is nemesis of regulation’, Washington Post, 16 Aug. 2004, p A1
65 Brickman R, Jasanoff S, Ilgen T, Controlling chemicals: the politics of regulation in Europe and the US, Cornell University Press, 1985, p.
53
66 US NRC., 1983, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, National Research Council, Washington DC, p. 40
67 US NRC, 1997, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, Washington, DC: National Academy Press
68 There is no single up-to-date authoritative version of US procedural risk assessment policy, although important reference points have
been provided by the US National Research Council in 1983 and 1996, the US RC, 1997 and OMB, 2006. US National Research Coun-
cil, Understanding risk: Informing decisions in a democratic society, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1997
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1980s numerous judicial rulings have obliged
agencies to justify regulatory initiatives through
risk assessments, especially in quantitative terms,
to show that their decisions are not ‘arbitrary’; reg-
ulatory agencies have internalized those rulings,
especially through a reluctance to restrict or delay
products.
In addition to the procedural features of US
risk assessment policy, stipulated or engendered by
statutes, the US authorities have published a series
of documents on data requirements for chemicals
in food under the title of Toxicological Principles
for the Safety Assessment of Food Ingredients; the
first edition emerged in 1983 and has subsequently
been through at least six revisions.69 That docu-
ment, also often referred to as the FDA Red Book
(as opposed to the US NRC 1983 ‘Red Book’, cf
Figure 2, on page 14), provides detailed guidance
concerning minimum toxicological data require-
ments and the ways in which the FDA normally in-
terprets toxicological data, introducing what are
referred to as ‘default assumptions’. The US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) has published
guidance of a similar type, in respect of putative
carcinogens.70 To that extent, and in those ways,
the US government risk managers are providing
some explicit substantive risk assessment policy
guidance to risk assessors. 
The inference guidelines emerged initially
from risk managers but have been, and are, pro-
duced through relatively extensive processes of
consultation not just with risk assessors but also a
wide variety of stakeholders, though the types of
stakeholders and nature of involvement varies
across sectors. For food toxicology, for example,
drafts of the FDA’s Red Book have been reviewed
by the chemical industry before being finalised
and later revised. 
There is extensive and detailed guidance on
toxicological data requirements for food chemi-
cals, whereas for GM crops no similar guidance
has been formalised or codified. In relation to
some GM crops, such as Bt maize, the EPA has in-
dicated some data requirements in specific cases,
but that has not been formalised or generalised. 
As Jasanoff has shown in her analysis of the
role of expert scientific advisors in US risk policy-
making regimes, there is a tendency in the USA for
both risk assessors and risk managers to portray
many of their key risk assessment policy judge-
ments as if they were fundamentally scientific. The
purpose of so doing may, as Jasanoff suggests, be
to try to insulate those sensitive issues from Judicial
or Congressional scrutiny.71 That tactic can also be
interpreted as an attempt to invoke a decisionist
Red Book model, so that risk assessments can be
portrayed as emerging from a policy-free zone.
UK
In the UK, in the aftermath of the BSE crisis of
March 1996, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and
Office of Science and Technology (OST - headed
by the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor) have
provided explicit procedural risk assessment policy
guidance to expert advisory committees, the de-
tails of which are provided in subsequent sec-
tions.72 Those explicit risk assessment policies are
almost entirely procedural rather than substantive
or interpretative. 
The FSA subsequently published in April 2002
a review of the conduct of its scientific advisory
committees; its conclusions and recommendation
also provided detailed procedural guidance.73 That
guidance covered, for example, issues of data con-
fidentiality and openness, and the treatment of sci-
entific uncertainties, assumptions and unorthodox
scientific views. It was not referred to by the FSA as
‘risk assessment policy’ but it did provide generic
advice to any and all committees in advance of
their appraisal of particular risks, and so invites in-
terpretation as procedural RAP guidance of the sort
called for by the Codex Procedural Manual. The
FSA’s advice was also developed in open consulta-
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69 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Toxicological Principles for the Safety Assessment of Direct Food Additives and Color Additives Used
in Food, (also known as FDA Redbook I), FDA Bureau of Foods 1982; and revisions in 1993, July 2000; Updated October 2001, Novem-
ber 2003, April 2004, February 2006; available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~redbook/red-toca.html#ftn1
70 US EPA (1996) Proposed guidelines for carcinogenic risk assessment, Federal Register 61(79): 17960-18011
71 S Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: science advisors as policy makers, Harvard University Press, 1990
72 OST (2005) Scientific Analysis in Policy Making. London: Office of Science and Technology [revision of OST, Scientific Advice and Policy
Making, 2000]
73 Food Standards Agency, 2002, Report on the Review of Scientific Committees, 15 April 2002, available from 
http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/58746
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tion with a wide range of stakeholders, unlike the
earlier Office of Science and Technology guidance
that had no such involvement, except for an op-
portunity for submitting written comments after the
document had been published.
Substantive RAP guidance emerged, for ex-
ample, when the Committee on Toxicity’s subcom-
mittee on Carcinogenicity and the Department of
Health published guidance on toxicological data
requirements, as well as some guidance on how
toxicological data would be interpreted.74 In that
case, RAP guidance emerged prior to the BSE cri-
sis of March 1996.
In relation to GM crops and foods, ACRE (the
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environ-
ment) and DEFRA (the Department for Food and
Rural Affairs) have jointly published guidance doc-
uments on substantive risk assessment criteria for
GM crops, complementing EU-level guidance.75
Those elements of substantive RAP, unlike the
more general and higher level procedural guid-
ance, have been issued by expert advisory bodies,
along with their host departments. In practice such
substantive RAP represents the result of joint dis-
cussions between risk assessors and risk managers.
For example, for GM crops, “…[risk assessment]
criteria evolve in a two-way iterative process be-
tween advisors and regulators.”76
The substantive RAP guidance is usually put
out for consultation whilst in draft form. This was
the case, for example, with the CoT’s guidance
documents on data requirements and data inter-
pretation.77 For GM crops, the 1998 DEFRA deci-
sion to extend risk assessment to include the
impact of herbicides on farmland biodiversity in-
volved open consultations with a wide range of
stakeholders. For GM foods, reference has been
made to European Guidance since 1997, which in
turn was set in consultation with all Member States
and some stakeholders. The ACNFP also holds
open public meetings, approximately once a year,
to discuss difficult or new issues and that commit-
tee has also included an informal ‘public’ repre-
sentative.
Germany
Some procedural risk assessment policy guid-
ance has been published by the new key German
risk assessment body, the BfR (although the Ger-
man authorities do not use the expression ‘risk as-
sessment policy’, or its German equivalent).78 That
guidance was developed by BfR staff, i.e. by risk
assessors rather than by risk managers or some
combination of the two, and then presented to risk
managers at BVL, in effect as a fait accompli.
Stakeholders were almost entirely excluded from
establishing that procedural risk assessment policy
guidance. General stakeholder involvement at BfR
is understood as something that happens after fi-
nalising an assessment,79 and does not include in-
fluencing or involvement in the risk assessment
question or process. Occasionally very generic risk
assessments of novel or broader issues, such as
nanotechnology, are reviewed, and on those rare
occasions stakeholders may be invited to partici-
pate in a carefully circumscribed deliberative
process.
Following the shift of GMO risk assessment
responsibilities from the German Federal Environ-
mental Agency (UBA) to the BfN, conflicts be-
tween BVL and BfN emerged on contrasting
approaches to risk assessment and differences
over the conclusions that could be drawn. The re-
sponse of the Ministry was to impose an Intera-
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74 COC (1991) Guidance for the Evaluation of Chemicals for Carcinogenicity; COC (2004) Guidance on a Strategy for the Risk Assessment
of Chemical Carcinogens available at http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/coc/guideline04.pdf
75 ACRE & DEFRA (1999) Commercial Use of GM Crops in the UK: Potential Wider Impact on Farmland Wildlife; ACRE & DEFRA (2001)
Risk Assessment for Release and Marketing of GMOs in the EU
76 pers. comm. Senior DEFRA official, 2006
77 Committee on Toxicity, Draft report of the Working Group on Variation and Uncertainty in Toxicology, Wednesday 12 April 2006 COC
(2004) Guidance on a Strategy for the Risk Assessment of Chemical Carcinogens; COM (2000) Guidance on a Strategy for Testing of
Chemicals for Mutagenicity
78 BfR 2005: Guidance Document – The Format for Health Assessment Documents
79 “risk communication work of the Federal Institute is to be understood as an ongoing and interactive process of opening up its assessment
work and results to the general public, scientists and other involved or interested circles. Differing views can be presented in the course
of this dialogue. […] another goal of the dialogue should be to determine whether there are differences in the way in which the partici-
pants in the dialogue perceive, assess and handle risks. Knowledge and consideration of different values and standards on which this as-
sessment is based, make two things possible: the reaching of a consensus on action options and the identification of dissent. In this way,
it will be possible to furnish the responsible offices with the foundations for their decisions on risk management.” (BfR on risk communi-
cation, http://www.bfr.bund.de/cd/1834).
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gency Agreement (Verwaltungs vereinbarung)
providing a procedure to resolve such disagree-
ments, without consulting external stakeholders.
The agreement stipulates that, in the event that
such differences can not be resolved, the final
opinion that the BVL will submit to the EFSA, or
to other parties, should include statements of mi-
nority opinions.
The German authorities have not explicitly
articulated any substantive guidance concerning
the scope or limits of the risks to be assessed, and
German risk assessors are therefore guided only
by EU and other international guidance docu-
ments and their own judgements, customs and
practices. There are, moreover, inter-institutional
differences in the extent to which those guidance
documents are acknowledged. For example, the
BfN emphasises the guidance on environmental
risk assessments provided by the Annexes of Di-
rective 2001/18/EC and Commission Guidance
Note while the BfR and the RKI more frequently
refer to the EFSA guidance document. 80 In com-
mon with all EU Member States, risk assessors of
GM crops and foods in Germany are also covered
by guidance from EFSA concerning the minimum
scope of risk assessments as well as some aspects
of procedures.
Argentina
In Argentina, the authorities have provided no
explicit procedural or substantive RAP guidance to
their expert advisory committees. Some implicit
substantive guidelines are available since the min-
imum data requirements for a risk assessment of
either GM plants or GM foods have been pub-
lished. Those data requirements were drawn up
and endorsed by the relevant technical commit-
tees, both of which involve representatives of the
regulated industrial sector. Although those mem-
bers are appointed as experts, rather than as for-
mal representatives of the industrial sector, that
process nevertheless allows representatives of that
stakeholder category to participate in risk assess-
ment policy-making, while other stakeholder
groups, except government departments and pub-
lic sector research organisations, are not repre-
sented on the expert committees. It is not clear,
given the lack of transparency, whether or not ap-
plicants in practice meet those data requirements.
In Argentina, once a plant GMO has been
field tested, the applicant can request that the crop
be approved for unconfined, usually large-scale,
planting. This procedure, known as ‘flexibiliza-
tion’, is the second stage of the environmental
evaluation and is required prior to full commercial
clearance. Resolution 39/03 states that the purpose
of the assessment: ‘…aims at determining that the
environmental impact of the released GMPO will
not significantly differ from that of its non-modi-
fied counterpart.”81 That provides some guidance
as to what assessors should do, but the document
is quite vague; it does not explain how the term
‘significant’ should be interpreted, nor which envi-
ronmental impacts should be assessed, nor what
kind of agricultural system should provide the
comparator for the non-modified counterpart. As
RAP guidance goes, it is rather open-ended.
Japan
In Japan, several substantive as well as proce-
dural RAP guidance documents setting out data re-
quirements and data collection methods have
been published for legally-mandated risk assess-
ments of GM foods and crops. For GM foods, the
principal document is Standards for the Safety As-
sessment of Genetically Modified Foods (Seeds
Plants).82 For GM crops, procedural guidance doc-
uments include the Guidance on Implementation
of Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biological Di-
versity of Type 1 Use of Living Modified Organ-
R
is
k-
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s:
39
80 COUNCIL DECISION, of 3 October 2002, establishing guidance notes supplementing Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council
Directive 90/220/EEC, (2002/811/EC) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biotechnology/pdf/dec2002_811.pdf; EFSA (2004): European Food
Safety Authority: Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for the Risk Assessment of Genetically
Modified Plants and Derived Food and Feed. 8 November 2004. The EFSA Journal 99, 1–94.
81 SAGPyA (2004) Revision of Argentina´s National Biosafety Framework, (Revisión Del Marco Nacional Sobre Bioseguridad En Argentina)
UNEP-GEF PROJECT, Sagpya – UNEP – GEF – GF/2716-02-4406, Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food, Buenos Aires.
Available at: http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/development/Countryreports/ARNBFENVol1.pdf
82 Food Safety Commission Japan. Standards for the Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Foods (Seeds Plants), Food Safety Commis-
sion Decision, 29 January 2004. Along with this one, several documents have been published for assessment of cross-bred GM plants,
GM-derived food additives, and feeds and feed additives.
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isms83 and the Application of Approval for the Pro-
duction and Distribution of GMOs under the Juris-
diction of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries.84 Those guidance documents were issued
in early 2000’s and replaced previous guidelines.85
As in UK, these documents are not referred to as
‘risk assessment policy’, but they do provide risk
assessors with specifications indicating substan-
tively which types of risks should be assessed; and
they also provide some procedural guidance.86
In the case of GM foods, these elements of
risk assessment policy emerged primarily from the
risk assessors, namely the Expert Committee for
Genetically Modified Foods (ECGMF) of the FSC.
The documents were developed by risk assessors,
based on the previous Japanese guideline and rel-
evant international documents (including the
Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assess-
ment of Foods Derived from Recombinant-DNA
Plants of Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task
Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology),
while also taking account of some public com-
ments.
On the other hand, in the case of GM crops,
new RAP guidance documents were developed in
the context of adapting legislation to enable the
Japanese government to implement the Cartagena
Protocol on Biodiversity. In order to draft those
documents relevant ministries, such as the Ministry
of Environment (MOE), Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), created their own
ad hoc advisory committees to consider the new
regulatory framework. Among others, MOE’s com-
mittee outlined substantive RAP issues, concern-
ing the scope and data requirements of risk
assessment. Through the deliberations of those
committees, and also taking account of the public
comments on the draft, these ministries finalised
guidance documents as well as a new domestic
law to ratify the Cartagena Protocol.
In this ad hoc process, however, the advisory
committees included not just ‘scientists’ but also
those concerned with broader issues of risk man-
agement, their membership included natural sci-
entists, social scientists and stakeholders’
representatives. At that stage, moreover, the institu-
tional separation between risk assessors and risk
managers had not yet been introduced. It was only
after all the guidance documents had been final-
ized, that the Committee for the Assessment of Ad-
verse Effects on Biodiversity (CAAEB), as an
independent risk assessment body for GM crops,
was established.
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83 Ministry of Environment Japan et al. Guidance of Implementation of Assessment of Adverse Effect on Biological Diversity of Type 1 Use
of Living Modified Organisms, Ministry of Environment (MOE), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT), Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF): http://www.bch.biodic.go.jp/download/en_law/en_assessment_guidence.doc
84 Director-General of the Food Safety and Consumers Bureau of MAFF et al. The Application of Approval for the Production and Distribu-
tion of GMOs under the Jurisdiction of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Notification of the Food Safety and Consumers Bu-
reau of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), No.15-5839; Notification of Director-General of Nature Conservation
Bureau of Ministry of Environment (MOE), No.040209002, 9 February 2004.
85 Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). Procedure of Application for Safety Assessment on Foods and Food Additives Produced by Re-
combinant DNA Techniques (MHW Announcement No.233, 1 May 2000: abolished on 30 June 2003); Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (MAFF). Guidelines for Application of Recombinant DNA Organisms in Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, the Food Industry
and Other Related Industries (April 1989: abolished on 18 February 2004).
86 For Japanese risk managers, ‘risk assessment policy’ means more specific guidance to be set out for each case of appraisal and includes
concrete information regarding what risk managers want to achieve in their management and relevant designations to risk assessors. The
operation of risk assessment policy in this sense is still under development.
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This section focuses on more specific ques-
tions concerning procedural RAPs: that is, guid-
ance about the processes by which risk assessors
are expected to perform their scientific assess-
ments. This discussion covers several issues, such
as the way in which scientific assessments should
be reported, the relationship between risk asses-
sors and managers, the recruitment and selection
of experts and the involvement of broader stake-
holders in the assessment process. Both this and
the subsequent section are structured by issue,
rather than by jurisdiction. This is because the
main purpose is to highlight the diverse national
approaches to each aspect of RAP, rather than to
explain and compare national systems.
Main cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdic-
tional differences
More explicit procedural risk assessment pol-
icy guidance has been provided at the global and
national levels than either substantive or interpre-
tative RAP guidance. 
The USA has numerous statutes that opportu-
nities for litigation, judicial review of Agency deci-
sion-making, and judicial case law has explicitly
contributed to many aspects of US procedural RAP.
In the UK and at Codex, some explicit and detailed
procedural guidance has been published, rela-
tively recently, the full implementation of which
would constitute a marked shift from traditional
practices. Implementation so far remains patchy.
By comparison with Codex and the UK, Germany
and Japan have recently provided somewhat less
comprehensive procedural guidance, concerning
for example clarification of uncertainties and in-
terpretative assumptions. No procedural guidance
has been provided in Argentina.
Much of the procedural RAP is generic and
applies across several sectors. Some countries es-
pecially Japan and Germany have some institu-
tional- and sectoral-specific RAP guidance.
Procedural guidelines in Germany apply only to
some risk assessment bodies not all, and they dif-
fer markedly amongst them.
In all the jurisdictions, including the global in-
stitutions, except Argentina at least some state-
ments have been published concerning the
independence of risk assessors from risk managers,
and in some cases from other stakeholders too.
Often, what is meant by independence, or indeed
what it is that risk assessors are supposed to be in-
dependent of, is not clarified. ‘Independence’
sometimes refers to freedom for risk assessors from
having the content and/or conclusions of their risk
assessments determined by risk managers. On
other occasions ‘independence’ is interpreted as a
freedom from influence on the scope of risk assess-
ments. In some jurisdictions, risk assessments often
result from close discussions between those nom-
inally labelled as ‘risk assessors’ and ‘risk man-
agers’, whose inter-dependencies may not always
be transparent. In several jurisdictions, the sup-
posed ‘independence’ of risk assessors is portrayed
as guaranteeing scientific integrity.
In Japan, the UK and sometimes in Germany
and the USA, but not in Argentina or in the global
institutions, official statements have said that risk
assessors should not make risk management judge-
ments. In practice, risk assessors in all jurisdictions
make at least some risk management judgements,
although almost invariably they have done so im-
plicitly rather than explicitly. Published RAP guid-
ance documents often invite risk assessors to
advise on selected risk management options.
Sometimes advice from risk assessors pre-empts
decisions about risk management, while in others
risk managers portray their decisions as if they
were based solely upon scientific assessments of
risks. Key ambiguities concern 1) which kinds of
risk management issues risk assessors should
avoid, 2) how those issues should be articulated
and 3) how the boundary between risk assessors
and risk managers should be delineated. 
Risk assessors in Codex, the UK, and in some
respects in Germany and the USA, but not in Japan
or Argentina, have been told to be explicit about
scientific uncertainties, although without much de-
tail about which kinds of uncertainties should be
made explicit. In practice, the risk assessors that
4. Procedural aspects of risk assessment policies
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we have reviewed were only rarely explicit about
uncertainties, although some uncertainties are im-
plicit in requests for further data. Risk assessors
normally only draw attention to those uncertain-
ties that can be addressed using currently available
methods, although occasionally more intractable
uncertainties are highlighted.
CCFAC and the UK have told their advisors to
make any/all assumptions explicit, but in practice
only some have been made explicit; many remain
implicit and unacknowledged. In Japan there is a
requirement to clarify the grounds for judgements
in GM crop assessments but in practice only some
of those grounds have been made explicit. No sim-
ilar guidance has been set out in either Germany
or Argentina. 
The US system has long been subject to an ex-
plicit Freedom of Information regime that covers
risk assessments, the process by which those as-
sessments were conducted, as well as much of the
scientific and technological data on which the as-
sessments are based. The provisions of the UK
Freedom of Information Act are more restrictive
than those in the USA, though some expert advi-
sory committees hold many of their meetings in
public. Proposed guidelines for the FAO/WHO
committees envisage continuing with current prac-
tice of holding only closed meetings and allowing
sponsors to decide whether or not their data enter
the public domain. In Argentina almost no infor-
mation is disclosed by the regulatory authorities. 
Over recent years, especially in European
contexts such as the UK and Germany, and in
Japan too, policy-makers have reiterated commit-
ments to making food safety policy deliberations
more open and accountable. In Germany, how-
ever, data are usually not disclosed; and the out-
comes of some risk assessments remain
confidential. In relation to GM foods and crops,
German risk assessment procedures are opaque
and all meetings are closed.
Opportunities for public and stakeholder in-
volvement in risk assessment have long been ex-
tensive in the USA. In Japan there are mechanisms
for public and stakeholder comments on draft risk
assessments; public meetings are also sometimes
held at an early stage in relation to generic issues.
In the UK there are a few formal opportunities for
stakeholder and public comments on risk assess-
ment issues. At meetings of the CoT, and its sub-
committees, observers may comment but not until
after the committee’s conclusions have been fi-
nalised. In Germany policy-makers have made
rhetorical statements about such opportunities but
little has been done to facilitate stakeholder en-
gagement in the course of decision-making. The
FAO/WHO advisory committees do not explicitly
include stakeholder involvement. In Argentina ex-
pert advisory committees include members from
the industries whose products are being assessed,
but other stakeholder groups are excluded.
The UK FSA recently published the report of a
joint project with the Royal Society which in-
cluded the proposal to: “…consult stakeholders
and the public (where appropriate) on the framing
of questions to be put to expert scientific advisory
committees.”87 If that procedural change were to
occur in the UK it would represent a distinct inno-
vation by making substantive risk assessment pol-
icy-making more inclusive and transparent.
In the USA, official substantive and interpre-
tative risk assessment policies have long been ex-
plicit in relation to food chemical risks, especially
carcinogenic risks. Almost no substantive or inter-
pretative RAP guidance has been provided in rela-
tion to GM food, for which approval has not
routinely been required in the USA. In relation to
GM crops, modified to express an insecticide such
as Bt, the EPA set a clear policy in the mid-1990s
to include impacts on insect resistance in the
scope of its official risk assessments. For non-target
harm, by contrast, scoping RAP assumptions have
been not codified, but have emerged on a case-by-
case basis. In Germany and Japan official substan-
tive and interpretative RAPs have not been
explicitly articulated in relation to food chemical
risks. In Japan, on the other hand in relation to GM
foods and crops, some explicit substantive RAP
guidance documents have been published. UK
and Germany risk assessors routinely refer to offi-
cial EU guidance, in relation to both food chemi-
cals and GM foods and crops. Those EU
documents include some explicit substantive and
interpretative RAPs. At the FAO/WHO committees
and in Argentina substantive and interpretative
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87 CoT paper TOX/2006/12, available at 
http://www.food.gov.uk/science/ouradvisors/toxicity/cotmeets/cot2006/cotmeeting060328/cotmeeting060328agenda
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RAPs have been conspicuous by their absence, ex-
cept for minimum data requirements.
All the jurisdictions, as well as the joint
FAO/WHO committees, accept unpublished data,
but some of them, including the USA, the UK, Ger-
many and Japan, but not either Argentina or the
FAO/WHO committees, subsequently place some
of the submitted data in the public domain.
The independence of risk assessors: Have ex-
plicit assertions been made that risk assessors
should be independent of risk managers? In
which other ways is the ‘independence’ of
risk assessors being interpreted? 
In all five jurisdictions, and at the global level,
several official statements have been published
concerning the ‘independence’ of risk assessors
from risk managers and in some cases from other
stakeholders too. Often, however, what is actually
meant by independence, or indeed what and/or
whom it is that risk assessors are supposed to be in-
dependent of, is not clearly articulated. Independ-
ence sometimes seems to refer to freedom for risk
assessors from having the content, or at least the
representation of the content, of their assessments
shaped, or biased, by political and other non-sci-
entific criteria. The assumption is often, though not
always, that all such intrusions on scientific crite-
ria for conducting risk assessments are unwar-
ranted. This is one of the senses in which
independence is used in several jurisdictions. 
At least two mechanisms to try to ensure such
independence can be found. One aspires to en-
sure the scientific credibility of assessments
through mechanisms such as peer review (as in the
USA), or by emphasising the fact that assessors are
professionally qualified (as in Argentina). In oth-
ers, independence is portrayed as an institutional
rather than individual achievement, based for ex-
ample on criteria for selecting experts, by refer-
ence to their occupational locations (eg academia
and public sector institutions) as well as their rel-
evant expertise, or by requiring expert advisors
with conflicting institutional or personal interests
to excuse themselves from certain deliberations. In
others it may involve locating scientists and pol-
icy-makers in different buildings under different
forms of institutional management and control.
Codex and WHO/FAO bodies
At the international level, JECFA and JMPR are
supposed to be independent of national govern-
ments; and occasionally interviewees claimed that
they were independent of risk managers in Codex
too. Indeed when JECFA rejected the proposed risk
assessment policy from CCRVDF, it did so in part by
asserting its independence from Codex risk man-
agers. Members of JECFA and JMPR can be, and
some often are, industrial consultants; although
there are now some requirements for disclosures. 
More specific assertions, or rather proposals,
about independence have also been made in the
draft and final risk assessment policies drawn up
by CCFAC and CCRVDP.
CCFAC
A key passage in the first draft of the 2002
CCFAC document refers to conflicts of interest:
JECFA should ensure the independence of its
scientific experts from conflicts of interest by
ensuring that the selection of experts and ad-
visors to JECFA is conducted in a transparent
manner and any commercial interests of its
scientific experts are declared.88
Those provisions represented a challenge to
traditional procedures. JECFA’s secretariat has re-
quested self-nominations from scientific experts,
but the ways in which experts are selected remain
opaque. At a full meeting of CCFAC, in March
2002 a version of the draft paper was discussed,
but it had been significantly diluted.89 On the issue
of recruitment, selection and independence of
members of JECFA from commercial interests, the
revised text just said: “JECFA will select scientific
experts on the basis of their competence and in-
dependence, taking into account geographical
representation to ensure that all regions are repre-
sented.”90 No reference was then made by JECFA
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88 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Request for Comment on the Proposed Risk Assessment Policy Statement for the Interaction Between
CCFAC and JECFA, CL 2002?_-FAC_2002, page 4 para 15
89 Report of 34th Session of CCFAC, ALINORM 03/12, April 2002 see www.codexalimentarius.net/download/report/28/Al03_12e.pdf 
90 op. cit. p. 124 para u
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to declarations of conflicts of interest, even less to
public declarations of conflicts of interest, though
since 2006 brief comments on declarations of in-
terests have been included in JECFA reports91. The
term ‘independence’ was used, without any indi-
cation of that from which risk assessors should be
independent. 
Since 2006 candidates for committee mem-
bership should disclose potential conflicts of inter-
est to the WHO/FAO secretariat,92 and since then
JECFA reports have started to include explicit state-
ments on the absence or presence of conflicts of
interest.93 Recent reports suggest that sometimes
committee members who have declared a conflict
of interest are required to leave the room or remain
silent when topics related to their declared inter-
ests are discussed.94
CCRVDF
The CCRVDF document states: 
Scientific experts from JECFA are selected in a
transparent manner by FAO and WHO under their
rules for expert committees on the basis of the
competence, expertise, experience in the evalua-
tion of compounds used as veterinary drugs and
their independence with regard to the interests in-
volved....95
That passage does not say that scientists
should be selected in a transparent manner, just
that they are. The document also asserts that
“JECFA is…responsible for providing independent
scientific advice” but no clarity is provided con-
cerning independence from whom or what. As re-
cently as March 2006, JECFA had commented on
the draft “Overall it is not clear if the document is
describing current procedures, or is describing a
way of working that should be achieved in the fu-
ture.”96 If it was unclear to JECFA, then it is even
less clear to outside observers. Neither JECFA nor
CCRVDF then commented on the issue of inde-
pendence of JECFA from commercial interests; al-
though since 2006 declarations of potential
conflicts of interest have been required and re-
ported.97
USA
In the USA, the independence of risk asses-
sors (i.e. staff at the FDA and EPA), or rather the in-
dependence of their products – the risk
assessments – tends to be associated with peer re-
view, rather than as a function of the institutional
relationships between risk assessors and risk man-
agers, or between Agency staff and other institu-
tions. As the US Risk Commission has pointed out:
“The integrity of a risk assessment is best assured if
it is carried out or peer-reviewed independently,
for example, by scientists at regulatory agencies,
universities and research institutions.”98 Risk asses-
sors are portrayed as separate, or separable, from
policy-making in the US system through assur-
ances of scientific quality, or as the US Office of
Management and Budget implies, by virtue of the
fact that risk assessment would ideally follow the
quality norms of a scientific experiment, such that
“…independent reanalysis of the original or sup-
porting data using the same methods would gener-
ate similar analytical results.”99
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91 See eg Evaluation of certain veterinary drug residues in food (Sixty-sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Addi-
tives) WHO Technical Report Series, No. 939,2006; Evaluation of certain food additives and contaminants (Sixty-seventh report of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 940, 2007
92 Cf: FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition (to Codex and member countries),
Rome/Geneva, 2006 para 5.4
93 See eg Evaluation of certain veterinary drug residues in food (Sixty-sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Addi-
tives) WHO Technical Report Series, No. 939,2006; Evaluation of certain food additives and contaminants (Sixty-seventh report of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 940, 2007
94 Discussion Paper on Risk Analysis Principles and Methodologies in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods,
CX/RVDF 01/9 July 2001 p 89 para 7
95 Report of 66th Meeting of JECFA, JECFA/66/SC 2006 available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/9241209399_eng.pdf
96 See eg Evaluation of certain veterinary drug residues in food (Sixty-sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Addi-
tives), WHO Technical Report Series, No. 939,2006; Evaluation of certain food additives and contaminants (Sixty-seventh report of the
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 940, 2007
97 US Risk Commission, Vol. 1, 1997: 25
98 Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, March 2006, p. 16
99 OST (2005) Scientific Analysis in Policy Making. London: Office of Science and Technology [revision of Scientific Advice and Policy Mak-
ing, 2000], p. 7
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UK
In the UK, general guidance from the govern-
ment’s Office of Science and Technology places
some emphasis on the independence of risk asses-
sors, or rather that fraction of risk assessors who op-
erate as expert advisors, from decision-making and
from political considerations. It states that: “Experts
should not be expected to take into account poten-
tial political reaction to their findings before pre-
senting them.”100 That advice almost certainly
reflects experience of BSE regulation in which, with
hindsight, expert committees underplayed or mis-
represented their assessments of potential risk in
order to match their assessment of the political con-
tingencies of policy-making at that time.101
The OST does acknowledge that risk assessors
are not entirely independent from risk managers as
regards the remit of their deliberations or the kinds
of policy options that they should comment on;
rather it asks that such choices be made explicit
and not confused with scientific decisions. To that
extent, the OST guidance to scientific advisory
committees acknowledges that their functions and
judgements are hybrids of scientific and policy
considerations. For food safety specifically, official
guidance also emphasises a need for ‘independent
expert committees’, without clarifying from whom
or what those committees should be independent.
The OST (recently renamed the Office of Sci-
ence and Innovation or OSI) also stipulated that all
material interests should be disclosed, but that de-
partments may conclude that a conflict of interest
will not likely ‘undermine the credibility and in-
dependence of the advice’.102 In practice, the rel-
evance of this particular piece of generic advice
varies greatly across committees. With respect to
GM crops, when the Advisory Committee on Re-
leases to the Environment was reorganised in
1998, there was an explicit policy decision to ex-
clude all potential candidates based in industry or
in NGOs. The Food Standards Agency has set a
similar policy in relation to the Advisory Commit-
tee on Novel Foods and Processes, which still has
a public representative, (appointed as an expert,
currently an academic social scientist) as well as
members with active relevant commercial inter-
ests.103 For chemical toxicity there is no general
commitment to independence from commercial
interests, just declarations of interests.
Germany
In Germany the independence of the BfR, re-
sponsible for food risk assessments, is stipulated by
statute and includes independence to conduct its
own risk communication activities, to set its re-
search agenda, and to manage its own budget. Risk
assessors at BfR are also supposed to be independ-
ent of risk management considerations. As one civil
servant put it, the BfR should pursue their tasks
“…even if these tasks are costly and might bring
some problematic results out into the open.”104
Claims of independence have not been made for
other official institutions with responsibility for risk
assessment such as the UBA, BfN and RKI, which
are involved in assessing risks from eg pesticides
and/or GMOs. Those institutions remain under ‘pro-
fessional supervision’ by their respective ministries.
Japan
In Japan, GM risk assessors are said to be ‘in-
dependent’ in three senses: of risk management or-
ganizations, of industrial promotion and of interest
parties. An example of explicit assertions of the
first sense is found in The Annual Report on Food,
Agriculture and Rural Areas in Japan FY 2002 that
was published after BSE crisis in 2001:
In the past food safety administration, func-
tions of risk assessment and risk management
had not been differentiated in the area of agri-
culture, forestry, fisheries and others. How-
ever, since this new organization [i.e. Food
Safety Commission] is required to produce re-
sults of objective, scientific risk assessment,
independence and competence must be en-
sured.
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100 Phillips, Bridgeman J & Ferguson-Smith M (2000) The BSE Inquiry: Report: evidence and supporting papers of the Inquiry into the emer-
gence and identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) and the action taken
in response to it up to 20 March 1996, The Stationery Office, London
101 OST (2005) Scientific Analysis in Policy Making. London: Office of Science and Technology, p. 5
102 See http://www.acnfp.gov.uk/acnfpmembership/acnfpmembersint as of 22 November 2006
103 Interview pers. comm.2005
104 BSE Investigation Committee. The Report of BSE Investigation Committee, BSE Investigation Committee, 2 April, 2002.
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An example of a second interpretation of in-
dependence first appeared in the 2002 report of
the ad hoc advisory body set up in response to the
BSE crisis.105 Pointing out the problem of not differ-
entiating ‘risk assessment’ from ‘risk management’,
it claimed that: 
“Radical reform of the status quo of Japan is
needed. A characteristic common to the re-
cent reform of food safety administrative or-
ganizations of EU, France and Germany is that
they established independent risk assessment
organizations. In particular, separation and in-
dependence from organisations responsible
for industrial promotion is indispensable.”
To achieve effective independence from con-
siderations of industrial promotion, an institutional
separation between risk management and industrial
promotion was also invoked. This emphasis reflected
an acknowledgement that, in the past food, safety
policy had often been dominated by business con-
cerns, with responsibility for both sets of considera-
tions located in a single section of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. A break with tra-
ditional arrangements was institutionalised when
MAFF established the Food Safety and Consumer Af-
fairs Bureau as an independent food safety section.
The third sense of independence was evident
in statements asserting that the members of Food
Safety Commission (FSC) should only be drawn
from scientific experts to ensure scientific objec-
tivity, and the ‘purity’ of risk assessments. For ex-
ample, according to a report of the Japanese
Consumers’ Co-operative Union (JCCU), when it
asked the Preparatory Office for the Food Safety
Commission to include representatives of con-
sumers and industry to the members of FSC, the
Preparatory Office replied as follows:
“We think that the role of Commission is to
conduct scientific risk assessment and that it is
the place for scientific discussion by experts.
‘Representative of …’ is the position of stake-
holders and it is undesirable that scientific as-
sessments are influenced by interests. In this
sense, we plan to add an ‘expert on con-
sumers’ attitude and behaviour’ to the mem-
bers of FSC.” 106
This interpretation of independence was em-
bodied in FSC’s 2003 decision ‘Regarding the Con-
duct of Research and Deliberation of Food Safety
Commission’.107 It stipulated that committee mem-
bers have to declare their interests and leave the
meeting if, for example, they were an author of an
application or contributor to a dossier submitted
by an applicant.
Argentina
In Argentina, no explicit assertions have been
made about the independence of those responsi-
ble for performing assessments of risk. In private,
interviewees stressed, however, that there was no
external pressure, for example, from ministers, on
the hybrid risk assessment/risk management activ-
ities performed by the relevant committees and
agencies for GM plants and GM foods. 
In an analogous way to the USA, there is an
implicit assumption that since Argentinean risk as-
sessment activities are nominally purely scientific
judgments then they are by definition independ-
ent of non-scientific considerations. For example,
the Argentine advisory committee for environmen-
tal releases of GM plants (known as CONABIA)
contains several representatives from the life sci-
ences industry who are represented as performing
their duties as technically qualified individuals
rather than as representatives of the sectors that
employ them. As the Agriculture Ministry puts it
“…the main characteristic [of CONABIA] is that its
operational proceedings are based on exclusively
technical considerations...”108
Are risk assessors asked not to make risk
management judgements? What happens in
practice? 
The remit of risk assessors, in relation to risk
managers, and in particular how the boundary be-
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46 105 Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union. “Report of Public Meetings with Preparatory Office for Food Safety Commission” , Web CO-
OP, December 2002 [in Japanese]: http://www.jccu.coop/web_magazine/back_number/web_2002_12/1tokusyu/index0.html
106 Food Safety Commission Japan. “Regarding the Conduct of Research and Deliberation of Food Safety Commission”, Food Safety
Commission Japan Decision, 2 October 2003 (amended on 13 November 2003). 
107 SAGPyA, 2004, 35
108 US EPA (2006) Environmental risk assessment for modified Cry3A Bt protein for MIR604 corn
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tween what risk assessors are seen as responsible
for, and what risk managers are supposed to do, is
an important variable. Most jurisdictions that ar-
ticulate risk policy-making in accordance with ei-
ther decisionist or transparent models (cf Figures 2
and 3 above pp. 14-15) make statements implying
that risk assessors should not make risk manage-
ment judgements.
There are many different kinds of risk manage-
ment judgements, some relatively obvious ‘down-
stream’ issues, such as whether or not to grant
approval to a product. Other risk management is-
sues are less obvious, and some RAP issues arise
‘upstream’, for example concerning particular as-
sumptions about what to count as ‘harm’ or ‘good
manufacturing practice’. There will probably al-
ways be at least some risk management judge-
ments that are, in effect, made by or assumed by
risk assessors. One key issue concerns: which
kinds of risk management decisions risk assessors
should avoid taking? That might be more appropri-
ate than stipulating that risk assessors should never
make any assumptions about risk management,
but few jurisdictions are set out to locate the
boundary, and interdependency between risk as-
sessors and risk managers at such a level of detail.
An important distinction is sometimes drawn
between risk assessors deciding regulatory issue
son the one hand, and risk assessors commenting
on potentially relevant risk management options,
judgements and decisions on the other. Those al-
ternatives are clearly different; the latter can per-
haps best be understood as scientists helping to
clarify the kinds of decisions that risk managers are
expected to take, while in the former case their
might be portrayed as prejudging decisions that
risk managers would otherwise be expected to
take.
USA
In the USA, EPA risk assessors have sometimes
commented on risk management issues about Bt
crops when providing advice, as have advisors
from the EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel. Thus, for
non-target harm, EPA assessors have proposed
monitoring requirements in parallel with commer-
cial use, for example proposing a three-year study
“…to evaluate insecticidal protein degradation, ac-
cumulation and persistence in a variety of soil
types.”109 As a rationale, the agency cited method-
ological limitations of the available studies, but
nevertheless risk assessors were then advising on a
risk management issue. In part this example illus-
trates the difficulty of separating risk issues into
components that are unambiguously scientific and
those that are clearly policy-related.
UK
UK RAP guidance from the Food Standards
Agency to its scientific advisory committee notes
that: “While committees are not responsible for
risk management, it may often be appropriate to
ask them for scientific advice on options for risk
management.”110 As noted above, such a practice,
if followed, ought to inform risk managers as they
make policy decisions rather than making those
decisions for them; in those conditions, risk asses-
sors would not be taking responsibility for risk
management decisions. Less clear, however, might
be a practice in which risk assessors comment on
risk management issues, without formally taking
responsibility for them, but where those comments
are not confined to indicating what is known and
not known about the risks associated with those
management options, but become instead actively
prescriptive.
Risk assessors sometimes specify or assume
conditions under which their advice would
apply, but this is not so much a risk management
judgement as an acknowledgment that risk as-
sessments are rarely about determinately con-
trolled phenomenon, but rather about risks that
in practice depend on a variety of factors that in
the real world are conditional and contingent on
broader political, institutional and social
processes. Thus, for example, risk assessment ad-
vice in relation to the impact on biodiversity of
certain GM crops was contingent upon implicit
assumptions, for example that farmers will spray
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109 FSA, 2005: 26
110 FAO/WHO draft framework for the provision of scientific advice on food safety and nutrition, Rome/Geneva, 2006, p 4; FAO/WHO
Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition, WHO/FAO, 2007, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/Proscad_Framework_Final_E.pdf
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their GM crops in the ways that occurred during
the Farm Scale Evaluations, and not in signifi-
cantly different ways. For imports of GM rape-
seed into the UK, ACRE proposed a requirement
for monitoring to deal with the possibility of
‘seed spillage’, which implies that ACRE some-
times chose to assess a relatively broad set of
risk, taking into account both herbicide use and
issues of segregation.
Codex
At the international level, the FAO/WHO ex-
pert committees do not formally make risk man-
agement decisions, those are supposed to be
taken by Codex Committees. The risk assessors
do make risk management judgements, however,
for example in setting ADIs, or ‘acceptable daily
intakes’. ADIs are the standard concept in terms
of which the results of animal toxicology tests are
interpreted for regulatory purposes of consumer
protection. Although the concept of an ADI su-
perficially resembles a scientific concept, since it
is frequently applied quantitatively and meas-
ured in units of milligrams of dose per kilo-
gramme of body weight of the recipient, its
application involves judgements of ‘acceptabil-
ity’. Ascribing an ADI to a compound is an eval-
uative judgement about levels of exposure at
which risks are acceptably low; decisions to use
ADIs, and the ways in which they are used, in-
volve issues of risk assessment policy. For exam-
ple, it is a matter of policy to choose just to set
ADIs for entire human populations or whether
also to set additional ADIs for sub-populations,
such as children, infants or immuno-suppressed
individuals who may be more susceptible to
chemical risks than an average healthy adult. The
2006 draft WHO/FAO framework for the provi-
sion of scientific advice on food safety and nutri-
tion assumed that setting ADIs is a purely
scientific judgement, and so too did the defini-
tive 2007 version of that document, but that re-
mains a problematic assumption.111
CCPR has provided itself and JMPR with some
procedural guidance to the effects that: “When re-
ferring substances to JMPR, the CCPR may also
refer a range of risk management options, with a
view toward obtaining JMPR’s guidance on the at-
tendant risks and the likely risk reductions associ-
ated with each option.”112 That implies that, when
asked by CCPR, JMPR should provide conditional
rather than prescriptive advice which might, if fol-
lowed, help risk managers exercise their judge-
ments.
Japan
In Japan there is a shared acknowledgement
that GM food risk assessors are not to take
responsibility for risk management judgements,
and they have restricted themselves to producing
scientific conclusions of risk assessment. In fact,
the distinction between risk assessment and risk
management has been often invoked in the delib-
erations of the Expert Committee for GM foods
(ECGMF). A typical example is the case of Bt10
maize, where risk managers asked the ECGMF to
evaluate the validity of setting a provisional per-
missible standard for contamination of human
foods and animal feedstuff with Bt10. In response,
an expert on the ECGMF insisted that such deci-
sions should be taken by risk managers not by risk
assessors.
On the other hand, in other FSC committees
such as those for chemical contaminants, pesti-
cides and food additives, risk assessors are asked to
take responsibility for setting ADIs, which involve
evaluative judgments that should be under the
responsibility of risk managers. In addition, the
Food Safety Basic Law stipulates that the FSC shall
take charge of making recommendations in
relation to risk management.113
In relation to GM crops, making risk
management judgements is, in principle, not the
responsibility of risk assessors in the CAAEB, but
they also sometimes give prescriptive advice on
monitoring when faced with uncertainties. The
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111 PROPOSED DRAFT RISK ANALYSIS PRINCIPLES APPLIED BY THE CODEX COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDE RESIDUES, Appendix 1 of RISK
ANALYSIS POLICIES USED BY THE COMMITTEE IN ESTABLISHING MRLS FOR PESTICIDES, CX/PR 05/37/8, March 2005, para 17
112 The Article 23 (3) of the Food Safety Basic Law stipulates that the FSC shall take charge of making “recommendations to related minis-
ters through the Prime Minister about policies to be implemented for ensuring food safety on the basis of the results of the assessment of
the effect of food on health, which was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the preceding item”.
Director-General of the Food Safety and Consumers Bureau of MAFF et al, cf footnote 80
113 BfR 2005, Guidance for Health Assessment Documents, p. 11
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explicit guideline, the Application of Approval
for the Production and Distribution of GMOs
under the Jurisdiction of Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, stipulates that risk
assessors can request applicants to submit a
monitoring plan when necessary.114 In fact, the
CAAEB requested monitoring for several varieties
of Bt maize including MON810, MON863,
MON810 x MON863.
Germany
Risk assessors at the German Federal Insti-
tute for Risk Assessment (BfR) are supposed not
to consider risk management issues in their de-
liberations, based on advice issued from the BfR
itself. However, that advice suggests that the BfR
may indicate the scope for possible regulatory
actions, including targets, strategies and options,
although it should not constrain the BVL (Federal
Agency for Consumer Protection and Food
Safety) “…to a single set of measures unless there
is an urgent need to do so.”115 In other words the
BVL should be able to choose between various
risk management options even if the BfR had
made risk management policy judgements con-
cerning the range of options that were available.
One interviewee noted that when the links be-
tween the BfR and BVL were being designed it
was envisaged that risk assessors could not only
make requests for further data, and decisions
about when a risk assessment was complete, but
that they should fulfil several functions that are
often considered part of the remit of risk man-
agers; such as recommendations about monitor-
ing and proposals on whether or not to authorise
particular products.
Argentina
In Argentina there is no requirement on the
part of risk assessors to avoid taking risk manage-
ment decisions. In practice, the committees that
provide assessments of GM crops and foods are
formally responsible for both scientific and policy
aspects of decision-making, although as noted pre-
viously no explicit distinction is made between
those two roles. Nominally, the committees do not
make formal decisions about approval, however.
That role is taken by ministers acting on the advice
of the committees but it is rare for Ministers not to
follow that advice.
To what extent have risk assessors been asked
to be explicit about scientific uncertainties,
and how explicit are they in practice? Con-
sistently or selectively?
The question of the extent to which risk as-
sessors have been asked to be, and are being, ex-
plicit about uncertainties is especially important,
partly because if key uncertainties are not made
explicit risk managers are unlikely to be able to
appreciate the relative fragility or robustness of
scientific assessments. Consequently they may
not appreciate the scope for exercising precau-
tion. There are, however, so many different
sources and types of uncertainties that it would
almost certainly be impossible to be explicit
about all uncertainties. In practice, as some com-
mentators have pointed out, expert advisors may
only emphasise the types of uncertainties that
current research methods could readily allow
them to address, but not to the more complex,
subtle or challenging ones. Advisors and regula-
tory institutions can also be selective in other
ways about the kinds of uncertainties that are ac-
knowledged; for example, by being explicit about
those uncertainties that have been resolved (as
well as those that could readily be resolved)
while not being explicit about qualifications to an
overall judgement, or by acknowledging only
those uncertainties that provide a rationale for not
doing what a policy institution doesn’t choose to
do.
Despite those complexities, policy guidance
about uncertainties rarely moves beyond general
statements about making uncertainties explicit; al-
though not all jurisdictions provide such guidance.
In our study, risk assessors and/or expert advisors in
the UK, Germany and in Codex have been asked to
be explicit about scientific uncertainties, although
without any further qualification, but not in Japan or
Argentina. In practice, however, risk assessors have
fallen considerably short of formal expectations.
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115 Carrington, C. and Bolger, P.M. (1998) ‘Uncertainty and risk assessment’, Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 4(2): 253-57
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USA
In March 2006 the US Federal government’s
Office of Management and Budget issued a Pro-
posed Risk Assessment Bulletin.116 In what it calls
‘new technical guidance on risk assessments’ the
OMB proposed that all risk assessment bodies
should be obliged to acknowledge all uncertain-
ties, while also seeking to quantify the extent of
those uncertainties. Indeed, in practice, US risk as-
sessors tend to focus on quantifiable rather than
unquantifiable uncertainties. As two FDA risk as-
sessors put it in 1998: “It is necessary to quantify
uncertainties to convey them to the risk man-
ager”.117
UK
In the UK, guidelines for expert committees
have emerged as a specific response to the BSE cri-
sis, in the wake of which it became clear, amongst
other things, that risk assessments had sometimes
failed to draw attention to key uncertainties and
had often depended upon implicit assumptions
about risk management.118 In response, official
guidance now requires an explicit account of un-
certainty. Thus, the OST stated in 2000 that: “De-
partments should ensure that levels of uncertainty
are explicitly identified and communicated di-
rectly in plain language to decision makers.”119 The
FSA Board has also stated that, for expert commit-
tees, an audit trail, “…showing how the committee
reached its decisions…” will be required.120 It adds
that: “When reporting outcomes, committees
should make explicit the level and type of uncer-
tainty (both limitations on the quality of the avail-
able data and lack of knowledge) associated with
their advice… Where significant uncertainty exists,
committees should advise on the steps that might
be taken to reduce this in future.”121 In practice,
however, advisors rarely make explicit statements
about scientific ‘uncertainty’, and not when mak-
ing safety claims, which are typically unqualified
and unconditional. 
Requests for additional data, especially when
advisors are not yet ready to give advice, imply
judgements about uncertainty, though without
necessarily or always indicating the stakes in-
volved, e.g. specific risks to be clarified and spe-
cific criteria for data that could clarify them. For
GM crop cultivation, committee advice on risk-
management measures sometimes explains uncer-
tainties that warrant RM measures; but sometimes
the rationale remains ambiguous, e.g. as a means
to gain extra information for longer-term assess-
ments of risks. 
The FSA guidance also stipulated that:
“Chairs of advisory committees …[should en-
sure]…that no view is ignored or overlooked,
and that unorthodox and contrary scientific
views are considered…[and should ensure] that
the proceedings of the committee, if necessary in-
cluding minority opinions, are properly docu-
mented…so that there is a clear audit trail
showing how the committee reached its deci-
sions...We recommend that committee decisions
should include an explanation of where differ-
ences of opinions have arisen during discussions
and why conclusions have been reached, even if
alternative opinions were expressed. They should
also explain any assumptions and uncertainties
that are inherent in their conclusions…”122 (em-
phases added) That guidance is not, however, yet
being fully complied with. 
Germany
In Germany, the BfR’s own guidance requires
that its risk assessors acknowledge certain uncer-
tainties explicitly and indicate how they influence
results of risk assessments. It states, for example,
that uncertainties should be acknowledged ‘where
there is discernable lack of knowledge’ and ‘where
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116 Phillips, Bridgeman J & Ferguson-Smith M (2000) The BSE Inquiry: Report: evidence and supporting papers of the Inquiry into the emer-
gence and identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) and the action taken
in response to it up to 20 March 1996, The Stationery Office, London; E Millstone and P van Zwanenberg, ‘The politics of expert advice:
lessons from the early history of the BSE saga’, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 99-112
117 OST (2005) Scientific Analysis in Policy Making. London: Office of Science and Technology, p. 7
118 FSA (2002) Report on the Review of Scientific Committees. London: Food Standards Agency, p. 22
119 op. cit. p . 25
120 op. cit. paras 88-89
121 BfR 2002: Updating the risk assessment of acrylamide in foods. Opinion of BfR of 28 November 2002, BgVV - Expert talks on the occur-
rence of acrylamide in foods; available at http://www.bfr.bund.de/cms5w/sixcms/detail.php/1425
122 ibid
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any necessary quality requirements have been ig-
nored in studies’ and that risk assessments should
report on ‘the extent of inadequacy of data submit-
ted to the BfR’ and ‘the gaps in knowledge which
may arise as a result’. In practice, however, it ap-
pears that uncertainties are only rarely and selec-
tively made explicit. For non-threshold toxicology,
BfR opinions acknowledge some uncertainties that
could be overcome by further work, e.g. in the
case of acrylamide, and statements by BgVV/BfR
with respect to data on dietary intakes.123 Uncer-
tainties have also been acknowledged with respect
to genotoxic carcinogens in general, as regards ex-
trapolation from high doses to low doses.123
For GMOs, the BfN highlights uncertainties
but other groups of risk assessors do not even men-
tion the word uncertainty.123 The BfN’s numerous
requests for further information, including addi-
tional testing, are in some cases explicitly justified
by reference to uncertainties, but for the most part
the BfN is implicitly drawing on uncertainties that
cannot be accommodated by the particular de-
signs, approaches or results of tests conducted.
Codex
Within Codex, guidance given to JECFA and
JMPR by the Codex Committees on Food Additives
and Pesticides (in the form of draft risk assessment
policies) did refer to uncertainties. For example,
the CCFAC draft proposed that: 
“In its risk assessments, JECFA will communi-
cate to CCFAC the level and type of uncertainty,
where the uncertainty arose during the risk assess-
ment process, and the impact of the uncertainty…
A clear understanding of the level of uncertainty
associated with the risk assessment is essential for
ensuring transparent, science-based risk manage-
ment decisions.”126
At the subsequent full meeting of CCFAC, in
March 2002, a version of that draft paper was dis-
cussed, but it had been significantly diluted.127 In
relation to ‘uncertainties’ the revised CCFAC draft
said: “JECFA will communicate to CCFAC the mag-
nitude and source of uncertainties in its risk assess-
ments. When communicating this information,
JECFA will provide CCFAC a description of the
methodology and procedures by which JECFA esti-
mated any uncertainty in its risk assessment…JECFA
will communicate to CCFAC the basis for all as-
sumptions used in its risk assessments including
default assumptions used to account for uncertain-
ties.”128 That passage does not say that JECFA
should draw attention to any and all uncertainties.
On the contrary it could be interpreted as implying
that uncertainties should be highlighted only if
their magnitude can be quantitatively estimated.
In practice, JECFA has however continued to re-
port only a few uncertainties, and to do so un-
evenly and inconsistently.129
The draft 2006 FAO/WHO framework for the
provision of scientific advice on food safety and
nutrition asserted that the FAO/WHO defined sci-
entific advice, of the sort the FAO and WHO pre-
sumed to be routinely received from eg JECFA and
JMPR, was advice that “…include[s] explicit
recognition of any uncertainty either in the current
state of knowledge or in the adequacy of the avail-
able data.”130 (emphasis added) That wording was
also included in the definitive 2007 version of that
document.131 The evidence reported in this docu-
ment implies that explicit recognition is given to
only relatively few of the uncertainties.
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123 The BfN provides risk assessment advise to the BVL with a particular focus on risk to the environment including higher animals.
124 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Request for Comment on the Proposed Risk Assessment Policy Statement for the Interaction Between
CCFAC and JECFA, CL 2002?_-FAC_2002 page 6 para 28
125 Report of 34th Session of CCFAC, ALINORM 03/12, April 2002 see 
www.codexalimentarius.net/download/report/28/Al03_12e.pdf 
126 op. cit. p. 125 paras dd-ee
127 See discussion on Neotame later in this document; JECFA, Food Additive Series, 54, 2004
128 FAO/WHO framework for the provision of scientific advice on food safety and nutrition 2006, p. 3
129 FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition, WHO/FAO, 2007, available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agn/proscad/Proscad_Framework_Final_E.pdf
130 According to applicant’s dossiers, there is a possibility that Cry35 broadens the holes that Cry34 created on intestinal cells of target in-
sects. Basic questions were 1) what the causal mechanism of this synergy is and 2) whether this synergy is unique to this specific combi-
nation of proteins. Risk assessors were afraid that unless the synergetic behaviour of Cry35Ab1 is specific to its combination with
Cry34Ab1, it might cause adverse effects on human health.
131 Committee for the Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity, Minute of 5th Meeting of General Committee of Committee for the As-
sessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity, 28 May 2004, p. 7
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Japan
In Japan in relation to GM foods, as well as
most other food safety issues, risk assessors have
not been asked to be explicit about scientific un-
certainties, but in practice published minutes of
the ECGMF indicate that risk assessors have held
extensive discussions about various uncertainties
and repeatedly requested additional data from ap-
plicants. One example is the case of a Coleoptera-
resistant and glufosinate-tolerant maize. It took six
ECGMF meetings, from June 2004 to August 2005,
to finalize its assessment. One of persistent issues
was the uncertainty about the mechanism of syn-
ergetic action of two proteins, Cry34Ab1 and
Cry35Ab1, which are produced by the inserted
genes.132 Following lengthy deliberations, ex-
change of opinions between the ECGMF and the
Du Pont and the submission of new data, an initial
conjecture was rejected and replaced by a new
plausible explanation that the target insect (west-
ern corn root worm) has specific receptors for
Cry34Ab1 and Cry35Ab1. The ECGMF accepted
that account and concluded that the product did
not pose a risk to human health.
In spite of extensive arguments and delibera-
tions, Japanese risk assessors have rarely described
uncertainties in their final assessment reports. This
is largely because they share a tacit convention
that they should produce clear-cut conclusions in-
dicating that products are either safe or not safe,
after resolving all relevant uncertainties. Only oc-
casionally would they conclude that they couldn’t
resolve some uncertainties and report them to risk
managers who can take them into consideration.
In the case of Bt10, the ECGMF concluded in its
final report that it was difficult to complete risk as-
sessment because it couldn’t resolve uncertainties
in terms of fragmentation and relocation of in-
serted genes and the determination of DNA se-
quence of those genes and their neighbourhood. 
Also for GM crops, risk assessors have not been
required to be explicit about uncertainties, but there
is a tacit convention in the Crops Subcommittee of
the CAAEB that its conclusions should be based on
unanimity among its members.133 To this end, where
there are uncertainties, the committee tries to re-
solve them and reach consensus by collecting addi-
tional scientific information from the applicants or
other sources. If the committee cannot resolve the
issues, it notifies the General Committee of that un-
certainty. The same applies to the General Commit-
tee, where several of uncertainties have been
scrutinized and sometimes publicly reported to risk
managers so that they could consider taking pre-
cautionary measures. The most repeatedly cited un-
certainties concern the possibility of 1) horizontal
gene transfer by viruses when the transferred DNAs
derived from a viral source 2) adverse effects of Bt
toxin on soil organisms when GM plant residues are
incorporated into soils and 3) evolution of Bt-resist-
ant pests. For all of those uncertainties, additional
information and monitoring has been requested of
the applicants.
Although uncertainty is often an important
issue for the risk assessors of GM crops and the
evolution of discussions is publicly accessible
through the committee minutes, not all uncertain-
ties are deemed to deserve special attention. Some
speculative uncertainties are discounted as not re-
quiring an immediate response, but as grounds for
passive precautionary measures such as monitor-
ing and preparing emergency preventive plans.134
In addition, more tacitly, scientific advisors distin-
guish between ‘what it would be nice to know’
and ‘what we need to know’.135
Argentina
In Argentina, too, risk assessors have not re-
ceived any guidance on how uncertainties should
4.
 P
ro
ce
du
ra
l a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f r
is
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s
52
132 An example for highly speculative uncertainty is the possibility of adverse effects of Bt toxin on non-target species whose ecological be-
haviour, or existence as such, is unknown or little known.
133 When a member of the General Committee of CAAEB raised a question about the possibility of cross breeding between GM Erect-leaved
semidwarf rice (∅ OsBRI1, Oryza sativa L.) and wild plants belonging not to genus of Oryza but to the same family as Oryza (i.e.
Gramineae), another member claimed as follows: “It is often claimed in scientific argument that we need to distinguish between ‘nice to
know’ and ‘need to know’. Even if it is nice to know about that information from the point of view of biodiversity, it doesn’t mean, from
past experience, that it is indispensable for evaluating effects on biodiversity. Therefore, I think, while it is reasonable that we take it into
consideration because it is nice to know, it is a logical leap that we have to confirm its safety beyond the knowledge we have accumu-
lated so much about Oryza”. See: Committee for the Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity “Minute of 3th Meeting of General
Committee of Committee for the Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity”, 15 March 2004, p.16.
134 Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants, CCFAC Policy for Exposure Assessment
of Contaminants and Toxins in Foods or Food Groups, in Codex Alimentarius Procedural Manual, para 35
135 FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition, WHO/FAO, 2007, p 22 para 6.1
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be reported and handled in risk assessments.
Since, however, risk assessors sometimes ask for
further data, this constitutes evidence that at least
some data gaps and/or uncertainties are recog-
nised. However, as almost nothing is published by
the regulatory regime about the outcome of risk as-
sessments we do not know how explicit risk asses-
sors are about uncertainties in practice.
To what extent have risk assessors been asked
to be explicit about the scientific and other
assumptions by reference to which data are
interpreted, and how explicit are they being
in practice?
The focus of this section concerns the extent
to which risk assessors have been told by risk man-
agers to be explicit about assumptions by refer-
ence to which data are interpreted. These
assumptions may be concerned, for example, with
scientists’ understandings about which changes
count as ‘harm’, and when cause-effect relation-
ships are indicated and established, i.e. how much
of which kinds of evidence is variously necessary
to indicate such links and sufficient to establish a
causal connection. The assumptions may concern
when and how to extrapolate from experimental
models, such as laboratory animals or computer
models of the structure and activity of chemicals,
to likely effects on humans or agricultural animals.
Other types of assumptions might be less scientific,
and be concerned for example with how agricul-
tural employees handle, prepare and apply pesti-
cides. They might also concern the range of policy
options available to, and deemed appropriate by,
risk managers.
Codex
Prior to drafting a risk assessment policy,
Codex did not require that its expert committees
make explicit any of their assumptions, scientific
or otherwise. The draft RAPs, however, marked a
significant change. The CCFAC document on Risk
Analysis Principles says “JECFA should communi-
cate to CCFAC the basis for all assumptions used in
its risk assessments including default assumptions
used to account for uncertainties.”136 (emphasis
added) That provision did not however survive the
subsequent process of amendment. Nonetheless
the 2007 WHO/FAO Framework for the Provision
of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition
does contain guidance indicating that reports of all
expert bodies should include: “…an explanation
of the reliability of the data and assumptions made
(and their impact on uncertainty)…”137
UK
In the wake of the BSE debacle, official guid-
ance is quite clear about the need for assumptions
that influence the interpretation of data to be made
explicit by expert advisors. Thus, the FSA requires
that: “Chairs of advisory committees …[should en-
sure]…that no view is ignored or overlooked, and
that unorthodox and contrary scientific views are
considered…[and should ensure] that the pro-
ceedings of the committee, if necessary including
minority opinions, are properly documented…so
that there is a clear audit trail showing how the
committee reached its decisions...We recommend
that committee decisions should include an expla-
nation of where differences of opinions have
arisen during discussions and why conclusions
have been reached, even if alternative opinions
were expressed. They should also explain any as-
sumptions and uncertainties that are inherent in
their conclusions…”138 (emphases added) Despite
those requirements, however, the practices of
ACRE, ACNFP and CoT do not match those guide-
lines, insofar as they rarely explain assumptions
that might be tested or reviewed later. 
USA
Regardless of specific guidance for risk assess-
ment, scientific assumptions tend to become ex-
plicit through statutory procedures and/or
anticipation of legal challenge, as noted previously
in section 3.1. For example, explicit default as-
sumptions for carcinogenicity assessments have
been devised so that regulatory agencies can claim
that they are not being ‘arbitrary’ in their treatment
of particular chemicals.
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136 op cit paras 88-89
137 BfR 2005: Guidance Document – The Format for Health Assessment Documents, p. 7.
138 No explicit guidance on uncertainty has been provided to BBA, RKI, BfN.
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Germany
BfR generic guidance does not explicitly men-
tion assumptions but provides guidance that can
be interpreted as covering assumptions. Risk as-
sessments should report “…where any opposing
scientific views that may be relevant have been
presented and where different interpretations in in-
ternational assessment systems, e.g. of rules for
classification and labelling, may influence the re-
sults.”139
BfR practice in GMO risk assessment has not
however complied with that guidance, neither do
other institutions involved in risk assessments spec-
ify their assumptions.140 Only very general assump-
tions for genotoxic carcinogens are made explicit
by risk assessors.141 For example, when mentioning
that in relation to suspected genotoxic carcinogens
no threshold can be assumed and therefore the ap-
plication of ALARA will be the only available ap-
proach.
Japan
In Japan, with regard to GM foods, there is no
definite stipulation demanding risk assessors to be
explicit about their assumptions, but in practice
some of data requirements virtually require the
applicants and risk assessors at the Food Safety
Commission to clarify some of the assumptions on
which they base their risk estimates and
judgements. An interesting example concerns as-
sumptions about estimating the daily intakes of
proteins expressed by the inserted genes. The
minutes of ECGMF committee’s meetings indicate
that the acceptability of those assumptions have
been frequently discussed by those risk assessors.
On the other hand, with the environmental
risk/safety of cultivating GM crops, while the term
‘assumptions’ is not used, there is a generic
stipulation in guidance document requiring risk
assessors to record and clarify the grounds for
their judgements.142 Additionally, some of data
requirements, such as those concerning productivity
of harmful substances, explicitly require clarifying
the assumptions on which estimates of the likelihood
of adverse effects on biodiversity are based. In con-
nection with those matters, each risk assessment
report has included an account of the relevant
assumptions used to model and estimate the
maximum distance of pollen flow.
Argentina
Argentinean policy officials have not made
any formal demands on their expert advisors with
respect to making assumptions explicit. In practice
the extent to which any such assumptions are in
fact made clear is unknown because the advice
provided by expert advisors to the Argentinean
government is not publicly available.
Transparency and relations to stakeholders
The final aspect of procedural risk assessment
policy concerns transparency and relations with
stakeholders. Transparency can variously refer to
the risk assessment itself, the process by which that
risk assessment was produced, and the data upon
which the assessment was based. Transparency is
important not least because moves to greater trans-
parency often entail that issues of substance get
raised and critically addressed, where previously
they might have remained implicit and unnoticed,
especially by those outside of the regulatory
regime. Thus procedural change may contribute to
substantive and interpretative changes. 
USA
The USA has operated with a Freedom of In-
formation Act since the 1970s. That regime in-
volves the disclosure not just of risk assessments,
but the process by which those assessments were
conducted, as well as much of the scientific and
technological data on which the assessments are
based. Opportunities for public and stakeholder
involvement in risk assessment have also long
been extensive in the USA.
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139 e.g. BfR 2002b: Updating the risk assessment of acrylamide in foods. Opinion of BfR of 28 November 2002; , BfR 2003d: Assessment of
acrylamide intake from foods containing high acrylamide levels in Germany. Abbreviated version of a BfR study from 15 July 2003.
140 Japan MOE et al. The Guidance of Implementation of Assessment of Adverse Effect on Biological Diversity of Type 1 Use of Living Mod-
ified Organisms, p.6: http://www.bch.biodic.go.jp/download/en_law/en_assessment_guidence.doc
141 Discussion Paper on Risk Analysis Principles and Methodologies in the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods,
CX/RVDF 01/9 July 2001 ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/ccrvdf13/rv01_09e.pdf Appendix IX, p 94 para 3
142 Food Standards Agency, 2002, Report on the Review of Scientific Committees, paras 64-65
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Codex
A key provision in CCRVDF’s proposed guid-
ance to JECFA referred to what was there called
‘Data Protection’ saying: “Considering the impor-
tance of intellectual property in the context of data
submission for scientific evaluation, JECFA has es-
tablished procedures to cover the confidentiality
of certain data submitted. These procedures enable
the sponsor to declare which data…[are]…to be
considered as confidential. The procedure includes
a formal consultation with the sponsor.”143 No such
provision is included in the CCFAC guidance to
JECFA or in the CCPR’s guidance to JMPR. This text
from CCRVDF indicates that commercial and in-
dustrial sponsors have the freedom to decide
which of their data will remain confidential, and
which may enter the public domain. It is not clear
how that provision can be reconciled with com-
mitments to transparency. The FAO/WHO advisory
committees do not explicitly include stakeholder
involvement.
UK
In the UK in recent years, policy-makers have
made commitments to making food-safety policy-
making more open, transparent and accountable.
For example, the FSA have said that: “…data used
as the basis for risk assessments and other commit-
tee opinions should be made freely available,
within the constraints of confidentiality…at as
early a stage in the process as possible… When-
ever time permits committees should issue a draft
opinion for public consultation before offering
their final advice.”144
On the crucial issue of ‘confidentiality’ the
FSA recommends: “…that each committee should
have clear guidelines to define what material can
justifiably be regarded as confidential...”145 It is not
clear why the FSA Board recommended that each
advisory committee should decide for itself which
data it will treat as confidential rather than observ-
ing an agency-wide policy of full disclosure in the
public interest.
Some expert advisory committees in the UK
now hold many of their meetings in public. Other
than those open meetings, however, there are few
formal opportunities for stakeholder and public
comments on risk assessment issues. The UK FSA
recently published the report of a joint project with
the Royal Society which included the proposal to:
“…consult stakeholders and the public (where ap-
propriate) on the framing of questions to be put to
expert scientific advisory committees”146 If that
procedural change were to occur in the UK it
would represent a distinct innovation.
Japan
In Japanese food safety policy-making, trans-
parency and stakeholders involvement has been
considerably enhanced in recent years. It occurred
partly because of serious decline of public trust in
food safety governance caused by the BSE crisis of
2001 and partly because of overall governmental
reforms since the late 1990’s. In the process of the
developing RAP guidance documents for both GM
foods and crops, there were formal mechanisms
for providing some transparency and public/stake-
holders involvement. In developing the guidance
documents for assessing the risks of GM foods,
committee meetings were open to the public and
public comments were invited on draft documents
via the FSC’s websites and other means. Public
meetings were also held prior to and during the
deliberation. The approach was similar during the
preparation of guidance documents for assessing
the risks of cultivating GM crops, except that pub-
lic/stakeholders meetings were not held. Instead,
some stakeholders’ representatives were included
in the advisory committees which drafted the guid-
ance documents.
In the routine operation of risk assessment of
GM foods and crops, all minutes of the committee
meetings and risk assessment reports, as well as all
the guidance documents, are publicly available on
the website of the Food Safety Commission (for GM
foods) or the Japan Biosafety Clearing House (for
GM crops), with the exception for confidentiality of
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143 op. cit. para 68 
144 CoT paper TOX/2006/12, available at http://www.food.gov.uk/science/ouradvisors/toxicity/cotmeets/cot2006/cotmeeting060328/cotmeet-
ing060328agenda
145 See BfR’s self portrayal on it website at: http://www.bfr.bund.de/cd/572
146 http://www.bfr.bund.de/cd/1834
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sections concerning data deemed to be ‘private in-
tellectual property’. On the other hand, as regards
disclosing data used in risk assessments of GM
foods and crops, the summary results of tests are
recorded in the assessment report while raw data
remain confidential. Lists of sources, including pub-
lished and non-published documents, are attached
to the official assessment reports on GM crops, but
they are often omitted, for reasons of ‘confidential-
ity’ from subsequently published official reports. As
for the public/stakeholders involvement, public
comments are routinely invited on draft risk assess-
ment reports for each item of appraisal for both GM
foods and crops. In addition, open public and stake-
holders meetings are sometimes held in relation to
more generic issues concerning GM food risk as-
sessment. In 2000, a consensus conference on GM
foods and crops was also held by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
Argentina
In Argentina the regulatory authorities dis-
close almost no information. The expert advisory
committee for GM crops includes members from
the industries whose products are being assessed,
but other stakeholder groups are excluded. Those
members are, however, officially included as ‘suit-
ably qualified experts’ rather than as ‘representa-
tives of particular interests’. The committee on GM
foods also contains members from the industries
whose products are being assessed but also a
slightly broader range of stakeholders including a
representative of a consumer organisation.
Germany
As in the UK, German policy-makers have in
principle made commitments to making food-
safety policy-making more open, transparent and
accountable than was previously the case. Accord-
ing to the BfR “[a]ssessments are to be presented in
a transparent and comprehensible manner to the
general public, scientists and other involved or in-
terested circles. The assessment results will, in
principle, be made publicly accessible whilst
maintaining the confidentiality of protected
data.”147 The BfR suggests that not only will risk as-
sessments be publicly available but that the
process of producing those assessments will in-
volve stakeholders and will itself be transparent. It
has portrayed risk communication as an “…inter-
active process of opening up its assessment work
and results to the general public, scientists and
other involved or interested circles.”148 Despite
those commitments, in practice, at least for GMO
regulation, things are rather different. The German
process of GMO risk assessment is at almost no
stage transparent to outsiders. The official German
comments issued by the BVL to the EFSA, and the
comments of the five authorities including the
ZKBS, have never yet been made public, and al-
most no information is publicly available on the
assessment process itself. The only way to access
documents is to make a formal request under the
German Umweltinformationsgesetz, but access
may not be granted if the documents are used in a
process that is still not completed or if they require
the prior consent of other involved authorities.149
Stakeholder involvement in GM risk assessment is
rare in practice.150 In one case Greenpeace Ger-
many sued the BVL to obtain access to the full-text
of a study and succeeded; BVL had initially refused
access because the applicant deemed the study as
‘confidential’. According to interviewees, in no
case has the BVL or other authorities actively
sought the involvement of wider non-industrial
stakeholders. Contacts with industry are of course
established in cases were the application was sub-
mitted to Germany. In the food toxicology arena,
there are in practice, by contrast, somewhat
greater levels of transparency and opportunities for
stakeholder involvement. Risk assessments by BfR
are made public, including preliminary assess-
ments. These risk assessment opinions are, how-
ever, rather brief and apparently directed to a
stakeholder community. They do not provide full
technical and scientific details and do not provide
indications of the scientific basis upon which as-
sessments were produced. Although risk commu-
nication is usually portrayed by BfR as a
bi-directional process, in practice stakeholders
have so far largely been involved at the very end of
the risk assessment process.
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147 The latter conclusions are partly based on personal experiences made by co-author (AS) when trying to access the documents.
148 - with the possible exception of public/political pressure as in the case of the debate on the whole-food toxicity study of maize MON863
149 The Frenchman René Truhaut was awarded the Legion d’Honeur, recognising his claim as ‘father of the ADI’.
150 Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 15th Edition, FAO, Rome, 2005, p. 109 para 8, footnote 31
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Summary
Main cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdic-
tional differences
In the USA some aspects of official substantive
and interpretative risk assessment policies have long
been made explicit in relation to food chemical
risks, especially carcinogenic risks. Almost no sub-
stantive or interpretative RAP guidance has been
provided in relation to GM foods, for which official
approval has not routinely been required in the
USA. In relation to GM crops, the EPA set a clear
risk assessment policy in the mid-1990s to include
insect resistance in the scope of official assessments
of GM crops modified to have insecticidal proper-
ties. On the other hand, for risks of harming non-
target species, no scoping RAP assumptions have
been codified, although they have emerged on a
case-by-case basis. In Germany and Japan official
substantive and interpretative RAPs have not been
explicitly articulated in relation to food chemical
risks. In Japan, on the other hand in relation to GM
foods and crops, some explicit substantive RAP
guidance documents have been published. UK and
German risk assessors routinely refer to official EU
guidance, in relation to both food chemicals and
GM foods and crops, which includes some explicit
substantive and interpretative RAPs. At the
FAO/WHO committees and in Argentina substan-
tive and interpretative RAPs have been conspicuous
by their absence, except for minimum data require-
ments.
Substantive RAPs
Following the food safety crises of the last 10
years in the EU and Japan, there have been pressures
to make more explicit substantive RAP assumptions
concerning the risks posed by GM foods and crops.
In the early and mid-1990s the scope of European
risk assessments of GM foods were primarily fo-
cussed on the potential toxicity of newly and delib-
erately introduced proteins, whereas more recently
their scope was widened to include unintended ef-
fects of genetic modifications. In the early and mid-
1990s risk assessments of GM crops focused prima-
rily on short-term and direct effects; more recently
their scope has been explicitly widened to include
long-term and indirect effects, and, for Bt crops, ef-
fects on a wider range of non-target organisms. In
some cases official guidance was modified to for-
malise changed practices, in others the practices
changed in response to the revised guidance. For
herbicide tolerant crops, their scope now includes
effects of commercial cultivation on farmland biodi-
versity, while those issues were not included even in
the late 20th century. Since 2002, EU guidance for
assessing the risks of cultivating GM crops has im-
plied that their scope could include effects on soil
micro-organisms, although in practice that option
has not always been exercised. In Japan, the scope
of risk assessments for GM crops had already in-
cluded possible effects on soil micro-organisms
since 1990s and, since 2000, it has been widened to
include non-target effects of Bt crops. Effects on
farmland biodiversity are increasingly deemed to be
significant in Japan even though they are not explic-
itly referred to in the official guidance documents.
From 2001 to 2005 in Japan, in response to the
proposal made by the consensus conference on GM
crops in 2000, several national laboratories jointly
carried out monitoring survey on the effects of long-
term cultivation of GM crops on farmland as well as
natural biodiversity.
In relation to food chemical risks, some sub-
stantive RAP guidance has been provided in the
form of minimum data requirements, while the USA
has issued more extensive and detailed substantive
guidance. At the joint FAO/WHO level, the
CCRVDF initially drafted RAP guidelines for JECFA
according to which several particular metabolic
changes, following the use of veterinary drugs,
would have been specifically included in JECFA’s as-
sessments; but JECFA refused to accept any such
specific substantive guidance. CCFAC’s guidance to
JECFA does instruct the committee to focus on toxi-
cological considerations, but provides no indication
that any other considerations, such as public health
nutrition, could be relevant. In the USA risk asses-
sors are also explicitly instructed to take account of
anticipated benefits when evaluating risks. 
5. Substantive and Interpretative Aspects 
of Risk Assessment Policy
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Interpretative risk assessment policies
Some interpretative RAP guidance has been
published in five of the six institutional settings
covered by this study, the exception is Argentina.
In none of the institutional settings has interpreta-
tive RAPs been uniform or comprehensive; they
are patchy and evolving. 
Setting ADIs is one dominant orthodox way of
interpreting toxicity data for policy purposes. The
concept of an ‘ADI’ was invented in Europe151, but
officially embraced first in the USA and then by
the joint FAO/WHO committees and by Japan.
ADIs have only rarely been set in the UK and Ger-
many; never in Argentina. At the global level, both
the risk assessment committees and the risk man-
agement bodies portray ADIs (and in ARfDs too)
as if they were purely scientific risk assessment
judgements rather than as evaluative judgements
concerning the ‘acceptability’ of risks. Judgements
of acceptability are evaluative rather than techni-
cal judgements, and so might be deemed appropri-
ate to risk managers rather than scientists. The
decision, on JMPR’s part, to set some ARfDs repre-
sents a recent change in its interpretative RAP;
which constitutes another example of scientific
risk assessors choosing their own RAPs without ref-
erence or accountability to risk managers, let
alone all other stakeholders.
Generalised interpretative RAPs for routine
toxicology is provided by the standardised proce-
dure for setting ADIs. In recent years, both risk
managers (eg CCFAC and CCPR) and risk assessors
(JECFA and JMPR) agreed that supplementary RAPs
need to be articulated concerning how data on
genotoxic carcinogenicity should be interpreted
for policy purposes, since ADIs assume thresholds
below which risks are vanishingly slight. Extensive
and detailed proposals have emerged, and are
being implemented, but the interpretative guid-
ance was developed by the risk assessors and de-
livered to the risk managers, rather than the other
way round. The US FDA has published guidelines
for interpretation data on genotoxic carcinogenic-
ity, e.g. using linear extrapolations from high to
low doses, which are rather different from those
adopted by JECFA and JMPR. 
In recent years, the body of official interpreta-
tive RAP guidance has been extended and supple-
mented, especially in the UK and Germany (and
in many EU countries too) as well as in Japan, with
official emphasis on the importance of risk asses-
sors paying explicit attention to scientific uncer-
tainties and drawing risk managers’ attention to
policy-relevant uncertainties. The acknowledge-
ment by risk assessors of uncertainties, and the ex-
plicit treatment of those uncertainties that are
acknowledged is, however, very uneven and in-
consistent across sectors and institutions. In Ger-
many, where several bodies play a role in assessing
the possible risks from GM crops and foods, some
bodies such as the BfN draw attention to uncer-
tainties that other German risk assessors do not
highlight. In Japan, guidance documents do not
explicitly refer to the notion of scientific
uncertainty, but there are several specifications in-
dicating substantively how to address and interpret
uncertainties in the risk assessment of GM food
and crops. The Argentineans have not provided
any explicit guidance concerning the interpreta-
tion of uncertainties. 
In relation to the interpretation of uncertain-
ties, in the USA and at JECFA and JMPR there has
been a longstanding practice of setting ADIs, by
dividing ‘no effect levels’ (or NELs) in animal stud-
ies (or ‘no observed effects levels’ (NOELs) or ‘no
observed adverse effects levels’ (NOAELs)) by a
‘safety factor’.152 Sometimes those factors have
been portrayed as taking account of the possibility
that humans may be more sensitive to toxic effects
than laboratory animals. On other occasions those
factors have been represented as ‘uncertainty fac-
tors’, implying some acknowledgement of sys-
temic uncertainties in extrapolating from
laboratory animals to human consumers. 
5.1. Explicit scoping judgements
This section focuses on the question of the ex-
tent to which explicit decisions have been made
concerning the scope of risk assessments and/or
changes to the scoping of risk assessments. 
Prior to March 1996, there were almost no
public debates about the scope of risk assessments
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of GM foods and crops, as there had been few
such debates concerning the scope of assessments
of the risks posed by chemicals in the food supply
such as additives, pesticides, contaminants or vet-
erinary pharmaceuticals. Since 1996 public de-
bates on the scope of risk assessments on GM
foods and crops have been explicitly conducted,
and consequently some overt decisions have been
taken to change their scope, and to do so by
widening them to cover issues that either were not
addressed, or that were addressed only partially
and tangentially. While GM food and crop policy-
making was recently transformed, at least in Eu-
rope and Japan, the same is less true for
policy-making of routine food chemical risks. In
relation to risks posed by genotoxic carcinogens,
there have been some explicit changes in proce-
dural and interpretative risk assessment policies,
but not on substantive scoping issues.
Codex and joint FAO/WHO expert com-
mittees
The CCRVDF endeavoured to provide some
substantive RAP guidance to JECFA by indicating
in some detail which metabolic changes, following
the use of veterinary drugs, should (and should
not) be the focus of JECFA’s attention. JECFA re-
sponded, however, by vetoing any such guidance,
asserting that those were matters that risk assessors
and not risk managers should decide.
CCFAC’s Risk Analysis Principles asserted in
2005 that: “CCFAC shall base its risk management
recommendations…on JECFA’s risk assessments,
including safety assessments, of food additives,
naturally occurring toxicants, and contaminants in
food.”153 The introduction of the term ‘safety as-
sessment’ constituted a linguistic innovation, but
that text otherwise represented an endorsement of
the procedural status quo. Since the discussion
was framed in terms of NOELs and ADIs, it implied
that risk and safety assessments should just address
toxicological issues, without any reference to nu-
trition or other aspects of human health such as in-
teraction with pharmaceutical products. It also
implied that the issue of selecting safety factors is
not one on which risk managers should have a
view or provide any input.154 CCFAC was enjoined
to attend to those uncertainties to which JECFA
draws attention, but not otherwise to be concerned
with possible uncertainties.
In 2004 CCPR provided JMPR with some RAP
guidance that was, in part, substantive, procedural
and interpretative, without fully acknowledging
the types of guidance provided, when it said:
“JMPR provides CCPR with science-based risk as-
sessments…that can serve as the basis for CCPR’s
risk- management discussions. JMPR should con-
tinue to use its risk assessment process for estab-
lishing Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) and Acute
Reference Doses (ARfDs) where appropriate.”153
The advice to set not just ADIs but also some ARfD
constitutes a recognition (jointly by CCPR and
JMPR) that some acute adverse effects occur in
some particularly sensitive sub-groups at levels of
exposure below the ADIs, and consequently that
for such compounds ADIs on their own are insuf-
ficient.156 The judgement that ADIs should be sup-
plemented with at least some ARfDs represents a
clear shift in substantive and interpretative risk as-
sessment policies. 
UK 
In relation to assessing the risks from GM
crops and foods, the replacement of Directive
90/220 with Directive 2001/18 constituted an ex-
plicit change in substantive and interpretative
RAPs in all EU Member States. Since 2001 the Eu-
ropean Commission has issued explicit guidance
as to the minimum scope of such assessments; risk
assessors in Germany, the UK and other Member
States explicitly and routinely cite that guidance.
The criteria by which risks are assessed were ex-
plicitly extended by EU Ministers in 1998 and then
incorporated into the 2001 Directive. Under the
provisions of Directive 90/220, risk assessors were
required in effect only to assess direct and short-
term risks from the introduction of GM crops, but
under 2001/18 they were also required to consider
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154 JMPR, Pesticide residues in food—2004, FAO Plant Production and Protection Paper. No 178, 2004, http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pes-
ticid/jmpr/pm_jmpr.htm , Section 2.1 Guidance on the establishment of acute reference doses
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ing060328agenda
156 BfR 2005: Guidance Document – The Format for Health Assessment Documents
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
indirect and long-term risks. Subsequently, the UK
authorities have elaborated that guidance and
those criteria specifying when changes to ecolog-
ical parameters are to be deemed to constitute ‘en-
vironmental harm’, although the criteria were
developed by risk assessors in ACRE rather than by
risk managers.
For the products of agricultural biotechnology,
EU legislation also explicitly precludes risk asses-
sors from taking putative ‘benefits’ into account
when the risks are assessed. The European Commis-
sion’s Communication on Precaution indicates that
while ‘benefits’ may be taken into account, account
should be taken of them by risk managers rather
than by risk assessors, and that they should do so
when making comparisons with alternatives that
may pose relatively less risk, rather than as a coun-
terpoint to putative risks of particular products.
Unlike the domain of GM foods and crops,
the scope of risk assessments of food additives,
pesticides, contaminants and veterinary medicines
was not directly or explicitly affected by the BSE
crises of the late 1990s. The structures and organ-
isation of the institutions through which they are
assessed have changed, and there have also been
changes in the procedural and interpretative RAP
guidance for those institutions. But the scope of
the assessments of those food chemicals has re-
mained largely insulated from, and consequently
unchanged by, public policy debates. 
In September 2005, a meeting was jointly
convened by the UK’s Food Standards Agency
(FSA) and the Royal Society of London (RS) on So-
cial Science Insights for Risk Assessment.157 The re-
port from that meeting to the CoT stated that: 
…principles were identified, which may enable
more effective risk assessment, and related man-
agement and communications processes…in-
clude[ing]…
• consult stakeholders and the public (where
appropriate) on the  framing of questions to
be put to expert scientific advisory commit-
tees; 
• acknowledge assumptions and uncertainty in
risk assessment…”
Those comments constitute a re-iteration of
the FSA’s previously published procedural guid-
ance, but the instruction to ‘consult…on the
framing of questions’ represents a more explicit
acknowledgement of the importance of substan-
tive RAP issues than had previous emerged from
the FSA. 
During a meeting held at the FSA by the
Committee on Toxicity on 28 March 2006, the
CoT discussed that FSA/RS report. The discussion
revealed a tension between a suggestion that the
principles set out in the FSA/RS document were
already implicit in the long-standing practices of
the CoT, and therefore that the explicit articula-
tion of that doctrine had no implications for the
CoT other than maintaining the status quo, and
on the other hand an acknowledgement that fol-
lowing some or all of the principles agreed be-
tween the FSA and the Royal Society would imply
radical changes to the ways in which the CoT and
its sub-committees operated. Consultation, on the
part of the FSA, with a broad range of stakehold-
ers and the public on the framing of questions to
be put to expert scientific advisory committees
has yet to take place.
Germany
The BfR has developed its own guidance doc-
ument on health assessments, but it provides no
guidance on how to deal with benefits; the focus
is on the assessment of risks.158 The BfR indicated
that on occasions, it might be appropriate for risk
assessors to assess benefits, for example if health
claims are made. BfR says that if possible benefits
are considered they should be assessed and re-
ported in a similar way to risks. BfR also proposed
considering “…whether the health benefits
claimed for the population or individual groups if
weighed against the risks are justifiable”.159 In
practice, benefits are normally not considered by
BfR risk assessors; they are deemed to be the re-
sponsibility of risk managers.
Whether benefit assessment can and should
be included in risk assessments appeared as a
novel and contested issue at the BfR. Some ar-
gued that there are cases where risks and benefits
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are to be assessed along the same dimensions,
e.g. nutrients and possible overdose of nutrients.
A recent BfR workshop discussed risk-benefit
analyses around such issues.160 Others contest the
validity of conducting benefit assessments within
risk assessments. In principle the BVL, which to-
gether with Federal Ministries (BMVEL/BMELV),
serves as the risk managing institution for food
safety policy, can consider other legitimate fac-
tors such as possible benefits. In relation to poli-
cies specifically on GM crops and foods,
however, BVL denies that potential benefits are
taken into account. Similarly, GMO risk assessors
are expected not to consider benefits, even if pos-
sible benefits are reported in the dossiers under
consideration.
In relation to GM crops and food policy, Ger-
man legislation does not limit the scope of the de-
liberations of the risk assessors. The official
German risk assessment bodies do not agree about
how the scope of their deliberations should be cir-
cumscribed. Consequently, some variables are as-
sessed by all the authorities involved (including
molecular characterisation, compositional analy-
sis, substantial equivalence and whole food toxic-
ity studies161), others by many but not all (e.g.
environmental monitoring). Some institutions ad-
dress issues that seem to be beyond the scope of
their remit. For instance, BfN sometimes com-
ments on issues of allergenicity, and the RKI com-
ments on environmental risks; while BVL (perhaps
assisted by ZKBS) tries to cover all aspects.
Japan
In Japan, the government has provided some
explicit substantive scoping risk assessment pol-
icy guidance in relation to GM crops and foods,
while general data requirements provide some im-
plicit scoping guidance. For GM crops, the scope
of assessments covers biological effects on natural
biodiversity but excludes effects that may be eco-
nomically and/or agronomically significant to
farmers, such as effects on non-GM conventional
crops162. 
The principal guidance document, Guid-
ance on the Implementation of Assessment of
Adverse Effects on Biological Diversity of Type 1
Use of Living Modified Organisms, stipulates that
the scope of risk assessments of GM crops should
include possible risks of cross-breeding with wild
plants, the risks of competition with wild plants,
the possibility of the release of harmful sub-
stances, and specifies data requirements under 3
main headings and 15 sub-headings.163 Among
others, the risk of cross-breeding is a new
element introduced by the 2004 Guidance. A
supplementary document, the Application of
Approval for the Production and Distribution of
GMOs under the Jurisdiction of Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, provides
detailed specifications of issues of scope, data re-
quirements and data-collection methods. Possi-
ble impacts on soil micro-organisms are also to
be evaluated under the category of ‘production
of harmful substances’.164 In addition, though not
explicitly stipulated in these official documents,
non-target harm of Bt toxin through pollen flow
had been routinely evaluated in accordance with
MAFF’s announcement of March 2000, prior to the
establishment of current guidance documents.165
The net effect of those explicit and implicit provi-
sions is to require Japanese risk assessors to assess
the full range of risks that were being addressed,
for example, in the USA and in the EU, but also to
add two extra items, namely the impact on soil
micro-organisms and effects of stacked genes.
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160 Effects on non-GM conventional crops were covered by a legally non-mandatory guideline of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, The Guideline for Experimental Cultivation of Living Modified Organisms approved for Type 1 Use (notified on 24 February
2004).
161 Guidance on Implementation of Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biological Diversity of Type 1 Use of Living Modified Organisms, Ar-
ticle 3 and Table 1, 2 and 4.
162 In fact, evaluation of the impact on soil micro-organisms has been carried out since 1990s under the former guideline of MAFF, namely
the Guidelines for Application of Recombinant DNA Organisms in Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, the Food Industry and Other Related
Industries.
163 Secretariat of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council (AFFRC). “Safety Assurance of Insect-resistant GM Maize”, 14
March 2000. Possibility of evolution of Bt-resistance of target insects is also a serious concern for Japanese risk assessors, though the
assessment of this effect has not actually been conducted so far. 
164 Op cit., Table 3.
165 Food Safety Commission Japan. The Concept of Safety Assessment of the Food Derived from Breeding Recombinant DNA Plants, Food
Safety Commission Decision, 29 January 2004
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
The Guidance also sets out procedures for
‘item-by-item Assessment of Adverse Effects on
Biological Diversity’. That Guidance specifies
following four procedural steps and assessment
methods for each item.166
Step 1: Identification of wildlife likely to be af-
fected
Step 2: Evaluation of concrete details of ad-
verse effect
Step 3: Evaluation of likelihood of adverse ef-
fect
Step 4: Judgment of existence of Adverse Effect
on Biological Diversity.
In relation to GM foods, the scope of risk
assessments is stipulated by the Standards for the
Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Foods
(Seed Plants), which stipulates assessments of al-
lergenic effects and effects of antibiotic resistance
genes. Adverse health effects caused by changes
of major nutrients, nutritional adverse effects of
long-term consumption, unintended adverse
effects, and effects of pesticide residues should
also be considered. However, a risk assessment of
nutritional changes is required only if ‘safety’
cannot be confirmed by means of routine
compositional analysis, for example when the
composition of nutrients is significantly modified
so as to improve nutritional values.
The same applies to toxicological effects. Tests
of acute toxicity, sub-acute toxicity, chronic
toxicity, reproductive effects, mutagenicity,
carcinogenicity, intestinal toxicity, immunotoxicity
and neurotoxicity are not mandatory but required
only if deemed necessary. So far, acute toxicity
tests have been conducted voluntarily by
applicants (e.g. Du Pont’s Bt maize DAS-59122-7,
Monsanto’s Bt-herbicide tolerant maize
MON88017), while sub-acute toxicity was
requested by the FSC for DAS-59122-7. On the
other hand, the novel explicit procedural
stipulation for the assessment of so-called ‘further
strains’, including varieties with stacked genes, is a
distinctive feature of current Japanese regulation
of GM foods that is not matched in the USA or the
EU, nor in previous Japanese practice.167
In Japan, any consideration of benefits is
deemed to be outside the scope of risk assessments
of both GM foods and crops. Although not
mentioned explicitly in any official documents,
risk assessors and managers agree that considera-
tion of possible ‘benefits’ falls under the
responsibilities of risk managers. For example, in
the process of drafting the Standards for the Safety
Assessment for GM foods at the ECGMF of FSC,
one of its members posed a question about
whether to include consideration of benefits of
GM foods (e.g. high-oleic soybean, vitamin-A en-
hanced rice, etc.) in a risk assessment. In response
the FSC secretariat indicated that consideration of
utility and effectiveness is the business of risk
managers.168 Similarly, for GM crops, a discussion
considered whether benefits of Bt maize should be
taken into account, but it was agreed that such
matters were relevant to risk managers but not risk
assessors. At the 4th meeting of General
Committee of the CAAEB, the chairperson of the
Crops Subcommittee, who is also a member of the
General Committee, stated that: “…while it is a
matter of course to compare risk and benefit,
Japanese rule is not designed to do so”.169
USA
In the USA, very little in the way of explicit
RAP guidance on the framing of risk assessments of
GM foods and crops is available. The reliance by
the FDA on an interpretation of the concept of
‘substantial equivalence’, which assumes that
comparisons of data from chemical analyses can
be sufficient to establish the substantial equiva-
lence of a GM food with its non-GM counterparts,
and that ascribing ‘substantial equivalence’ pro-
vide sufficient grounds to conclude that further as-
sessments of risk or tests are unnecessary, entails
that few formal official GM-food risk assessments
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166 Food Safety Commission Japan. “Minute of 2nd meeting of Expert Committee for GM Foods”, 19 November 2003, p.27. Under the
former guideline before establishment of FSC and introduction of RA/RM separation, benefit was explicitly argued in the case of high
oleic soybean.
167 Committee for the Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity. “Minute of 4th Meeting of General Committee of Committee for the
Assessment of Adverse Effects on Biodiversity”, 16 May 2004, p.36. 
168 Gaylor, D., Bolger, P.M., and Schwetz, B. (1998) ‘US FDA perspective of the inclusion of effects at low-level exposures in safety and risk
assessment’, Environmental Health Perspectives 106, supplement 1: 391-94
169 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2005 Argentina Biotechnology Annual 2005, GAIN Report Number: AR5033
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have been conducted in the USA, and no formal
guidance has stipulated their minimum scope.
For the environmental risks of Bt insecticidal
crops, some substantive RAP guidance has been
elaborated through specific cases. Unlike the other
countries in this study, a benefits’ assessment was
also included, because Bt toxins fall under US pes-
ticide legislation, which obliges the EPA to balance
risks against benefits. For Bt crops, environmental
benefits were initially taken for granted, but more
recently such claims have been challenged and
eventually downplayed.
The FDA’s toxicological assessments of food
chemicals consider only direct product risks, i.e.
testable characteristics; they do not include indi-
rect effects on overall diet or on nutritional public
health. On the other hand, proposals to restrict
and/or ban food ingredients or products, and
thereby to reduce risks, are judged against poten-
tial losses of nutritional benefits. Little in the way
of systematic evidence is required indicating that
such benefits would be lost; they tend rather to be
assumed.
The FDA’s legislative basis, the Food Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, allows a consideration of ben-
efits when assessing risks from foods containing
environmental contaminants, but (under the provi-
sions of the Delaney amendment) it precludes
such consideration for food additives suspected of
being carcinogenic.170
In the USA, where the FDA and EPA are hy-
brid institutions, responsible for both risk assess-
ment and risk management, it is not possible to
identify precisely the fractions of those agencies
that are, and that are not, responsible for taking ac-
count of the potential benefits that potentially risky
products and processes might provide. The EPA’s
legislative framework directs the EPA to balance
judgements of the risks of GM crops against the
benefits they are expected to provide. In routine
policy-making in respect of food additives and
contaminants, US risk assessors have a long-stand-
ing practice of considering anticipated benefits
when assessing, not so much the magnitude of par-
ticular risks, but their acceptability. When fed rel-
atively high doses of the preservative sodium nitrite
(as well as sodium nitrate and potassium nitrite –
E249-E252) laboratory rats showed measurable
dose-related increases in the incidence of malig-
nant tumours. The FDA’s response was to argue
that the benefits provided by the use of those com-
pounds, in terms of reducing the risk of acute bac-
terial food poisoning from pathogenic
micro-organisms, substantially outweighs any rel-
atively modest long-term risks that the compounds
might pose. Ceasing to use those preservatives
would cause greater mortality and morbidity than
their continued use. 
When evidence emerged, indicating that
when fed even moderate doses of saccharin, espe-
cially over two generations, rats showed dose-re-
lated increases in the incidence of bladder cancer
in males, and the FDA proposed to ban the use of
saccharin under provisions of the Delaney amend-
ment, Congress passed legislation obliging the
FDA not to ban it but merely to require warning
labels, arguing that the benefits of saccharin con-
sumption outweighed the risks. In that case,
elected representatives in Congress took explicit
political responsibility for providing the FDA with
risk management policy guidance, to the effect that
risks were to be assessed in the context of judge-
ments concerning benefits too. The evidence sug-
gests that the FDA has subsequently acted in
conformity with the guidance that Congress pro-
vided.
Argentina
In Argentina, no explicit guidance on the
scoping of risk assessments is provided, but data
requirements provide some very limited implicit
scoping guidance. Benefits do not explicitly form
part of risk assessments of GM foods or crops.
However, not only do the Argentinean authorities
conduct assessments of risks to domestic con-
sumers from the introduction of GM crops and
foods, they also include, in the scope of their con-
siderations, possible economic risks to export mar-
kets. Those risks to markets access are assessed by
a separate part of the agriculture department; GM
plants are normally only approved for domestic
cultivation if they have previously been approved
for sale in major export markets. Recently, the Ar-
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gentine Secretary of Agriculture approved a vari-
ety of herbicide tolerant maize for commercialisa-
tion, before the EU granted import authorization,
but that was the first time such a decision had been
taken.171
Which explicit judgements have guided pol-
icy on which kinds of evidence to include in
risk assessments, and which to exclude or dis-
count?
Within the EU, and under the provisions of
EU legislation and EFSA Guidance documents,
data requirements and some criteria of assessment
for GM crops and food indicate the minimum
kinds of data that must be provided. Those provi-
sions stipulate not only the types of studies from
which data are required, but also their minimum
duration. For pesticides and additives, there are
some standard data requirements, but there are no
comparable general data requirements for contam-
inants; they do not have any explicit sponsors.
No general statements have even been pub-
lished by either CCFAC or by JECFA indicating how
much information, and of which kind, is necessary
and/or sufficient for judgements to accept, restrict
or reject the proposed use of particular food addi-
tives. Risk assessment policy assumptions of that
type are, and always have been, implicit. They
have never been explicitly articulated, but can be
derived inferentially by scrutinising institutional
practices. 
At the global level, both JECFA and JMPR rou-
tinely accept evidence that has not been published
in peer-reviewed journals, and then allow that ev-
idence to remain unpublished indefinitely. On this
issue, the practices in the UK, Germany, Japan and
Argentina were, for many years, indistinguishable
from those of JECFA and JMPR. Recently, more sci-
entific evidence has entered the public domain be-
cause of decisions by the British and Japanese risk
management authorities. 
Since the provisions of the US Freedom of In-
formation Act were strengthened in 1976, follow-
ing the Watergate Scandal, almost all the
toxicological data by reference to which food ad-
ditives and pesticides have been approved in the
USA have been, in principle at any rate, in the
public domain, as they are in several Scandinavian
countries. Despite this fact, JECFA, JMPR continue
to accept and rely on unpublished data, and data
from unpublished studies.
Academic peer review is supposed to provide
a degree of quality control over papers in scien-
tific journals. Some policy-makers therefore rely
primarily on evidence from scientific studies that
have been published in peer-reviewed journals.
Risk assessors in the UK, Germany, Japan and Ar-
gentina accept unpublished data and studies, and
until recently all acquiesced in keeping the evi-
dence out of the public domain (in whole or in
part). Not even in the USA are they all available as
electronic files on the internet.
No explicit decision rules have been set out in
Argentina, by expert advisors or policy-makers,
concerning which data to require and which not
to require, or to discount. Decisions on those mat-
ters have been taken, but how they were taken is
not publicly accountable, although representatives
of industrial applicants typically attend meetings
at which their applications are considered. When
considering whether or not to require long-term
monitoring for GM plants, for example, the deci-
sion rule may therefore be explicitly indicated to
the applicant, but not to the general public.
Have risk assessors been provided with, or
themselves published, any default assump-
tions about the interpretation of data for pol-
icy?
Risk assessments are routinely portrayed as
evidence-based, and they often are based on evi-
dence, but evidence does not interpret itself. Par-
ticular bodies of data can and often do legitimately
admit a range of alternative scientific interpreta-
tions concerning public and environmental health,
and groups of experts can differ on the issue of
what to count as relevant evidence. While con-
trasting risk assessments may be equally scientific,
they are not necessarily equally precautionary;
some may be significantly more or less precaution-
ary than others. 
For example, the approach adopted in the
USA, that many aspects of GM crops and foods that
the Europeans and Japanese deem worthy of risk as-
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sessments, do not require such assessments is in that
respect less precautionary that the European and
Japanese approaches. On the other hand, the ap-
proach of the US authorities to suspected carcino-
gens in the food supply may well have been
significantly more precautionary than the ap-
proaches adopted in Europe or by the global
FAO/WHO risk assessors. The focus of the discus-
sion in this section concerns the extent to which in-
terpretations of data are framed by explicit RAP
guidance, and if not whether implicit interpretative
risk assessment policies can be identified, and char-
acterised by reference to notions of precaution. 
USA
The US authorities have published guidance
documents setting out the default assumptions
with which they interpret carcinogenicity data, but
similar forms of guidance have not been devel-
oped for other toxicological ‘end points’. The USA
was the first major jurisdiction to issue explicit
‘procedural’ risk assessment policy, in relation to
the interpretation of evidence of carcinogenicity.
The guidance has changed over time, but those
changes have been explicit, with an audit trail of
the changes online. Key assumptions were both
made explicit in official documents, and explained
in journal articles by US government officials. 
The changing US approach to geno-
toxic carcinogens
During the 1970s and into the early 1980s,
the US government started to show greater precau-
tion in relation to food-borne chemical carcino-
gens than it had previously. The FDA began to
assume, more or less explicitly, that all carcino-
genic agents should be classified and assessed as
if they were non-threshold agents unless there was
evidence indicating that a threshold mechanism
accounted for the carcinogenic effects of com-
pounds. The basis for the new policy was not that
all carcinogens were believed to act in a non-
threshold manner, but rather that even if some
mechanisms of carcinogenesis involve thresholds,
in practice scientists could not reliably determine
where those thresholds were located. The FDA’s
policy was to exercise precaution; it was deemed
prudent to act as if no threshold existed unless, in
particular cases, there were good grounds for sup-
posing otherwise. Since ADIs presume a threshold,
the default RAP guidance was that risk assessors
should not routinely assign an ADI to carcinogens.
In practice, by the mid-1980s, the US authorities
had modified that approach. 
The 1958 Delaney amendment stated that:
“…no additive shall be deemed safe if it is found
to induce cancer when ingested by man or ani-
mal.” In that context Congressional legislation ex-
plicitly provided US risk managers with RAP
guidance on how to regulate known or suspected
carcinogens. The passage of that amendment
posed significant problems for the FDA and sub-
sequently for the EPA. For example, saccharin was
shown in 1976 to be an animal carcinogen, but
there were high levels of commercial and congres-
sional support for its continued use; and FDA risk
managers assumed that artificial sweeteners were
essential for diabetics and helpful for weight con-
trol. In response, the US authorities introduced
quantitative mathematical modelling with which
to try to extrapolate from high doses given to lab-
oratory animals to low doses to which consumers
were, or might realistically be, exposed. The re-
vised policy meant not always banning additives
or pesticides that were carcinogenic in a labora-
tory study, but restricting consumption sufficiently
so that residual risks were deemed acceptably
slight. In particular, US risk managers and risk as-
sessors adopted as a conventional benchmark of
acceptability, an indication that an additional life-
time risk of developing cancer would not exceed
one chance in a million; such levels came to be
referred to as ‘virtually safe’ doses. The Delaney
amendment has never been formally repealed, but
it is not consistently implemented.
Codex
When CCRVDF proposed to JECFA that it
could use a default safety factor of 100 to ‘calcu-
late’ (rather than to ‘estimate’) ADIs from NOELs,
it was providing some explicit interpretative RAP
guidance, which moreover amounted to little more
than codifying routine practice.172 Nonetheless,
JECFA vetoed that guidance. CCRVDF also pro-
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posed that JECFA should treat laboratory animals
as providing a basis for extrapolation to humans,
and indicated circumstances when some evidence
of adverse effects in laboratory animals should be
discounted.173 CCRVDF indicated (procedurally,
substantively and interpretatively) that decisions,
about what is to count as a benchmark of an ac-
ceptable level of risk, is one for which CCRVDF,
rather than JECFA, should be responsible.174
Whether that meant that CCRVDF and not JECFA
should set ADIs, or whether JECFA should continue
to set ADIs but only by acting in accordance with
guidance from CCRVDF (and presumably CCFAC
too) remains unclear. Since JECFA vetoed the draft,
and CCRVDF responded with a fundamentally dif-
ferent type of document, that has yet to be clari-
fied.
Risk assessment policy in relation to
non-threshold toxicological effects
In recent years regulatory toxicologists have
been asked to assess the risks of an increasing
number of compounds, primarily contaminants,
for which the rules for setting ADIs cannot readily
apply. In cases like acrylamide, evidence suggests
that they might not only be carcinogens but also
genotoxic compounds, and therefore that even
one molecule may be sufficient to initiate a tu-
mour, therefore there may be no threshold greater
than zero below which risks can be assumed to be
negligible. If no threshold can be identified, esti-
mated or assumed, there is a conspicuous need for
some alternative to the ADI.
JECFA’s approach
For many years JECFA’s approach (in contrast
to that of the US FDA and EPA) was to allocate
ADIs to compounds that had been shown to be ro-
dent carcinogens, as long as they were deemed
‘non-genotoxic’. At JECFA and JMPR the long-
standing practice was to assume that carcinogens
act with threshold-limited mechanisms unless
there was clear evidence of genotoxicity. That pol-
icy has not been explicitly embodied in formal
published documents, but it was in practice the
implicit rule of thumb. For genotoxic carcinogenic
contaminants, JECFA’s advice was that the ALARA
approach should be adopted, i.e. risk managers
should aim to reduce exposures to ‘as low as rea-
sonably achievable’.
In 2005 JECFA acknowledged that ‘ALARA’
was insufficient. That was partly because improved
analytical and testing methods meant that ever
more genotoxic carcinogens were being detected
in foods. Some risk managers also indicated that
ALARA-type advice could not provide them with a
way of prioritising efforts to reduce exposures as
between different genotoxic carcinogenic com-
pounds. 
Innovating four regulatory concepts
In response, a set of four new regulatory con-
cepts was invented and adopted by JECFA. If the
risks from genotoxic carcinogens cannot be meas-
ured on a cardinal scale, their relative risks might
be ranked on an ordinal scale. JECFA introduced
what it terms the ‘benchmark response’ (or BMR)
and the ‘benchmark dose’ (or BMD). The BMD is
defined as a dose that generates a chosen level of
measurable benchmark carcinogenic response or
‘BMR’. JECFA selected as its BMR a 10% increased
incidence of tumours in test animals compared
with the controls. JECFA proposed that, the ‘lower
confidence limit’ of the BMD (termed a ‘BMDL’,
or ‘benchmark dose lower confidence limit’) could
and should be used to rank genotoxic carcinogens
in terms of their potency. JECFA proposed that the
BMDL, together with exposure data, could be used
to calculate a ‘Margin of Exposure’, or ‘MoE’. The
MoE is defined as the ratio of the BMDL to esti-
mated exposure to the compound. MoEs could be
used to prioritize different contaminants, as well
as providing a basis for judgements about how far
exposure should be reduced.
UK
In the UK, there has been little in the way of
explicit guidance about the interpretation of toxi-
cological data. In the UK there has been a process
5.
 S
ub
st
an
tiv
e 
an
d 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tiv
e 
A
sp
ec
ts
 o
f R
is
k 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t P
ol
ic
y
66
173 DoH (1991) Guidelines for the Evaluation of Chemicals for Carcinogenicity. Report on Health and Social Subjects No. 42. Committee on
Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment. HMSO, London 
174 Secretariat of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council of MAFF (2000) “On the safety assurance of the insect-resistant
maize”, 14 March 2000
Te
ch
ni
ca
l R
ep
or
t S
er
ie
s
built on examples and precedent, with slow incre-
mental adjustments at the margin. Patterns of data
interpretation have been far more matters of ‘case
law’ rather than of ‘statute law’. Customary prac-
tice in UK toxicological risk assessments was to
treat any adverse effects that occur in ways that
were not monotonically dose-related and/or at lev-
els above the conventional benchmark of statistical
significance (of there being less than a one chance
in 20 of the phenomenon not being a random arte-
fact) as being effectively zero and discountable,
when testing chemicals on samples of 50 male and
50 female rodents, at ‘low, medium and high’
doses alongside a control group of 50 animals per
sex. In that respect, the approach adopted in the
UK has been significantly less precautionary than
that in the USA. 
Historically, British committees have chosen
not to use, even hypothetically, mathematical ex-
trapolation models; as an FDA official put it ‘the
Brits always try to stay out of the numbers game’.
The Committee on Carcinogenicity has argued
against using quantitative models on the grounds
that they depend on numerous approximations
and assumptions that cannot be validated. The
problem is not that there are no mathematical
models, but rather that there are too many, and that
there are no conclusive grounds for selecting one
rather than another. The Department of Health’s
expert Committee on Carcinogenicity explicitly
stipulated (in 1991), in a similar way to the US
agencies, that not only genotoxic carcinogens, but
also non-genotoxic carcinogens for which no
mechanism has been established, should be as-
sumed to have no threshold of entirely safe expo-
sure.175 The approach by the mid-1990s in the UK
was to ban the use of genotoxic carcinogens as
food additives or pesticides and to reduce levels of
contaminants ‘as low as is reasonably achievable’.
In the UK, only two main sets of default as-
sumptions have been explicitly set out, and they
emerged from toxicology advisory bodies not risk
managers. The committees have indicated that
they will not routinely use linear models to extrap-
olate from adverse effects at high doses to estimate
effects at lower doses. Risk assessors are, in effect,
expected to exercise discretion and take account
of chemical and biological evidence and knowl-
edge, thereby making more informed judgements.
The one exception to that rule is that advisors have
been told to interpret data concerning compounds
that appear to exert carcinogenic action via a
genotoxic mechanism, as indicated with data from
in vivo studies, by assuming a non-threshold dose-
response relationship, such as a linear model. 
The approach adopted by the UK has differed
in several key respects from that of the USA. In prac-
tice, in the UK the CoT, and its sub-committees, has
occasionally exempted suspect carcinogens from
those default assumptions, by reference to hypothe-
ses about mechanisms of action that may, for exam-
ple, occur at high but not at low doses. Typically
(though implicitly) those committees assumed that
almost all toxicological mechanisms are not just
dose-related but also dose-limited. Genotoxic car-
cinogens have become the only category of toxic
agents assumed to accomplish their effects through
processes with no threshold, but the UK CoT has
not yet endorsed the innovations outlined above re-
cently introduced by JECFA. In that respect too, the
approach adopted in the UK has been significantly
less precautionary than that proposed by JECFA and
JMPR. 
Germany
BfR risk assessors have explicitly articulated
some of their default assumptions concerning risk
assessments of contaminants. In cases where there
is evidence of carcinogenicity, but without evi-
dence of genotoxic activity, the BfR assumes that
there is a threshold and that an ADI can be set. On
the other hand, for carcinogens believed or known
to act through genotoxic mechanisms, the assump-
tion is that there is no threshold and therefore ADIs
are not appropriate. Instead, the BfR invokes rec-
ommends reducing exposure to the maximum ex-
tent that can reasonably be achieved, but leaves it
to BVL risk managers to decide what, in those con-
texts, is reasonable.
GM food and crops
No formal guidance on the interpretation of
data has been published in the USA by either risk
assessors or risk managers for GM crops as a
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whole, or for categories of GM crops such as those
expressing Bt. In particular cases, however, risk as-
sessors have provided some account of how data
were interpreted. Risk assessors have also ac-
knowledged some methodological uncertainties
about how to investigate effects of Bt toxin on non-
target organisms. The ‘indicators species’, upon
which the risk assessors have required tests to be
conducted, evolved during the late 1990s. That
constituted at least an implicit recognition of some
uncertainty, which can be interpreted as a shift
from a relatively less to a relatively more precau-
tionary approach. 
In the UK, on the issue of antibiotic resistance
marker genes, the ACNFP refers to its own specific
guidance indicating that GM foods should not
contain genes coding for antibiotics that play a sig-
nificant role in human medical therapy. On the
other hand, in the UK for GM foods, no general
guidance has been published by either risk asses-
sors or risk managers on the interpretation of data.
As in the USA, however, the ACNFP sometimes
provides some explanations of how, in particular
cases, data were interpreted. In Japan, no official
guidance on the interpretation of data has been
published for GM foods and crops. But, as in the
USA, the method of indicators species has been
also used to evaluate non-target effects of Bt toxin
since the MAFF distributed a press release in
March 2000 that specified the procedure of the
evaluation.174 As mentioned above, this implies
that risk assessors recognise some uncertainties
and can take a precautionary approach to them.
In Germany and Argentina no explicit documents
have been issued indicating default assumptions
for data interpretation by risk assessors of GM
crops and foods.
Have risk assessors been provided with, or
themselves articulated, any default proce-
dural assumptions about the interpretation of
uncertainties for policy?
Global institutions
In the context of its treatment of chemical tox-
icology, JECFA has established the practice of set-
ting ADIs by dividing NOELs (or sometimes
NOAELs) with a numerical parameter that is some-
times referred to as a ‘safety factor’ (or SF) and at
others as an ‘uncertainty factor’. That practice has
been explicitly set out in a document by both
JECFA and CCFAC. Beyond that, JECFA has not ex-
plicated any general rules about acknowledging or
responding to uncertainties. When asking for more
data, JECFA implicitly acknowledges that it faces
significant uncertainties. In the USA, FDA staff
have acknowledged that ‘safety factors’ may them-
selves be uncertain, but neither JECFA nor JMPR
acknowledged that.177
USA
When the US Congress introduced the De-
laney Amendment, it did so because it recognised
that there were considerable uncertainties in ex-
trapolating the effects on humans from laboratory
animal data. Subsequently, the FDA has provided
risk assessors with explicit guidance about partic-
ular kinds of scientific uncertainties, and how to
respond to them. US regulatory culture is one in
which, when faced by uncertainties, the reaction is
to try to quantify the uncertainties, or to use quan-
titative tools despite the imprecision in data and
their interpretations. Procedural risk assessment
policy concerning the risks of possible carcinogens
has been extensively and explicitly set out, usually
by groups comprising both risk assessors and risk
managers. 
While chemical carcinogenesis has been a
focus of risk assessment and risk management in
the USA, similar levels of attention have not been
devoted to regulating the products and processes
of agricultural biotechnology; on the contrary they
are widely assumed to be safe and subject to far
less detailed scrutiny than chemicals. The knowl-
edge of their likely interactions with human and
environmental health are officially characterised
in the USA as well understood and not compli-
cated by uncertainties. In the absence of any ac-
knowledgement of uncertainties, there has been
no perceived need to articulate policies about un-
certainties. In the USA official food toxicology risk
assessors at the FDA represent themselves as rou-
tinely making conservative assumptions in re-
sponse to uncertainties. They sometimes explicitly
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acknowledged uncertainty in extrapolating from
animal studies, and tried estimating the scale of
those uncertainties.178 Official US guidance explic-
itly discusses the complex issue of ‘conservative
default assumptions’, ostensibly so that practition-
ers can clarify and justify their choices.179
Germany
In Germany, the BfN sometimes refers to the
precautionary principle, and uses it when inter-
preting available data. For example, it has done so
in relation to Bt11 maize when recommending
minimum separation distances of GM crops from
ecologically sensitive areas, to diminish risks to
non-target organisms.180 The BfN explicitly ac-
knowledges uncertainties, and has adopted ex-
plicit routines for responding to them. The BfN has
also drawn attention to evidence of statistically sig-
nificant differences in compositional analyses be-
tween GM foods and their non-GM counterparts,
and evidence from feeding trials, as indicating im-
portant scientific uncertainties. The BfN has also
argued that particular forms of post-release moni-
toring should be required, which also implicitly
acknowledges uncertainties. The other federal Ger-
man institutions (such as the RKI and the BVL) with
responsibility for assessing the risks of GM crops
and foods refer less frequently to precaution or to
uncertainties. The BfR has issued its own default
guidance on the application of precaution and
sees its role as identifying relevant uncertainties
that might provide the occasion for a possible ex-
ercise of precaution, while assigning to the BVL re-
sponsibility for deciding whether or not, and how,
to implement precaution.181 For non-threshold tox-
icity no explicit guidance has been provided by
risk managers. Nevertheless, the BfR apparently
‘inherited’ some risk assessment approaches from
the former BgVV. For example, in relation to a
known or suspected genotoxic carcinogen, no
threshold can be assumed and ‘ALARA’ is the rou-
tine approach to risk mitigation. Since EFSA was
established, German authorities have often ac-
cepted EFSA judgements without conducting their
own assessment. Some German officials indicated,
however, that a BfR assessment of, for example,
dichlorvos might have been more precautionary
than that delivered by EFSA.
UK
In the UK, for GM food and crops, members
of the ACNFP and ACRE say that they adopt ‘con-
servative’ assumptions when there are relevant un-
certainties, but no formal official documents
stipulate such an approach. In practice, in the late
1990s, expert advisors acknowledged that impor-
tant uncertainties remained concerning the poten-
tial consequences of consuming foods that had
been modified with antibiotic resistance marker
(or ARM) genes. They were uncertain whether
ARMs could transfer to microbial pathogens in the
human gut, or in the digestive tracks of agricultural
livestock. Rather than waiting until the uncertain-
ties were diminished, their advice was that, in re-
spect of some types of especially important
antibiotics that medical practice could not afford
to lose, it would be better not to use those ARMs
in GM foods. Risk managers accepted that advice,
and it has also been endorsed by EU authorities.
Subsequently, some other uncertainties have been
acknowledged, mainly those that could be signif-
icantly reduced by relatively modest further stud-
ies.
Japan
In Japan, for GM food and crops, the guidance
documents do not explicitly refer to the notion of
scientific uncertainty, but there are several
specifications indicating substantively how to
address and interpret uncertainties. For example, in
relation to GM crops, a document provides a
stipulation that allows risk assessors to request the
applicants to submit plans of monitoring and
emergency preventive actions182, which constitutes
a default procedural assumption about how to
address the uncertainty. In practice, risk assessors
have requested monitoring for several varieties of
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Bt maize, taking into account uncertainties in the
evaluation of non-target effects of Bt toxin.
A second example is the specification of the
evaluation method for the effects of Bt toxin on
non-target insects in farmland soil, which was
developed by risk assessors in the CCAEB. In this
case, risk assessors recognized the uncertainty in
the survivability of Bt protein in soil. Based on this
recognition, the CCAEB adopted a conservative, or
precautionary, assumption that Bt protein could re-
main active in soil for several weeks or months,
much longer than previously assumed.
In relation to GM foods, risk assessors are
provided with no explicit guidance about the
interpretation of uncertainties, but they have made
some default assumptions concerning uncertainties.
For example, in the deliberation about -Amylase
LE399 (Novozymes Japan Co., Ltd), a food additive
derived from GM microbes, there had been an
extensive discussion whether to assume the possible
widest range of use of the additive or particular
usage designated by the applicants. The problem
was that the additive could be used in other ways
than assumed by risk assessors and, if so, it might
pose additional risks that have not been evaluated.
In order to address such an uncertainty, risk
assessors have so far worked out an agreement that
they should presuppose the possible widest range
of use of the additive, which implies that they have
made a conservative assumption in relation to
uncertainties. In Argentina, no RAP guidance has
been published in connection with identifying or
handling uncertainties.
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Section summary
The discussion in Section 5 indicated the ex-
tent to which interpretative risk assessment policies
have been made explicit. This section explores, by
contrast, the extent to which, and the ways in
which, implicit RAPs can be inferred and charac-
terised. The ease with which implicit RAPs or risk
assessment policy-type judgements can be identi-
fied depends to a large extent on the extent to which
empirical evidence is publicly available in each in-
stitutional setting. In those cases where the docu-
mentary evidence on scientific assessments of risks
is sparse it can be difficult to identify RAP-like
judgements because the methods of identifying im-
plicit RAP-like judgements require careful scrutiny
and reconstruction of scientific assessments and de-
cision-making. Furthermore, unless we scrutinise a
large representative sample of scientific assessments
within any one jurisdiction it can be difficult to es-
tablish whether any such identified RAP-like judge-
ments are deployed consistently across different
products – and thus constitute an implicit ‘policy’ –
or whether all we can identify are the ad hoc judge-
ments made by an individual assessor or assessment
team, and which might vary as between different
products or assessors.
Implicit procedural RAPs have been previ-
ously reviewed above in the context of the discus-
sion of procedural practices and how those
practices compare with explicit procedural guid-
ance. Substantive risk assessment policies have
often limited the focus of attention to sub-sets of
possible considerations, although those exclusions
typically remain implicit. The sub-sets that are in-
cluded have widened in recent years, in relation
to GM crops and foods, but not in relation to
chemical risks. Another important aspect of sub-
stantive RAP concerns judgements about includ-
ing, excluding or discounting certain types of
evidence; those judgements vary within and be-
tween institutional settings. Statements about the
scope of risk assessments are more explicit about
what is included than about what is excluded. The
risks that are excluded can often only be inferred,
and comparing assessments prepared in different
institutional settings can facilitate those inferences.
Interpretative RAPs interact with judgements
about the scope of risk assessments and data re-
quirements. They have often also involved distinctly
asymmetric approaches to dealing with possible
false positives and false negatives. In several cases
we found evidence that risk assessors have dis-
counted evidence of possible adverse effects by ref-
erence to hypotheses about, for example, modes of
action, even where those mechanistic hypotheses
were not supported by specific evidence showing
the hypothesis to be well-founded. On the other
hand, risk assessors rarely take systematic steps to
avoid possible false negatives, even when the test
methods provided conspicuously poor models of
real life conditions.
Implicit assumptions that have been guiding
the interpretation of data have been crucial to de-
termining the conclusions of many risk assess-
ments, therefore if the request from risk managers
to risk assessors to make all their interpretative as-
sumptions explicit were implemented it would
make the underlying reasoning far more transpar-
ent than has hitherto been the case.
To the extent that risk assessment policies
have been implicit rather than explicit, can
we identify what they are or have been? 
At the global level
A recently published full report from JECFA’s
discussions on food additives (JECFA Food Addi-
tives Series 52) emerged in 2004. The evaluations
contained in that volume constituted, at the time of
writing, an up-to-date sample of its work.183 The
prevailing implicit risk assessment policy adopted
by JECFA (in 2004) can be illustrated by reference
to a comprehensive food additive risk assessment;
it concerns a novel synthetic sweetener called
Neotame –Nutrasweet’s follow-up dipeptide
6. Implicit aspects of risk assessment policies
183 JECFA, Food Additive Series, 54, 2004, p. 124
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methyl ester to aspartame. The toxicological
monograph from JECFA on neotame cited 69 re-
ports, every one of them unpublished.
Neotame: substantive RAP - which studies
were reported?
Against the background of an unresolved and
acrimonious debate (from the early 1970s until the
present day) about the safety and acceptability of
neotame’s parent compound (aspartame184), a
wider range of studies was conducted on neotame
than had been conducted on aspartame at the
stage when it was first approved by JECFA. 
When JECFA met in 2003 “The absorption,
distribution, metabolism and excretion of neotame
have been studied in mice, rats, dogs, rabbits and
humans.” Studies were reported under 17 head-
ings. Seven of the first nine categories were rou-
tine 20 years ago, while requirements for studies of
reproductive toxicity and developmental toxicity
had been increasingly common since the mid-
1990s. The scope of the appraisal of neotame was
as wide as for any other new additive, although its
scope did not extend to tests for endocrine disrupt-
ing effects. Some data on ‘tolerance’ of single
doses and repeated doses were reported for small
groups of healthy adults. 
As usual, short-term tests served as ‘range-
finding’ studies to set dose levels for longer-term
studies. During those short-term tests, it was evi-
dent that, at even relatively moderate doses, the
rate at which laboratory animals consumed food
and gained weight diminished, when compared
with animals in the control groups. One question
therefore was whether those failures to ingest food
and gain weight at the anticipated rates were ‘toxic
effects’ or merely problems of ‘unpalatability’.
‘Palatability’ is one of the categories under which
data were reported, and it will be discussed below.
Discounting positive evidence of neotame
toxicity
At several points, JECFA referred to some evi-
dence of adverse effects. On each occasion, JECFA
characterised the phenomena as ‘sporadic’ or ‘rel-
atively low level’, and discounted those symptoms
and evidence, as if they had not occurred or were
unimportant. JECFA treated levels of consumption
below which evidence of adverse effects had oc-
curred, as if they provided a demonstrable ‘no ob-
served effect level’. Several inconvenient or
unwelcome observations were treated as if they
had not been observed. An alternative, and equally
scientific but more precautionary, way of interpret-
ing those data could have been to request more
detailed studies of those adverse effects. A deci-
sion of that sort is a matter of procedural and inter-
pretative risk assessment policy concerning how
uncertain evidence is to be interpreted.
In the context of a discussion of the results
from a 3-month study of ‘tolerance’ of repeated
dosing with neotame with 144 healthy human
adults, JECFA said:
“…82 persons reported at least one adverse
reaction during the study. Most of these were de-
termined to be of mild or moderate severity, and
were reported in all three treatment groups, with
no dose–response relationship or statistically sig-
nificant differences between groups. Headache
was the most common adverse experience, occur-
ring in 16, 15 and 13 persons at 0, 0.5 and 1.5
mg/kg bw per day, respectively. There were no se-
rious adverse reactions during treatment.
There were no treatment-related changes
throughout the study in pulse rate, blood pressure,
respiratory rate, temperature, body weight, oph-
thalmological or haematological parameters. The
sporadic changes observed in clinical chemistry
parameters were not considered to be of biological
significance or to be treatment-related. 
On the basis of the results of this study, neo-
tame was well tolerated at a dose of up to 1.5
mg/kg bw per day for 91 days, with no treatment-
related adverse effects.”185
JECFA implicitly made several risk assessment
policy assumptions. 82 out of 144 of the people in
the two treatment groups reported “…at least one
adverse reaction...” but JECFA provides no informa-
tion on how many symptoms were reported by dif-
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ferent fractions of the sample. Some of those 82 ex-
perimental subjects may have reported several or
many symptoms, but such information is not pro-
vided by JECFA. JECFA did not say whether or not
those in the control group reported similar symp-
toms; that assumption remains implicit. The most
commonly reported symptom was headaches. This
may be important because, amongst consumers
who have reported suspected adverse effects from
aspartame (from which neotame is derived), severe
headaches have been the most frequently reported
adverse effect.186 The absence of statistically signif-
icant dose-response relationships, cited by JECFA,
is inconclusive. If all the individuals who were intol-
erant of neotame responded even at the lower of
the two doses, then similar effects would have oc-
curred in both test groups, and therefore the effects
would not be ‘dose-related’. But that does not entail
that the reported adverse effects were ‘sporadic’ or
discountable. Without data in the public domain, it
is not possible to be sure. JECFA was making RAP
interpretative assumptions, but neither their use nor
their adoption was transparent or precautionary. 
JECFA stated that “[t]here were no serious ad-
verse reactions during treatment…” but not how
the distinction between ‘serious’ effects and those
deemed not to be serious was drawn, nor who
drew it. JECFA did not indicate whether the sub-
jects participating in the study thought the effects
were serious.
In relation to a short-term ‘range-finding’ 13-
week mouse study of neotame, using 20 male and
20 female mice, JECFA said:
“In females, haematology revealed small sig-
nificant decreases in mean corpuscular volume at
4000 and 8000 mg/kg bw per day, but these were
within the historical reference range and not con-
sidered to be toxicologically significant. There
were slight but significant increases in absolute
liver weights at 8000 mg/kg bw per day in both
sexes and slight but significant increases in rela-
tive liver weights in females at 4000 and 8000
mg/kg bw per day. These changes were generally
within the ranges for historical controls and were
not accompanied by microscopic changes. There
were no treatment-related gross pathological
changes. Histopathological examination revealed
a slight increase in chronic inflammation of the
kidney in both sexes, but no dose–response was
evident. The NOEL was 1000 mg/kg bw per day
on the basis of changes in relative liver weight.”187
(Emphases added)
If those adverse effects on haematology and
liver weights were ‘significant’ in the formal statis-
tical sense of there being less than 1 chance in 20
of having occurred randomly, in samples of just 20
mice, those changes must have occurred with con-
spicuous frequency. JECFA does not however re-
port that frequency. JECFA said “…changes were
generally within the ranges for historical con-
trols…” but not how they compared to concurrent
controls. The choice of comparing test groups to
concurrent controls or to average historical con-
trols (or to both) is an issue of interpretative risk as-
sessment policy, and one that was implicitly being
made by neotame’s corporate sponsors and by
JECFA, but not by risk managers. JECFA discounted
apparently positive evidence of toxicity as if it had
been shown to be a false positive.
Similarly in the context of a discussion of a
short-term study on dogs, JECFA said: 
“The absolute weight of the liver was in-
creased by 18% in males in week 12 at
1200/2000 mg/kg bw per day, and by
12–23% in females at 600 mg/kg bw per day.
There was a significant increase in relative
liver weight (to body weight) at 1200/2000
mg/kg bw per day in males (49% more than
controls) and in females at doses of >600
mg/kg bw per day (27–35%). Absolute spleen
weight was decreased in males in all groups
(15–43%), and spleen weights were increased
in females at 200 and 1200/2000 mg/kg bw
per day only, although none of these changes
were statistically significant.”188 (emphasis
added) 
Given, however, that the experiment involved
as few as 6 dogs per sex per dose level, the
changes would have had to have been both severe
and ubiquitous to satisfy the standard requirement
for statistical significance. 
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Neotame and weight change: toxicity or
‘unpalatability’?
During the course of its discussion JECFA
identified 18 separate studies in which laboratory
animals treated with neotame exhibited absolute
or relative body weight loss, and changes to organ
weights. The effect occurred remarkably consis-
tently. The lowest reported level of exposure at
which that effect occurred was 30 mg/kg bw in a
14-day rat feeding study in groups of 10 male and
10 female rats per dose level. Nonetheless, at the
conclusion of its assessment, JECFA deemed 200
mg/kg bw per day as the ‘no observed effect level’
(or NOEL), on the basis of the 1-year dog study. It
was not that weight loss was not observed at lower
levels of exposure, or that the weight changes were
not ‘effects’. It was an observed effect that JECFA
categorised as one that did not count.
JECFA said that the weight changes were not
toxic effects. Rather, the animals found the dosed
feed unpalatable and therefore consumed less of
it, implying that neotame did not make them ill,
they just preferred to eat less if their diets con-
tained it. JECFA did not deny that the animals did
not thrive on the diets containing neotame, but dis-
counted that effect by invoking a previously un-
stated interpretative assumption: that weight
changes on their own, or symptoms that can be at-
tributed to weight loss, can be discounted.189
A possible false negative
JECFA repeatedly discounted evidence of pu-
tative adverse effects of neotame as if they could
reliably be categorised as ‘false positives’, but was
relatively forgiving when it came to possible false
negatives. For example, studies on the degradation
products of neotame included tests in what JECFA
described as: “...mock beverages containing phos-
phate- and citrate-buffered solutions simulating
formulations used in commercial cola soft drinks
(pH 2.8 and 3.2), lemon-lime soft drink (pH 3.8)
and root beer soft drink (pH 4.5)…These condi-
tions simulated typical commercial, as well as ex-
treme, storage conditions for beverages...” Since
commercial cola products frequently contain high
levels of caramels and often contain high levels of
caffeine, the absence of tests on those more real-
istic mixtures is puzzling. Using insufficiently real-
istic ‘mock beverages’ could have generated false
negatives, but JECFA did not request further stud-
ies on actual beverage formulations or more real-
istic models.
Summary
JECFA’s assessment of the risks of neotame re-
lied upon numerous implicit interpretative risk as-
sessment policies. One key assumption illustrates
an inversion of what was supposed to be happen-
ing under what is called a ‘positive list’ system.
When ‘positive list systems’ were introduced in the
1960s and 1970s, the claim was that instead of
food chemicals being assumed safe until proven
harmful, they would be assumed risky until proven
safe. JECFA’s practice, however, has implicitly
shifted to the contrary interpretative perspective.
Evidence from studies suggesting no adverse ef-
fects were taken at face value, while evidence
from studies suggesting that there might be adverse
effects were subject to a far more critical exami-
nation, to see if there might be any grounds for dis-
counting the evidence. Furthermore, several of
those decisions to discount evidence of adverse ef-
fects, were based on hypotheses for which no sup-
porting evidence was adduced.
Implicit routine toxicology risk assess-
ment policies in the UK
From the 1960s until the European Food
Safety Authority was established in 2002, the UK’s
CoT conducted scientific reviews of evidence of
risk and safety of food additives. The CoT, however,
disclosed far less than JECFA did by way of infor-
mation or interpretations. Since 2003, when the
AFC (or Panel on food additives, flavourings, pro-
cessing aids and materials in contact with food) of
the European Food Safety Authority was estab-
lished, the CoT has not conducted a detailed com-
prehensive review of any food additives. Its
food-related work has focused on contaminants
and ‘materials in contact with foods’, such as
wrapping and packaging. Since the CoT has not
recently published any assessments of the toxico-
logical risks from food additives, it is not possible
to document its contemporary practices. 
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On the other hand, since the implementation
of the FSA’s procedural guidance for scientific ad-
visory committees, the CoT (and its subcommit-
tees) has held (almost all of) its meetings in public.
At a CoT meeting held in London on 28 March
2006, and in the context of a discussion of evi-
dence indicating that a group of compounds might
exert a carcinogenic effect in human consumers, a
member of the committee said: “We [i.e. the mem-
bers of CoT] have a particular responsibility to seek
and to avoid false positives.”190 When that remark
was made, none of the other committee members
commented on, or contested; none suggested that
avoiding false negatives was equally, or at least as,
important.191
Germany
The institutional structure in Germany, and its
risk appraisal and decision-making on GM crops
and foods, is complex, opaque and problematic.
Some implicit risk assessment policy judgements
have, however, emerged from the interactions be-
tween the various institutions. Formally, only the
BfR and the BBA are designated as a ‘risk assess-
ment body’, but other institutions such as the RKI,
the BfN (for GM foods and crops) and the UBA (for
pesticides) are in effect hybrid institutions that,
amongst other things, contribute to assessing the
risks of GM crops and foods. The BVL is ostensibly
the institution responsible for risk management,
but it also conducts its own risk assessments of GM
foods and crops. The BVL does not, and never has,
provided any explicit risk assessment guidance to
risk assessors or to hybrid bodies in advance of risk
assessment; nor have ministers in the German gov-
ernment. The BVL does not see itself as empow-
ered to provide RAP guidance. 
The division of labour amongst the institu-
tions, or lack of it, is complex and heterogeneous.
Some questions are addressed and assessed by all
of the participating institutions (e.g. molecular
characterisation, compositional analysis, substan-
tial equivalence, whole food toxicity studies192),
while others such as the issue of post-release mon-
itoring are assessed by several institutions. Some
institutions discuss issues that seem conspicuously
outside the scope of their remits. For example, the
BfN sometimes comments on issues of allergenic-
ity to consumers, while the RKI comments on en-
vironmental risk issues. The BVL sees its role as
taking account of all of the possible risks on which
the other participating institutions report. Each of
the German bodies is implicitly making their own
substantive RAP decisions. 
Our interview evidence indicated that the in-
teractions amongst different federal German insti-
tutions have been vigorous, and our knowledge of
what happened is inferential, since the exchanges
have not taken place, nor been recorded in the
public domain. Protracted processes of negotiation
appear to have taken place, the results of which
only entered the public domain once agreed posi-
tions have been reached and delivered to EFSA or
DG-SANCO. Available evidence suggests that the
BVL’s view is the one that tends to prevail.
The BfN has apparently been the institution
that has interpreted the evidence and uncertainties
in particularly precautionary ways. For example,
in case of stacked events the BfN recommended
that additional tests should be conducted on the
resulting crop (including whole food toxicity tests,
full molecular characterisation and investigation
into genetic stability). The BVL, RKI and BfR, on
the other hand, did not consider any additional
tests to be necessary. With the dossiers evaluated
since 2003 in Germany, the BVL, RKI and BfR in-
terpreted the data as providing no indication of un-
intended effects. The BfN however often reported
statistical significant differences, such as marked
differences in levels of protein expression, for ex-
ample in relation to GM Maize.193
The BVL, RKI and BfR use the concept of ‘sub-
stantial equivalence’, and interpret it as providing
a framework with which to assess the nutritional
and toxicological consequences of consuming GM
food, but only the BfN interprets it as including
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190 The level of in-depth assessment might however be different.
191 2 The compositional analysis shows a substantial number of statistical differences between Mon863xMon810 and the control lines (Total
comparisons 290; 71 significant differences with Mon846; 59 significant differences with Mon863; 122 significant differences with
Mon810; 142 significant differences with commercial lines).” (BfN 2005, Notification EFSA/GMO/DE/2004/03 of the transformed appli-
cation for Mon863 x Mon810 maize feed and food products in accordance with regulation (EC) 1829/2003
192 e.g. RKI comments on 1829/2003 dossiers of Cotton 281 and MON863xNK603
193 Food Safety Commission Japan. The Concept of Safety Assessment of the Food Derived from Breeding Recombinant DNA Plants, Food
Safety Commission Decision, 29 January 2004
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agronomic, ecological and environmental aspects.
The BfN would like to see further and more exten-
sive field trials of GM crops in a wider variety of
climatic and environmental conditions than the
BNVL, RKI and BfR consider necessary. The BfN
also called for more comprehensive studies of ef-
fects on non-target organisms and more often rec-
ommends post-release monitoring than the other
institutions. The RKI has, for example taken a quite
different approach, arguing that no monitoring is
necessary provided that seed and biologically vi-
able materials will be transported in ways that en-
sure that no unintended release would occur.194 To
the extent that they set the benchmarks of accept-
ability at different levels they are implicitly mak-
ing different interpretative RAP judgements. Over
time, the BVL in its role as risk manager has dis-
counted the dissenting views of BfN when issuing
official comments to EFSA or the Commission. 
Japan
An example of implicit RAP in Japan can be
found in the discussion about the possibility of
synergetic effects of two proteins produced by
inserted genes of maize DAS-59122-7 (see Sec.
4.3), which were recorded in the minutes of
ECGMF meetings. It illustrates the case where an
encounter with unanticipated phenomenon could
lead to revealing underlying assumptions of risk
assessment. In this case, the hidden assumption is
that there is no possibility of interaction between
proteins produced by inserted genes in cross-bred
varieties (strains with stacked genes) made of a
combination of insect-resistant and/or herbicide-
tolerant GM crops. Based on this premise, the risk
assessment of that type of strains is exempted in
the guidance document.195 However, the case of
DAS-59122-7 cast a doubt on this assumption;
although that maize itself was not a stacked genes
strain: namely if the synergetic effects of proteins
are not specific to a particular combination of
Cry34Ab1 and Cry35Ab1, it implies the possibility
that such interaction could take place in various
strains with stacked genes. While this possibility
was finally denied by a new plausible explanation
of the phenomena, the case brought a hidden
assumption to the light.
More generally, as mentioned in Section 4.3,
meeting minutes of relevant committees show that
Japanese risk assessors of GM foods and crops
share implicit conventions on how to address
uncertainties. In principle, they have tried to
resolve all significant uncertainties and to reach
unanimous, clear-cut conclusion about safety of
GM foods or crops.
Argentina
In Argentina, numerous GM crops have been
deemed acceptable. However, CONABIA rejected
an application for a variety of GM oil seed rape
(canola) in 1997 on environmental grounds. It was
not satisfied that it did not pose a significant risk of
gene flow and out-crossing with wild relatives.
That decision indicates at least two risk assessment
policy assumptions, one concerning the scope of
the assessment, and another concerning the
amount of data sufficient to sustain a recommen-
dation not to approve a proposed GM plant vari-
ety.196
Most aspects of the procedure in Argentina re-
main unclear because they are either undocu-
mented or because none of the documents has
entered the public domain. Risk assessments are
not published or made publicly available. What
emerges in public is prescriptive advice to minis-
ters from a hybrid committee of scientists, indus-
trial representatives and civil servants, but no
detailed assessment of possible risks is published.
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194 Interviewees also confirmed that effects of Bt crops on both insect-resistance of target species and on non-target organisms are also in-
cluded in the scope of assessments, but their exact scope remains unclear
195 op cit page 112 paras 34-36
196 www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf 
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How does the organisation and conduct of
risk assessments compare to the Codex guid-
ance, and such domestic guidance as has
been articulated?
Codex
The Codex Procedural Manual requires all its
subsidiary risk management committees (e.g.
CCFAC, CCPR and CCRVDF) to provide their risk
assessment bodies (JECFA and JMPR) with risk as-
sessment policy guidelines. Moreover, those guide-
lines: “…should be established by risk managers in
advance of risk assessment, in consultation with risk
assessors and all other interested parties.” The doc-
ument entitled Risk Analysis Principles Applied by
The Codex Committee on Food Additives and Con-
taminants is as close as CCFAC comes to complying
with that requirement, but the degree of compliance
is partial and fragmentary. The corresponding draft
documents from CCPR and CCRVDF, if adopted,
would be even less compliant with the require-
ments of the Codex Procedural Manual.
CCFAC’s Risk Analysis Principles represents a
retreat from the text and spirit of the Codex re-
quirement, and emerged as a compromise with
JECFA. The document was not ‘…established by
risk managers…in consultation with risk assessors
and all other interested parties.’ It was established
following lengthy and relatively opaque exchanges
between CCFAC and its secretariat, and with
JECFA and its secretariat. There is no indication
that ‘all other interested parties’ were able to en-
gage in the process, or even know about it.
CCFAC’s Risk Analysis Principles is in effect a
‘peace treaty’ between CCFAC and JECFA. They
were able to agree to this text primarily because of
its orthodoxy, and its avoidance of acknowledging
that risk assessments are framed by some prior up-
stream risk management RAP assumptions. In Feb-
ruary 2004, in the context of a disgruntled
response to CCRVDF, JECFA insisted that: “The de-
velopment of risk assessment guidelines is an in-
herent part of the corresponding scientific work
which needs to be accomplished by risk asses-
sors.” (emphases added) CCFAC’s Risk Analysis
Principles does not state explicitly that the devel-
opment of risk assessment guidelines will be ac-
complished by JECFA and by JECFA alone, but it
included no suggestion that CCFAC could or
should provide JECFA with such guidelines nor
does it include any substantive or interpretative
risk assessment guidelines. 
It does, however, include a few procedural
risk assessment policy provisions. JECFA is en-
joined to: “…communicate to CCFAC the magni-
tude and source of uncertainties in its risk
assessments. When communicating this informa-
tion, JECFA should provide CCFAC with a descrip-
tion of the methodology and procedures by which
JECFA estimated any uncertainty in its risk assess-
ment…JECFA should communicate to CCFAC the
basis for all assumptions used in its risk assess-
ments including default assumptions used to ac-
count for uncertainties…JECFA’s risk assessment
output to CCFAC is limited to presenting its delib-
erations and the conclusions…in a complete and
transparent manner.”197 (emphases added)
Traditionally, JECFA was not instructed to
draw attention to the existence, magnitude and sig-
nificance of scientific uncertainties, to be explicit
about its assumptions (let alone about any or all of
them) or to present its deliberations completely
and transparently. Implementing that procedural
RAP guidance would represent a radical change of
practice. JECFA continues to report only few un-
certainties, and unevenly and inconsistently and
in a relatively unprecautionary fashion, while nu-
merous assumptions remain unacknowledged. In
the context of a discussion about JECFA’s com-
ments on the genotoxic carcinogenic contaminant
acrylamide, a JECFA member said: “JECFA is, in re-
ality, not allowed to say ‘we don’t know and we
cannot assess the risks’ because that would be un-
acceptable to risk managers at CCFAC.” This sug-
7. Implementation of Codex and national guidelines
197 e.g. Decision 2002/811/EC
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gests that, in practice, JECFA has historically been
under pressure to understate uncertainties, rather
than to be entirely explicit, let alone exhaustively
explicit, about the limitations and imprecision of
the available scientific evidence. 
The CCFAC text portrays JECFA as conducting
scientific risk assessments within a policy-free
zone, and CCFAC as making down-stream risk
management policy judgements; any acknowledg-
ment that up-stream policy judgements inform sci-
entific risk assessments was in effect deleted. With
the exception of a few, but important, procedural
RAP provisions, the remainder of the document
represents a retreat, as far as possible, from a trans-
parent model (as in Figure 3, on p. 15) to a deci-
sionist Red Book model (as in Figure 2, on p. 14).
The CCFAC document is an attempted reinstate-
ment of the supposed status quo ante. That text
was, moreover, the product of a substantially
opaque process, involving a small fraction of those
with relevant interests. Consequently, not even
CCFAC, or CCPR/CCRVDF, has followed the pro-
cedure stipulated for them in the Codex Procedural
Manual. Instead, they have contrived to veer away
from full and proper implementation, and made a
bid for reinstating the status quo ante. 
USA
The contrast between the USA and the global
institutions is quite striking. Accountability to Con-
gress and the Courts, along with the implications
extensive legislation, compels risk managers in the
US Federal government to articulate at least some
of the risk assessment policy parameters that guide
substantive, procedural and interpretative aspects
of risk assessment. Furthermore, the accountability
to Congress and the Courts compels risk assessors
to appear to comply with the explicit RAP guid-
ance that risk managers have issued. Risk man-
agers in the Executive Branch have established
some RAP guidance and some has been embodied
in Congressional legislation.
Procedurally, risk assessors are highly selective
about which issues are emphasised for public con-
sultation, and which are left in the background. Of-
ficial documents take account of uncertainties in im-
plicit ways but rarely expound on uncertainties per
se. Risk assessment policies have evolved markedly
over the past 30 years. In the 1970s they were often
more precautionary that those in Europe, but since
the BSE crisis of the late 1990s that contrast has re-
versed. Currently, US agencies are required to pro-
vide quantitative ‘scientific’ justifications of any
further tightening of regulations; while the require-
ments for deregulation or decisions not to restrict
some product or ingredient are less exacting. 
In March 2006 the US Federal government’s
Office of Management and Budget issued a Pro-
posed Risk Assessment Bulletin.198 Interpretations
of what the OMB calls ‘new technical guidance on
risk assessments’ is contested, but to a substantial
extent it sought to formalise prevailing practices.
The OMB proposes that all risk assessment bodies
should be obliged to acknowledge all the uncer-
tainties, while also quantifying the extent of those
uncertainties; in practice, US risk assessors tend to
focus on quantifiable rather than unquantifiable
uncertainties.
Since risk assessors often deal with issues that
go beyond those formally set out in the official
guidance documents, some RAP decisions have
been taken by risk assessors rather than by risk
managers. Official US RAP guidance has often ret-
rospectively codified existing practices, rather than
prospectively setting benchmarks for judging is-
sues that had not previously been settled, although
the OMB’s emphasis on quantification of uncer-
tainties constitutes an attempt explicitly to set a
new benchmark.
UK
In the UK, prior to the creation of the Food
Standard Agency, the only domestic risk assessment
policy concerning food safety was provided by De-
partment of Health/Committee on Toxicity data re-
quirements documents. They indicated which kinds
of data would be required, and approximately how
much of those kinds of data would be necessary. In
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198 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). Standard Operating Pro-
cedure of Risk Management for Food Safety in MHLW and MAFF, 25 August 2005. To implement this procedure, MAFF created the
Investigation Committee for Risk Management (ICRM) as a private advisory body to the Director-General of the Food Safety and Consumers
Bureau (FSCAB) of MAFF, whose membership comprises representatives of consumer unions and food industries, and the Food Safety Risk
Management Support Team comprising the officials of FSCAB.
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the UK, food safety risk appraisal and decision-mak-
ing is organised in technological sectors, and sepa-
rate administrative divisions, while separate expert
committees deal with food additives, pesticides,
GM foods and crops. In each sector, the risk asses-
sors have some limited substantive RAP guidance;
the Committee on Toxicity is evidently expected to
consider toxicological issues. Similarly, ACRE is ex-
pected to consider risks to the environment of the
release of GM crops and the ACNFP considers pos-
sible adverse effects on consumers from ingesting
GM foods. Substantive RAP guidance is however
vague, and defines only core issues not peripheral
ones or the location of boundaries. The CoT and the
ACNFP decide for themselves when and how far
they consider issues of allergenicity and other types
of acute intolerance. 
Prior to the late-1990s, the UK system was
more like the CODEX-JECFA system than it was
like that in the USA. The Food Standards Agency,
along with the government’s Chief Scientist, has,
in the aftermath of the BSE crises, issued some ex-
plicit procedural guidance. When the FSA devel-
oped that procedural RAP guidance it acted in a
relatively transparent and inclusive manner, en-
abling a wider range of stakeholders to participate
than had ever previously been the case in UK food
policy-making. When the government Chief Sci-
entist, and the Office of Science and Technology,
developed its procedural guidance the process was
less transparent or inclusive.
On the other hand, the FSA’s procedural RAP
instructions are not being fully implemented. Risk
assessment committees are often, but not always,
meeting in public, but the public do not have full
access to all the information available to commit-
tee members. Risk assessors report some uncer-
tainties, but in uneven and inconsistent ways. They
make considerable efforts to identify and discount
potential false positives, but pay far less attention
to trying to identify, and take account of, false neg-
atives. In that respect they are interpreting data in
relatively unprecautionary ways. UK risk assessors
are not providing full audit trails to their delibera-
tions and decision-making, and they are drawing
attention to only very few of their interpretative as-
sumptions.
Germany
In Germany, in the GM field, there is not one
set of risk assessment policies, but several sets that
apply in different institutions. On the other hand,
there is very little openness, and no transparency,
and it is therefore difficult accurately to charac-
terise the RAP regimes operating in those institu-
tions. The processes by which they have been set
have not been transparent or accountable, and
there is no evidence that stakeholder groups have
been consulted. 
On generic procedural RAP, it is unclear if BfR
risk assessors are actually following the BfR formal
guidance on health assessments. Some aspects are
increasingly being followed in relation to non-
threshold toxicity; for instance with respect to the
type of risk management advice that legitimately
could be provided by risk assessors. In respect of
policy on GM foods and crops, the only explicit
RAP takes the form of an Interagency Agreement
that sets mandatory procedures in the event of
conflicting institutional advice, but it remains un-
published. It is explicit to the institutions that are
parties to the agreement, but not to German citi-
zens or stakeholder groups. 
With respect to substantive and interpretative
RAPs, given that the institutions are not remotely
transparent, nor are the exchanges amongst them,
it is hard to tell if and when EFSA and other EU
Guidance documents are being followed, and if so
which. There is some interview evidence suggest-
ing that the RKI typically refers to the EFSA Guid-
ance, while the BfN more commonly refers to the
guidance provided by the Annexes of Directive
2001/18/EC and subsequent guidance notes.199
Some commentators suggest that the BfN some-
times goes beyond the minimal requirements of
the EFSA Guidance or at least interprets it in a
more precautionary way, when compared with the
RKI, BfR and BVL. German institutions are evi-
dently not complying fully with the stipulations of
the Codex procedural manual for risk managers to
provide RAP guidance to risk assessors, and to de-
velop that guidance in transparent and consulta-
tive processes. 
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199 In fact, they distinguish two types of documents by name: guidance documents analyzed in this report is called ‘assessment guidelines
(Hyo-ka Shi-shin in Japanese)’, while the RAP is ‘assessment policy (Hyo-ka Hou-shin)’.
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Japan
Japanese risk assessors of both GM foods and
crops are provided by legislation with some sub-
stantive as well as procedural RAP guidance, but
those documents do not refer to uncertainties, nor
to how risk assessors should respond to uncertain-
ties. The only explicit exception is the stipulation
on monitoring for GM crops. In practice, however,
evidence suggests that the attitude of risk assessors
toward uncertainties is generally precautionary, al-
though reference to that concept has rarely been
explicit. Evidence also shows that risk assessors
share some implicit conventions according to
which they deal with uncertainties selectively but
consistently. Some rules are generic ones that are
shared inherently among scientists, and others
have been established as particular rules specific
to particular uncertainties through the discussion
among risk assessors, as they are faced with
those uncertainties. Additionally, the guidance
document for microbiological risk assessment of
food, a substantive as well as procedural RAP
document, provides several stipulations that
require risk assessors to conduct uncertainty
analysis and sensitivity analysis.
In relation to the drafting process of guidance
documents, compliance of Japanese risk assessors
and managers with the Codex Procedural Manual
seems ambivalent. On the one hand, Japanese
guidance documents for GM foods, which are gen-
uinely procedural and substantive RAP documents,
were mainly developed by risk assessors in the FSC.
The same applies to the risk assessment of other
types of risk, such as microbiological risk and
human health risk of antibiotic resistance resulting
from use of antimicrobial veterinary medicinal
products. In this regard, Japanese institutions are ev-
idently not complying fully with the Procedural
Manual. On the other hand, however, Japanese risk
managers are now implementing a new risk
management procedure in which establishment of
risk assessment policy is allocated to risk managers
in consultation with risk assessors and other inter-
ested parties,200 which is quite consistent with the
Codex manual. This contradiction is explained by
Japanese risk managers’ understanding of what RAP
is. In the first place, they do not recognize their
guidance documents quoted in this report as RAP
defined in the Procedural Manual. For them, RAP is
more specific guidance to be set out for each case
of appraisal and to include concrete information
regarding what risk managers aim to achieve in their
management and relevant designations to risk
assessors.201
Argentina 
The Argentinean regime represents itself, as
far as possible, in technocratic terms, with as few
references as possible to policy matters, as op-
posed to scientific ones. The only extent to which
some substantive RAP guidance has emerged,
has been in the form of general data require-
ments, particularly for GM crops and foods. It is,
however, not possible to tell whether or not that
guidance is being followed in practice, given the
lack of transparency. Consequently, the Argen-
tinean regime accords to a lesser extent with the
provisions of the Codex Procedural Manual than
any of the other systems covered in this report.
SENASA’s food biotechnology office and its tech-
nical committees are simultaneously responsible
for risk assessment policy-making, risk assess-
ments and risk management decision-making,
and the external observer is unable to discern
differentiation amongst those tasks. The process
by which risk assessment policy assumptions are
adopted or decisions taken in Argentina is en-
tirely un-transparent; some stakeholders in the
private sector participate in the deliberations and
decision-making, while all others are excluded.
Argentinean institutions are evidently not com-
plying fully with the stipulations of the Codex
procedural manual for risk managers to provide
RAP guidance to risk assessors, and to develop
that guidance in transparent and consultative
processes.
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200 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). Standard Operating Pro-
cedure of Risk Management for Food Safety in MHLW and MAFF, 25 August 2005. To implement this procedure, MAFF created the In-
vestigation Committee for Risk Management (ICRM) as a private advisory body to the Director-General of the Food Safety and Consumers
Bureau (FSCAB) of MAFF, whose membership comprises representatives of consumer unions and food industries, and the Food Safety Risk
Management Support Team comprising the officials of FSCAB.
201 In fact, they distinguish two types of documents by name: guidance documents analyzed in this report is called ‘assessment guidelines
(Hyo-ka Shi-shin in Japanese)’, while the RAP is ‘assessment policy (Hyo-ka Hou-shin)’.
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates that
there are at least three types of RAPs: substantive,
procedural and interpretative. Furthermore, those
3 sets of RAPs are individually, jointly and sever-
ally pivotal to the construction and outcomes of
scientific risk assessments. Risk assessments are
routinely portrayed as if they were purely scien-
tific; but that is always an oversimplification and
misrepresentation.
RAP issues are concerned with scientific de-
liberations about risk but they are not themselves
strictly scientific issues. They are not issues that sci-
entific considerations on their own can settle. They
are often the types of issues for which risk man-
agers, as policy-makers rather than as scientific ex-
perts, could and should be taking responsibility. 
Often, perhaps too often, RAP issues are
being decided by risk assessors, pretending to sci-
entific purity and policy neutrality. But those deci-
sions can not be decided purely scientifically.
Those issues are too often being decided in unac-
countable ways.
Nonetheless, in all of the jurisdictions and in-
stitutional settings covered by this study, some
RAPs have been set by risk managers, but that has
not occurred consistently. There is little consis-
tency within jurisdictions across risk categories or
within risk categories across the justifications.
Often RAP issues are being decided in ways that
are not in accordance with the provisions of either
the Codex Procedural Manual or domestic na-
tional policy guidance.
If the spirit and the letter of the Codex RAPs
guidance were to be followed both by Codex and
the national jurisdictions, then food safety policy-
making would be conducted in more open and ac-
countable ways. One consequence might be
higher levels, and more wide-spread patterns, of
domestic support. Another consequence might be,
either fewer international trade disputes, or at any
rate the conditions under which disputes could be
resolved would be more readily appreciated.
8. Conclusion
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